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Abstract
Bjorn K. Wold and Julia Grave
Poverty Alleviation Policy, Pursuing Equity and Efficiency
Reports 99/20 • - Statistics Norway and Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 1999
The overall objective of this report is to contribute to the provision of tools for policy makers and others alike who
work or consider to work to mitigate and alleviate poverty and to ensure the utilization of the poor as the important
resource they are. The report has used the definition of poverty applied by Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (INE) in
urban areas and an estimate of 61 per cent of the urban population being poor (moderate poor or extreme poor).
Unfortunately, due to lack of data, it is not possible to apply this poverty line in rural areas. Hence in rural areas we
have applied a poverty line based upon the minimum calories recommended by United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO). We have then combined this requirement with the common non-food consumption share in
Angola. With this approach, 40 per cent are poor in urban areas and 78 per cent in rural areas. Data for rural areas
do not allow for the same analysis of causes behind poverty and the impact of being poor and hence the main focus
is on urban areas in this report.
The report analyzes why people are poor in urban areas and whether the informal sector really can be the way out
for all poor people or rather just a dead end way out. Strong emphasis is also given to analyze how the poor manage
to get the social service they need and want and shows how poverty penetrates all social sectors. Very high school
repetition ratios, non-affordable health service and expensive private water-supply is the bleak situation of the poor
urban Angola household. Food security is as you might expect closely linked to poverty.
Wars and economic crises have always forces women into paid labor. But in Angola the crisis became permanent
and women remained in the labor force. Still, women have continued to collect water and do household chores. This
way women have doubled there work load. Such a development put gender equity on the public agenda in other
countries ranging from many Western countries to neighbor countries as South-Africa and Zimbabwe, but strangely
enough yet not in Angola.
Several policy conclusions are presented addressing four policy issues: a) How to give the urban poor a chance to
enter and remain in the labor force, with a special focus on women. b) Rural / urban issues addressing how to create
motivation for the rural population to remain in their areas of living and increase their production for sale and hence
their income. c) How to approach social service shortcomings. d) How to design subsidies in a poverty and food
security perspective.
Languages: This report will also be available in Portuguesh.
Keywords: Africa, Angola, Education, Food Security, Health Service, Informal Sector, Poverty, Rural Areas, Subsidies,
Urban Areas, Water supply.
Acknowledgement: The study was financed by United Nations Development Program, Luanda, Angola.
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Preface
This report is prepared by Bjorn K. Wold, Statistics Norway and Maria Julia Grave, Instituto Nacional de
Estatistica. The study is another step in the work on poverty and living conditions carried out over several years
and presented in both published and unpublished work by the Gabinete de Monitarizacåo das Condicoes de Vida
da Populas åo (GMCVP) in Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (INE) . The main data sources for these reports are a
series of surveys carried out by INE on poverty and living conditions. The main data source for the current report
is a survey carried out in the first half of 1995 in urban areas in five provinces of Angola (GMCVP 1996) . The
urban data were supplemented by a survey carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture (Departamento de Estatistica
e de Informåtica 1997) in the second half of 1996 in the rural areas in nine partly overlapping provinces of
Angola.
The study was initiated by the previous head of INE, Mario Albeita de Sousa and Isabel Emerson and Alexander
Abogye from UNDP in Luanda. The statistical analysis was undertaken by Wold. The report was drafted by Wold
based upon this analysis and unpublished work by Grave. The draft report was then reviewed, revised and
finalized by Wold and Grave. The authors received valuable comments and inputs from a team comprising
Gilberto Ribeiro, Camilo Ceita and Zatando Mbiki from GMCVP and INE. Any shortcomings of the final report is
however the sole responsibility of the two authors.
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Summary
The overall objective of this report is to contribute to
the provision of tools for policy makers and others
alike who work or consider to work to mitigate and
alleviate poverty and to ensure the utilization of the
poor as the important resource they are. This provision
will include the following elements:
• Presenting factual information concerning living
conditions of the poor;
• Documenting the effects for the poor versus the
better off of public policy across sectors;
• Analyzing how public policy might be adjusted or
changed in order to increase efficiency and equity
in provision of public service to poor and better off
alike;
• Analyzing how public policy might be adjusted or
changed in order to assist the poor in utilizing their
own resources to grow out of poverty;
• Analyzing how public policy might be adjusted or
changed in order to serve both genders considering
the bearing of gender; and
• Based upon the findings from the analysis,
suggesting possible adapted policy changes for
consideration, assuming these to serve as examples
for further work on policy implementation design
rather than a final detailed policy list.
Three features set the Angolan economy apart from the
average one:
• the natural resource economy based upon oil and
diamond resources,
• the long lasting civil war with so far deceiving
peace agreements, and
• the special mix of regulated and free market
economy.
While none of these features are unique to Angola,
they definitely create a specific set of conditions for all
economic and social life. Forced migration and block-
ing transport-ways between rural and urban areas form
important elements for the social and economic con-
text of poverty.
The main approach of the report is sector-wise, with a
final chapter trying to integrate the different sectors
while presenting a more comprehensive set of policy
recommendations. The outline of each chapter includes
the following steps:
• a descriptive documentation,
• direct efficiency issues — trying to identify win-win
situations where policy reform might save public
resources and increase economic performance,
• indirect efficiency (and equity) issues — to identify
constraints for poor people, and
• equity (and indirect efficiency) issues — to identify
constraints for poor people utilizing public service.
Poverty profiles and productive sectors
The report goes straight to the key question, why are
people poor. The simple answer is that they have few
resources and find it difficult to utilize their main
resource, their own labor, in an efficient manner. The
more detailed answer is that households where the
male and/or female heads'. have some education and
employment are less likely to be poor. There is how-
ever a strong gender dimension here. It is whether the
female head is employed that really matters. While
there is a positive effect of education for both sexes,
the effect of high education for the female head is
clearly more important. This is partly a reflection of a
situation where more or less all male heads work, but
this is not the full explanation.
Three policy recommendations with different aims are
given, as follows:
• In the short run the main recommendation to
reduce poverty is to provide employment for the
female head either directly or making it possible for
her such as by providing day care for children,
providing access to water close to the house etc.
• The main recommendation to reduce poverty in the
long run is to ensure access to education especially
for the girls.
• The main recommendation to mitigate poverty is to
provide food subsidies through a cross-subsidization
'. We have used the terms male and female head in a manner which
allows for both a male and a female head in a household. If a male
head is married, his wife will be considered female head and vice
versa.
9
Poverty Alleviation Policy 	 Reports 99/20
scheme taxing a luxury good and subsidizing an
inferior good.
The analysis of the urban informal sector not only con-
firmed the existence of a large small and petty trading
sector, but showed that this sector rather replaced than
added to the more standard production segments of
the informal sector. The big advantage is that this
informal trading sector creates opportunities for all. 9
of 16 are employed in the informal sector and 7 of
these 9 are working in informal commerce. Women
and young people are dominating, but you find all ages
and both genders well represented. The profile of
employees is different within informal production. This
is dominated by men and often men with quite some
experience. In addition you find an interesting sector
of informal professional work dominated by young
people with education and older ones with only low
education.
One could have expected that informal sector work
was really the sector of last resort with low pay across
the sub-sectors. But this is not the case, in fact salaries
are higher in informal commerce. We should add that
this is salary per day or week and not per hour. But
even if we may assume that people have to work long
hours for their pay in informal commerce, it is still
remarkable with a fair pay in this sector. This really
means that some of the profit trickles down even to
this level. In the short term this is only positive. It gives
the usually marginal groups, women and young ones a
chance to earn a living.
Unfortunately the current economic situation is not
very sound and it may well change one day. Then the
informal commerce sector is deemed to shrink and
people in informal commerce will be in big trouble.
Unless they manage to adapt to a new situation the
young ones risk becoming the lost generation and
older women might face either reduced income or
being squeezed out of business. Hence the policy
recommendations are twofold: 1. Prepare people for
the changes by providing training with an emphasis on
apprenticeship but also vocational training and 2.
Change the policy regime in a stepwise manner.
The urban poverty survey from 1995 does not include
rural areas and we have supplemented it with a rural
survey conducted in 1996. Since we lack information
on the price level across the country we were not able
to inflate the urban poverty line from 1995 to fit rural
areas in 1996. Hence it was necessary to calculate two
new poverty lines using a common approach. The
absolute poverty line approach allows for this and that
has been applied in both rural and urban areas. This
absolute poverty line accepts the given food and non-
food pattern in each of rural and urban areas. We then
recalculated the expenses needed to provide a
consumption that gives food calories according to the
FAO recommendation being 2100 kcal per adult
equivalent per day.
Based upon this approach we find an overwhelming
poverty in rural areas where 78 per cent are moderate
poor or extreme poor while 40 per cent are moderate
poor or extreme poor in urban areas. While the main
impression is one of widespread poverty in rural areas,
the analysis shows that it increases even further if the
head is old or if the male head does not have education
and is reduced if the female head has employment or
business outside the crop farm. The main conclusion is
however that a large share of the rural population is
isolated and not able to sell any produce for a fair
price. In order to integrate rural areas it is essential to
improve infrastructure and transport means allowing
farmers some options for selling their produce and
buying consumer goods, inputs and equipment. While
private traders will continue to work in the close
hinterland of cities and other markets, a public pro-
gram such as a Strategic food reserve program is
needed for remote and less central areas. A strategic
food program will have a two-sided effect:
• marketing opportunities are serving as an incentive
to the rural population, an incentive that might
even improve the transition to a peaceful situation
in the future, and
• such a reserve means that the Government and
donors are better prepared when future emergency
situations develop.
Social sectors
We have already identified that education has a large
impact on poverty reduction and it is essential to give
both poor and better off, girls and boys alike access to
education. The data analysis gives two distinct
findings:
• the repetition ratio is very high and creates a large
extra burden on the system and
• the main factor behind low enrollment is poverty,
but this varies over age with very low enrollment
rates among the very young and old and closer to
average enrollment rates in the core age groups.
The analysis also shows that these findings are highly
linked. The extreme poor and moderate poor are more
likely to repeat classes than the better off and hence
taking poverty along for the next generation. The real
task is to break this circle. A comprehensive approach
is needed and should include:
• Donor assistance is required to provide additional
resources for a limited period,
• A school fee program with local control and local
spending is to be introduced,
• A school fee exemption program should encourage
early start and a maximum of one repetition.
• A fellowship program for extreme poor non-
repetitors 10 years and above should be introduced
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• When donor support is phased out, the school fees
should fully cover the extra costs of repetition and
pay for the fellowship program of the extreme poor.
While the poor at least manage to arrange for some
years of education, they have considerable larger
problems to afford health service. In some areas only
people who can afford to travel or pay for private
service have access to health service. But for the poor
the situation is worse, even if there is health service
available, they can not afford it. Hence they often end
up giving their own diagnosis and buy drugs for
example at the local market. In many cases the
situation is even worse. A large share of poor and
extreme poor people do not even buy drugs for
malaria. In some cases this may reflect that these drugs
are not available in the market, but usually they will be
available at a high price which is too expensive for the
moderate poor and extreme poor. We can summarize
the problem as follows:
• an overall lack of access especially in Mexico,
• no ability to pay for health service and drugs among
the extreme poor, and
• a system of gasosas which hardly increase the
overall health service available but rather reshuffles
the line making it even harder for the extreme poor
to get a consultation and treatment.
The solution seems to require an expanded two-tier
system, trying to develop both the public and the
private health service.
The main obstacle to develop a functioning two-tier
system is the massive use of gasosas. Rather than
trying to control or even combat this system, it is
recommended that the Government establish a legal
way to develop a two-tier system within the public
health service. In order to reduce the need for control
the Government should consider negotiating a deal
with one or more doctor associations and one or more
nurse and mid-wife associations.
The survey itself documents a not uncommon situation
where the poor have the lowest water quality, treat the
water less frequent than poor and better off and end
up being substantially more exposed to diseases. But
the survey also documents that this circle has moved a
step further especially but not only in Luanda and
created a system with private entrepreneur water lords
running a retail water business, putting a quite large
financial burden on the poor. This has two vicious
effects on the moderate poor and extreme poor. First,
high prices mean low water consumption among the
extreme poor and hence they become even more
dependent on the water quality, more affected by low
water quality and more exposed to diseases. Second,
the waterlords not only have no incentives to improve
the situation; they are even said to be trying to stop
public pipelines to be extended to public taps in new
squatter areas.
The current situation is however a potential win-win
situation for the years to come. The challenge is to
design programs where donors will support the
extension and rehabilitation of public water pipes and
the Government will tender the work to water supply
entrepreneurs inviting entrepreneurs currently running
water trucks and others to present bids. Running and
maintenance of taps and wells should also be tendered
to local entrepreneurs. Previous waterlords and others
should be invited to present bids. Community or bairo
water committees should monitor the situation, partici-
pate when the tenders are up for renewal and be given
the right to put in a veto if they are not satisfied with a
bidder.
The energy situation is more standard. The better off
people are, to a larger degree they buy subsidized
energy carriers than the extreme poor. There are no
reasons what so ever for the Government to subsidize
energy supply. These have been and will remain
subsidies favoring the better off.
It is well documented that during crises, women move
in as breadwinners. After a short crisis they might then
return to their homes, but there are no short-term crisis
in Luanda. The situation has long ago settled as
permanent. Women are breadwinners on equal footing
with men. But still we see that they also continue to
bear the burden of household chores only assisted by
the children, this is the real bearing of gender.
While the survey information on time use is limited it
documents clearly than also in cities of Angola, women
have moved into the bread winner group while men
have not started to do households chores to the same
extent. The old fashioned statement that division of
labor in families is a private matter, should be confron-
ted openly by two strategies:
• Public campaigns to tell the population that men
are not doing their share of the total work burden
and that it is due time for them to start doing
household chores.
• Government support to provisions to reduce the
work load for women such as:
• a second review of gender impact when intro-
ducing new Government policies;
• an improved water supply, reducing the time
needed to walk long distances; and
• arranging for extra child care such as kinder-
gartens etc.
Food security is as you might expect closely linked to
poverty. 1 of 10 better off families do not get enough
food to ensure the FAO recommendation of a mini-
mum of 2100 kcal per day per adult equivalent. But 4
of 10 moderate poor families and 9-10 of 10 extreme
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poor families fall below the same minimum calorie
line. Differences across provinces and gender of the
head of household are small, but the share of low
calorie intake households almost doubles when moving
from households with a young head to one with an old
head.
There is however also an important gender effect.
While education for both the female and the male head
reduced poverty, only education of the female head
reduces the number with a too low calorie intake,
higher education of the male head in fact reduces the
calorie intake. This finding supports the hypothesis
that the bargain power of the female head ensures that
a higher share of the spending are used for food
providing calories.
Three policy conclusions are drawn:
• food security in a gender perspective: to improve food
security women should be encouraged and assisted
both to increase their human resources as education
and experience from paid work;
• ensure equal access and enrollment in
school for girls and boys;
• reduce existing barriers for women to
enter public and private formal sector
work
• a gender conscious food security policy: public
campaigns for gender equity in sharing household
chores and public efforts to reduce the workload.
• cross-subsidising food items: to mitigate effects of
poverty, the Government should consider utilizing
the different consumption pattern to redistribute
money from the better off to the poor by cross-
subsidizing food items.
Final policy recommendations
In the final chapter the policy recommendations are
presented as comprising four categories:
• Rural / urban
• Subsidies in a poverty and food security perspective
• Get people to work
• Social sectors
Rural / urban policy recommendations are split
between those that should be implemented in secure
areas only and recommendations for less secure areas.
In a stable situation it would be a win-win policy to
improve crop market efficiency. A standard
recommendation to be considered would include as
follows:
• for the Government to improve transport infra-
structure especially feeder roads but also main
roads and railways.
• for the Government to provide a framework to
encourage production for sale, marketing and
trading; spreading price information (produce and
transport) by radio, to support provision of credit
packages to farmers by private firms and NGOs, to
support a stable marketing environment by offering
a (low) floor price at provincial level by a
marketing agency (rather contracted to private
traders or NGOs than run by a public agency),
provision of credit packages to farmers by private
firms and NGOs, to provide credit to traders, to
support construction of storage, and to provide
extension service.
In insecure areas two elements should be considered:
• for the Government and donors to improve
infrastructure and provide the framework in the
surrounding secure areas, and
• for the Government and donors to support private
traders and NGOs who are trading in less secure
areas, including buying crops, selling inputs,
equipment and even consumer goods, and pro-
viding inputs and equipment on credit terms.
Support could be given as credit or by commission-
ing traders to buy produce and transport it to public
depots.
The issue of subsidies is considered in both a poverty
and a food security perspective and self-targeting
(cross-) subsidies are recommended. Three luxury
goods, meat, sugar and drinks are identified. Alcoholic
drinks and soft drinks are prime candidates for being
taxed. One inferior good, maize meallie meal, is
identified. Further data collection linked to the
planned 1999/2000 Consumption and expenditure
survey to identify a grain/ meallie meal of maize,
cassava, millet or sorghum in each large city in the
scheme is needed in order to identify an inferior good
for each city.
It is stressed that only urban areas provide the stable
structure to allow for cross-subsidies. Even here, the
size should be kept a reasonable level to avoid too
large leakage. It is also discussed how the idea of
subsidizing inferior goods might create some political
resistance just because the good is ...., yes, inferior.
Currently the informal sector is an underemployment
buffer that gives opportunities even for groups that
often are marginalized as women and the young ones.
It is however recommended planning for the future
and the following recommendations are presented for
urban areas:
• Prepare people for the changes by providing
training, with a main focus on apprenticeship but
also vocational training.
• Change the policy regime in a step-wise manner.
• Reduce existing barriers for women to enter public
and private formal sector work
• Public campaigns for gender equity in sharing
household chores and public efforts to reduce the
workload of household chores e.g. collection of
water.
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As already stated, a comprehensive analysis of rural
areas is outside the scope of this study. The very low
and very fluctuating crop prices combined with the
high degree of poverty point however to the need to
strengthen the link between rural and urban areas.
This approach do not require an end of civil war and
unrest and will serve as both a short and long term
incentive for rural people to remain in their villages
rather than moving to Luanda and other cities. Such a
program should comprise the following main element:
• the main element will be to build a strategic food
reserve by a program to buy staple food that store
well (e.g. maize and millet) to be operational both
in surplus and normal years.
Such a program should be coordinated by the
Government with assistance from main donors both
emergency relief donors as the WFP and the UNHCR
and the longer term development donors such us
UNDP and UNICEF. The operations as such would gain
from being decentralized to public authorities and a
series of donors.
Policy recommendations within the social sectors are
usually implemented sector-wise but the effects should
be considered simultaneously. The overall situation is
that the poor families to a large degree still manage to
send their children to school, but are hardly able to pay
for health consultation and rely on self-diagnosis and
buying the necessary drugs. Water supply is clearly a
public disaster and is to a very large extent handled by
waterlords who are well paid for their service. In fact
the water supply is so lucrative that there are anec-
dotal stories about the waterlords using any means to
make sure new squatter areas are not supplied with
public water taps. Whether true or not, the water
market is overdue for changes.
In this situation, the water supply is a prime candidate
for a win-win solution making sure to involve the
current waterlords but only as well controlled local
operators. The education sector is also a candidate for
a win-win policy change but here improved efficiency
is more openly linked to the equity objective of provid-
ing education opportunities for all. The education
policy should start by improving school and education
quality based upon a combination on donor support
and locally controlled school/PTA funds, second,
reduce repetition, third, hence reduce number of
children in each class and fourth, either improve the
quality, reduce the payment through locally controlled
school/PTA funds, or providing scholarships to the
extreme poor children with scholastic achievements
(limited to such as 5 per cent in a given class) .
The health sector is worse off. We know from other
developing countries that the poor are willing to pay
for health service if it is relatively cheap and gives
value for money, but poor and especially the extreme
poor in urban areas in Angola can hardly afford to pay
for any consultation. There is hardly any win-win
policy which will also provide access for all. Unless the
Government is willing and able to increase resources
considerably, it is rather recommended to face the
situation and open up for a combined privatized/
public scheme. In these schemes health personnel
should be allowed to work in both sectors rather than
continue with charging gasosas or leaving the public
service all together.
The report includes a technical appendix on the
construction of poverty lines.
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1. Introduction, objective and approach
The overall objective of this report is to contribute
towards a poverty mitigation and alleviation policy
which is efficient in the short run and can be main-
tained in the long run by a) documenting facts which
what might be known to some but hardly widely
acknowledged and b) providing new knowledge. Both
actions have the potential to push an enhanced
consideration of policy reform that might serve the
benefit of the poor households, families and
individuals in Angola.
1.1. A report to initiate policy discussions
This report is presented as a report to initiate policy
discussions with line ministries and other stakeholders
rather than claiming to present final policy. Some
might argue the need to start such a process by open
discussions with line ministries and other stakeholders.
But this is a chicken and egg discussion. By experience
you first have to present some information and
suggestion for policy consideration before you can
expect to receive some feedback. This is exactly the
aim of this report.
1.2. A focus on policy issues rather than policy
design
It should be stressed that the strength of this report is
supposed to be the ability to document emerging
knowledge, reject false myths and present some new
findings in order to identify potential policy issues. The
report takes even the first step further by presenting
some preliminary ideas for policy design. These are
however only intended to indicate one possible option
among others, rather to show that the policy issues
raised really already at this stage allow for improved
policy design.
1.3. A twofold or rather threefold economy
The Angola economy is a network of three layers; the
off-shore US dollar based oil-production and the
diamond exploration in UNITA controlled areas, the
domestic rural and urban economy comprising a
formal sector based upon a combination of official
currency rate and the parallel currency rate, and an
informal sector totally based upon a parallel currency
rate. These layers create an exceptional, unpredictable
and volatile economic environment where access to a
proper network and knowledge is essential for playing
at equal footing. The oil sector in general and Sonan-
gol in special are running their own sub-economy or in
fact even sub-society with a range of social and
economic service provided for the employees and their
families. The large discrepancy between the official
and parallel market exchange rates, currently (end-
1998) doubling the rates, provides a de facto subsidy
of around 100 per cent to importers gaining access to
currency quotas at official rate. Neither of these two
sources is open for traditional public policy design, but
through trickle down or not trickling down, have wide
and deep implications not only for current economic
transactions, but for the economic structure as such.
The effects of the civil war are not only disastrous for
the human beings directly affected by fighting activi-
ties, evacuation and forced migration, but through
blocking transport and distribution in substantially
larger parts of the country.
While we are not addressing these issues directly, they
inevitably turn up while discussing other issues.
1.4. Poverty
Poverty is a monster with many heads. Whether in
peace or war, it is caused by natural and man-made
environment being ecological conditions, demographic
structures, physical infrastructure, and social and
economic organization of the society at all levels from
the household and community to the national and
international levels. Poverty is a question of means and
resources, opportunities and constraints but also about
how the human end goals are achieved, how the level
of living is perceived and the overall quality of life.
While fully realizing that the poverty monster might
need an attack from many angels, the focus is on how
public resources might be allocated to ensure equity
and efficiency in poverty alleviation. Hence this report
aims to contribute to an understanding of how public
resources might be allocated in order to work towards
the common objective of combating poverty.
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The approach will be a sector-wise, using data from
two central household surveys, the Inquerito Pobreza 2
in urban areas the Inquerito aos Agregados Rurais 3 in
rural areas, to analyze the situation in a series of
sectors, aiming as follows:
• Descriptive — to identify and describe the poor and
their situation;
• Direct efficiency — to identify a potential win-win
situation where a policy reform might a) directly
save public resources or b) increase overall
economic performance;
• Indirect efficiency and equity — to identify the main
constraints of the poor people for fully utilizing
their economic potential; and
• Equity and indirect efficiency — to identify the main
constraints of the poor for being able to utilize
public service.
The study includes a review of the series of reports
from the Luanda 1990 Household Budget and
Nutrition Survey4 . It is outside the scope to include a
general analysis of changes during this period but we
have included references to these reports in the
introduction to a number of the chapters.
2 Refer to Gabinete de Monitarizacåo das Condicoes de Vida da
Populacåo/ GMCVP (1996) .
3 Refer to Departamento de Estatistica e de Informåtica (1997).
4 Refer to seven reports: Aguilar (1992), Bender & Hunt
(1991a,b,c,d), Devereux & Hunt (1991), and Hunt (1991).
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2. Poverty, expenditures and subsidies
In this chapter, we will present an overview of in
which provinces and among which social groups you
find more poor people than among other groups. We
will also address the consumption pattern of poor
versus non-poor people. This will help us understand
more about how the poor people manage. It will also
allow for a discussion on whether the current subsidy
package reach the poor ones, and as an advise to a
Government who wants to reach the poor with the
least leakage to better off people, where to put direct
or indirect subsidies.
Similar studies in other countries such as Zambia
(Central Statistical Office 1994 and 1998) and
Zimbabwe (Social Development Fund 1997) have
shown that the poor are loosing at two fronts. First,
they have to allocate a larger share of their overall
expenditures to basic needs, which always comprises a
large share for food but often also other expensive
necessities as charcoal. With a large share for such
basic necessities they are of course very vulnerable for
changes in supply and price of these commodities.
Second, the poor usually do not have access to
individual infrastructure as piped water and electric
power supply. Such basic infrastructure at the
household level is often directly subsidized and even
when the subsidies have been removed they are
charged for operating costs only and pay nothing for
the installation costs. Hence this infrastructure is really
an asset and how it is spread among the poor and
better off will be addressed in chapter 7. In this
chapter we will rather look at the other side of the
coin, paying for the more expensive alternatives, such
as tank water and expensive energy.
2.1. Definition and measurement of poverty
As already mentioned, poverty is a multidimensional
concept. It was originally used to describe a lack of
resources, being monetary, material or even immaterial
resources. Today it is not only used to describe a lack
of resources, but even a slow development process and
poor results of the process as well. For policy planning
it is however important to focus on resources, the
process and the final result step by step and in this
report the focus will be on poverty defined as the lack
of income measured by total consumption in cash and
kind. We will then take one step backwards, trying to
understand why some people are poor and one step
forward to address the effects of being poor.
We will measure poverty as described in Perfil da
Pobreza em Angola (GMCVP 1996: 11) and discussed
in a separate annex to this report, i.e. whether a house-
hold has an income (measured by total consumption)
below a certain poverty line. The main approach,
which is used for the urban areas, will be to define the
poverty line according to the average total consump-
tion in urban Angola. When measuring rural poverty
and comparing poverty in rural and urban areas we
will however also define an absolute poverty line
defined from the calorie requirements set by FAO and
the consumption pattern measured in Angola.
2.2. Where do you find the poor?
The Perfil da Pobreza em Angola presents a number of
tables and details on where to find the poor. We are
presenting some of this information in figure 2.1 and
table 2.1. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of poverty
head count (moderate poor and extreme poor) in
provinces and by gender and age of head of household.
Table 2.1 gives more details and shows the distribution
of poverty head count (moderate poor and extreme
poor), poverty gap and poverty severity. For a further
analysis along other dimensions we refer to the Perfil
da Pobreza. We have here rather chosen to com-
plement this picture by running some multivariate
analysis with the same aim, trying to identify social
groups with many poor people.
In order to allow the reader to learn more about the
interpretation of the poverty measures, we present
poverty indices not only across provinces, by gender
and age of the head of households, but even for the
two groups of poor, moderate poor and extreme poor.
The poverty indices include PO - poverty head count =
number of people below the poverty line, P1 - poverty
gap = the distance below the poverty line or the extra
income needed to reach the poverty line, and P2 -




Better off 	 Poor 	 Ext. poor 	 PO
Poverty index 	 Contribution to national poverty
P1 	 P2
Share
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Table 2.1. Poverty and extreme poverty in various provinces and by various groups of gender and age of head of household
Poverty
Better off 	 100.0 	 0.0	 0.0
Poor 	 0.0 	 100.0 	 0.0
Ext. poor 	 0.0 	 0.0	 100.0
Province
Luanda 	 40.5 	 51.5 	 8.1
Moxico 	 38.1	 54.2 	 7.7
Cabinda 	 22.7 	 57.4 	 19.9
Benguela 	 37.3 	 46.7 	 15.9
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Figure 2.1. Poverty and extreme poverty in various provinces and
by various groups of gender and age of head of
household
• Better off ® Poor 0 Extreme poor
By definition non of the better off are poor, but all
moderate poor people and all extreme poor people
have a poverty head count of 1 or 100 per cent, no-
thing less nothing more even for the extreme poor. But
P1 tells you the difference. Moderate poor people are
on average missing 35 per cent of the income needed
to balance on the poverty line, while the extreme poor
on average are missing a, yes, extreme share i.e. 75per
cent of the income needed to balance on the poverty
line. As you would expect the better off do not contri-
bute to the national poverty. The moderate poor
contribute 84 per cent of the number of poor, but only
71 per cent of the poverty gap and 59 per cent of the
poverty severity. The extreme poor are only 16 per
cent of the poor, but they contribute 29 of the poverty
gap and 41 per cent of the poverty severity.
The province information in figure 2.1 and table 2.1
split the provinces in two groups. The end cases, the
most rural province, Moxico and especially the capital,
Luanda, have the cities with the highest share of better
off people, the lowest share of extreme poor people
and the lowest poverty gap and poverty severity.
People in Moxico contribute least to poverty incidence,
and the contribution to the poverty gap and poverty
severity remains equally low. People in Luanda
contribute somewhat more to the poverty incidence
but equally little to poverty severity as people in
Moxico. It is quite interesting to learn that the condi-
tions of a remote province as Moxico does not create
more poor than in other parts of Angola. As we shall
learn in other chapters of the report they might how-
ever still be worse off along other dimensions such as
lacking public service and infrastructure.
In countries where poverty profiles have been conduc-
ted in both rural and urban areas, such as Zimbabwe
and Zambia , you will usually find a higher share of
poor people in rural than urban areas, and the very
lowest shares in the capital cities. In Zimbabwe
separate poverty lines were constructed for rural and
urban areas in each province adapting to lower local
prices in rural areas, but still there were 60 per cent
very poor in rural areas versus 21 per cent very poor in
urban areas (Social Development Fund 1997: 23) . In
Zambia only one national poverty line was constructed
and according to that line there were 89 per cent
extremely poor in rural areas and 56 per cent in urban
areas (Central Statistical Office 1996: 115) . In both
countries, unpublished analysis shows however that
while the poverty is lower in capital cities, the severity
of poverty among those who are poor in capital cities
are not necessarily lower.
In Angola, this is not the case. Luanda is rather better
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severity piling up in the big city. The population in
Luanda contributes less than average to the poverty
incidence but even less to the poverty severity.
You find some similar and parallel patterns across
gender and across age groups of head of house-holds.
Female headed and younger households have a lower
poverty head count, and both these groups have a
higher poverty severity than you would expect. This is
surely and interesting and not common pattern. We
might expect that both female headed and younger
headed households are more flexible to the volatile but
potentially rewarding informal urban markets,
especially in Lusaka. The chapter on the informal
sector might cast some further light on this question.
On the other hand, households with an old head do
not only have the largest poverty incidence, but their
share increases to a larger share of the poverty gap and
an even larger share again in poverty severity. Old
households might not be able to adapt to the con-
tinuously changing opportunities and constraints.
2.3. Coping and subsidies
Having identified some information on background
and resources among the poor versus the non poor the
next big issue is how people cope. This is both a matter
of provision of resources and utilization of them. We
will return to the provision of resources in rural and
urban areas in later chapters. At this stage we will start
by addressing how the poor versus the non-poor spend
their income. This will also allow us to address the
subsidy policy issue.
Figure 2.2. Commodity group consumption expenditures in per
cent by various pocverty groups, provinces, gender
and age of head of household
• Food ® Health O Education IM Transport & Housing ® Energy 0 Clothing
Table 2.2. Commodity group consumption expenditures in per cent by various poverty groups, provinces, gender and age of head of
household. Per cent
Commodity
group Food 	 Health 	 Education 	 Transport 	 Housing 	 Energy 	 Clothing 	 Total
	 Number 
Poverty
Better off 	 75.0 	 6.3 	 1.5 	 7.8 	 0.8 	 5.9 	 2.7 	 100.0 	 1 525
Poor 	 76.6 	 5.2 	 2.3 	 6.5 	 0.7 	 6.1 	 2.6 	 100.0 	 2 109
Ext. poor 	 76.7 	 3.7 	 2.3 	 5.1 	 0.8 	 8.9 	 2.4 	 100.0 	 476
Province
Luanda 	 73.7 	 6.2 	 1.9 	 8.1 	 0.8 	 6.8 	 2.5 	 100.0 	 2 072
Moxico 	 86.2 	 2.2 	 0.7 	 0.9 	 0.3 	 7.9 	 1.9 	 100.0 	 296
Cabinda 	 76.8 	 6.0 	 2.2 	 4.8 	 0.7 	 4.8 	 4.7 	 100.0 	 426
Benguela 	 83.6 	 3.4 	 2.5 	 3.3 	 0.7 	 4.6 	 1.8 	 100.0 	 879
Huila 	 84.9 	 2.8 	 2.1 	 3.1 	 0.5 	 3.2 	 3.5 	 100.0 	 437
Gender of head
Man 	 76.0 	 5.5 	 2.0 	 6.8 	 0.8 	 6.3 	 2.6 	 100.0 	 3 249
Woman 	 76.0 	 5.4 	 1.9 	 7.1 	 0.7 	 6.4 	 2.5 	 100.0 	 861
Age of head
15-29 	 75.7 	 5.9 	 1.1 	 7.1 	 1.0 	 6.2 	 2.9 	 100.0 	 797
30-39 	 75.9 	 5.4 	 2.1 	 6.8 	 0.8 	 6.3 	 2.7 	 100.0 	 1 526
40-49 	 76.6 	 5.2 	 2.3 	 6.8 	 0.5 	 6.2 	 2.4 	 100.0 	 1 001
50+ 	 75.8 	 5.7 	 2.1 	 6.8 	 0.6 	 6.6	 2.4 	 100.0 	 786
Total 	 76.0 	 5.5 	 2.0	 6.9 	 0.7 	 6.3 	 2.6 	 100.0 	 4 110
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Figure 2.2 and table 2.2 give an overview of the
consumption pattern across poverty, province and
gender and age of head of household. It is highly
uncommon that the food share is more or less equal for
all poverty groups. The common picture is that better
off people spend less on food and in capital cities in
neighbor countries with a more or less open foreign
trade policy you will tend to find an even better choice
of non-food commodity. The special situation in
Luanda is the wide range of imported luxury food
items. Another explanation is the lack of infrastructure
and hence the larger need to buy gas, charcoal etc.
These might be parts of an explanation, but is still
remarkable and you would definitely not expect this to
continue if the trade policy changes. The provincial
patterns are also uncommon. We have just seen that
poverty is lowest in Luanda and Moxico, but they are
the extremes concerning food share of consumption.
Up country Moxico has the highest share of food
consumption. It seems reasonable to assume this
reflect both an influx of expensive imported food items
but also a low supply of non-food goods.
Other part of the consumption patterns are easier to
interpret and give us interesting information on the
situation of the moderate poor and the extreme poor,
as follows:
• The table tells us that the extreme poor can not
afford to pay for health service as the moderate
poor or better off can. The threshold is obviously
too large.
• On the other hand, also the moderate poor and the
extreme poor send their children to school, but this
certainly has a cost, they pay a share more than 1.5
times the better off.
• Transport has also a special pattern. It is really a big
city expense and especially a Luanda expense. It is
however above the threshold for the poor and
especially the extreme poor.
• Energy has the opposite pattern and for the oppo-
site reason. The poor are hardly using more energy,
but are left with more expensive energy. We will
return to the details both below and in the chapter
on water and power supply.
2.4. Food consumption patterns
Even finding the same level of food consumption share,
we would hardly expect to find the same pattern across
food commodity groups for better off, moderate poor
and extreme poor.
Indeed as table 2.3 shows there are considerable differ-
ences, exactly what you would expect. The extreme
poor spend like 1/3 on meal and other cereal products
or 1.5 times the share of the better off. The better off
compensate by a higher share of more luxury goods
like meat, sugar, milk and alcoholic drinks. You will
also find clear geographical patterns both for stable
food and for relish food. And probably due to transport
problems, sugar is low on the list in Moxico.
There are hardly any differences across gender and age
of head of household.
Table 2.3. Detailed food consumption expenditures in per cent by various pocverty groups, provinces, gender and age of head of
household
Maize Millet Cereal Bread Rice 	 Fish 	 Meat Leaves Oil Sugar Milk Drinks Beans Salt 	 Sum 	 Non- 	 Total Num-food food 	 ber
Poverty
Better off 	 5.3 	 6.1 	 1.4 	 6.6	 7.2 	 11.0 	 6.1 	 3.2 5.1 	 7.4 	 4.3 	 4.4 	 5.4 	 1.4 	 75.0 	 25.0 100.0 1 525
Poor 	 5.9 	 8.2 	 1.3 	 7.9 	 7.5 	 12.9 	 4.0 	 3.0 5.8 	 7.1 	 3.4 	 2.7 	 5.6 	 1.3 	 76.6 	 23.4 100.0 2 109
Ext. poor 	 4.7 	 15.2	 2.1 	 7.6	 8.8 	 12.5 	 1.8 	 3.0 6.3 	 5.2 	 1.4 	 1.6 	 5.3 	 1.3 	 76.7 	 23.3 100.0 	 476
Province
Luanda 	 6.4 	 5.2 	 0.9 	 7.8 	 7.3 	 12.8 	 4.5 	 2.8 5.3 	 7.2 	 3.7 	 3.4 	 5.1 	 1.3 	 73.7 	 26.3 100.0 2 072
Moxico 	 13.6 	 14.8 	 3.4 	 3.1 	 6.1 	 9.9 	 5.2 	 4.4 6.9 	 2.4 	 1.9 	 2.9 	 5.3 	 6.3 	 86.2 	 13.8 100.0 	 296
Cabinda 	 3.0 	 2.9 	 0.4 	 7.7 	 7.8 	 14.6 	 5.2 	 3.4 6.5 	 7.7 	 4.4 	 4.0 	 8.1 	 1.2 	 76.8 	 23.2 100.0 	 426
Benguela 	 0.7 20.8 	 2.5 	 6.2 10.2 	 8.9 	 4.2	 3.9 6.3 	 6.7 	 4.2 	 1.9 	 6.7 	 0.4 	 83.6 	 16.4 100.0 	 879
Huila 	 0.5 	 21.6 	 4.4 	 6.9	 6.7 	 9.8 	 5.2 	 4.1 	 6.8 	 7.2 	 1.9 	 2.9 	 6.3 	 0.6 	 84.9 	 15.1 	 100.0 	 437
Gender of head
Man 	 5.6 	 8.1 	 1.4 	 7.5	 7.6 	 12.2 	 4.5 	 2.9 5.6 	 7.0 	 3.6	 3.4 	 5.4 	 1.4 	 76.0 	 24.0 100.0 3 249
Woman 	 5.4 	 8.1 	 1.6 	 7.0	 7.3 	 12.2 	 4.8 	 3.5 5.6 	 7.3 	 3.5 	 2.6 	 5.7 	 1.3 	 76.0 	 24.0 100.0 	 861
Age of head
15-29 	 5.5 	 8.2 	 1.2 	 7.2 	 7.8 	 11.8 	 4.0 	 2.9 6.0 	 7.0 	 3.8 	 3.6 	 5.3 	 1.5 	 75.7 	 24.3 100.0 	 797
30-39 	 5.5 	 8.1 	 1.5 	 7.0 	 7.2 	 12.3 	 4.7 	 3.2 5.5 	 6.9 	 3.5	 3.3 	 5.6 	 1.5 	 75.9 	 24.1 	 100.0 1 526
40-49 	 5.4 	 8.3 	 1.5 	 7.7 	 7.8 	 12.2 	 4.7 	 3.1 	 5.2 	 7.2 	 3.6 	 3.3 	 5.5 	 1.1 	 76.6 	 23.4 100.0 1 001
50+ 	 5.7 	 7.8 	 1.3 	 7.8 	 7.4 	 12.1 	 4.8 	 3.0 5.8 	 7.1 	 3.3 	 2.9 	 5.5 	 1.3 	 75.8 	 24.2 100.0 	 786
Total 	 5.5 	 8.1 	 1.4 	 7.4 	 7.5 	 12.2 	 4.6 	 3.1 	 5.6 	 7.0 	 3.6	 3.3 	 5.5 	 1.4 	 76.0 	 24.0 100.0 4 110
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2.5. Non-food consumption patterns
As presented in table 2.4, there are a number of very
interesting and informative patterns in consumption of
non-food across poverty groups, as follows:
• We have already learned that the extreme poor can
not afford health service. The details show us an
even clearer picture. They can not afford consul-
tation nor any treatment, but rely on self-diagnosis
and drugs bought at the market.
• You will find a similar but modified pattern in
Moxico and Huila, in this case probably because
there are not that many offers for health treat-
ment.
• On education expense the extreme poor can only
afford the same share of fees, meaning a lower
20
amount and then less training. Still they have to
pay a larger share than the better off for books.
With other words they are squeezing out the
money needed but end up with poorer service.
• The details on transport are very interesting indeed.
The poor pay an equal share for private transport
but next to nothing for public transport. With other
words, only the better off can afford to go where
public transport is available, for the extreme poor,
the situation is likely to be that they only use tran-
sport to work, and in this case they are anyhow left
to private service such as urban minibuses or
hiking for a fee in rural areas.
• The poor and especially the extreme poor are
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larger share, but obviously not a larger amount.
They are loosing out step by step. Few of the
extreme poor have access to electricity, still they
need light and have to rely on petrol which is more
expensive. They end up compensating through
firewood, which is not very energy efficient but
serve well for both light, heating and cooking. This
is really the poor peoples energy.
2.6. Durable goods
This study has measured poverty as being common in
Angola and most other countries, by income and con-
sumption. It could have been done by measuring assets
and durable goods. You will except a very clear rela-
tion between poverty as measured here and the owner-
ship of assets and durables. In fact this relationship is
usually so strong that anything else would indicate that
income and consumption vary considerably over time.
With other words, the poor of yesterday, might not be
the poor of today or tomorrow. As presented in figure
2.4 and table 2.5 there is a clear but not that strong
relationship. Except for house and more specialized
productive assets for the urban population, a larger
share of the better off own durables. But it should be
added that the poor and not that far below.
Housing is a special case because the better off are
more likely to get free housing from their employer
and the extreme poor and poor are more likely to live
in squatter areas where they might own the house but
rather a sub-standard house, and they will hardly the
plot of land.
The overall picture is one of a less strong relationship
between income/ consumption poverty and ownership
of durables than we expected. This indicates that there
are large fluctuations over time and that the income
poor of today might not be the income poor of tomor-
row. It is very important to underscore that this does
not reduce the hardship of being poor, but what is does
indicate is the possibility of growing out of poverty for
the individual household.
Table 2.5. Durable goods owned by the households in per cent
by various poverty groups. Per cent
Better off 	 Poor 	 Ext. poor 	 All 	 Number
Durable good
House 	 65.5 	 71.8 	 64.5 	 68.6 	 3 560
Agric.plot 	 2.6 	 7.3 	 6.7 	 5.4 	 3 560
Fish.boat 	 0.7 	 1.6 	 0.1 	 1.1 	 3 560
Tractor 	 0.4 	 0.1 	 0.1 	 0.2 	 3 560
Mot.cycle 	 7.3 	 6.7 	 3.1 	 6.6 	 3 560
Bicycle 	 6.4 	 6.6 	 3.8	 6.2 	 3 560
Heater 	 0.3 	 0.4 	 0.5 	 0.4 	 3 560
Furniture 	 4.5 	 6.5 	 4.3	 5.5 	 3 560
TV 	 62.2 	 54.0 	 34.6 	 55.3 	 3 560
Video 	 29.1 	 16.4 	 7.9	 20.5 	 3 560
Radio 	 89.8 	 87.4 	 72.4 	 86.9 	 3 560
Fridge 	 55.5 	 47.4 	 29.5 	 48.8 	 3 560
Car 	 21.0 	 12.7 	 6.5 	 15.3 	 3 560
2.7. Subsidies
The issue of subsidies is a multi-dimensional one. As
discussed in Bender & Hunt (1991c) it is a fiscal and
budget balance issue, it is a matter on avoiding
inefficiencies, and a matter of target group and target
objectives. An overall approach to this issue is outside
the scope of this document. Our aim is a more modest
one. If the Government of Angola wants to reduce or
mitigate the effects of poverty the above discussed
consumption patterns give clear guidelines to where to
focus the subsidies.
2.7.1. Food subsidies
For food the obvious choice is maize meallie meal. As
for any food commodity group the amount spent by
the better off is higher than by the moderate poor or
extreme poor. But the budget share is like 2.5 times as
high for the extreme poor as among the better off.
2.7.2. Energy and water subsidies
For energy and water the budget shares are clearly
different, and from a theoretical view there are some
candidates for subsidies such as firewood. However
few of the items lend themselves to control. The few
which might be easily controlled such as petrol pro-
ducts and public water supply are all luxury items and
hence candidates for taxing not for subsidizing. For
these items it is rather recommended to avoid any
subsidy scheme, the better off should definitely pay the
costs of these products and services.
2.7.3. Social sector subsidies
From a poverty point of view, the message is clear. The
extreme poor stretch far to send children to school.
Hence the extreme poor may be reached by rather
reducing than introducing further user-fees. In addition
there are valid reasons to introduce school meals to
encourage the poor to allow their children to remain in
school. Further analysis of school attendance will tell
whether to focus solely on primary schooling or even
consider lowering fees in secondary schools.
On the other hand, subsidizing health service fees,
might not be the way to move. In fact information from
this survey gives strong support to focus public health
service on preventive health such as vaccinations since
the public gain is even larger than the private. Only by
a full coverage of vaccines can you keep epidemic
diseases down. Curative health is obviously already in
1995 only for the better off anyhow. Hence these data
rather support the idea to introduce a two-tier system
with and without user fees and allow medical person-
nel to use public premises and equipment on their
spare time charging a market fee.
We will return to some of these issues while discussing
the sectors.
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Table 2.6. Total expenditures per adult equivalent*, weighted
linear regression**, reduced form, complete modell
Regressor
Stan-
	Esti- 	 Std. 	 dard-





Years of education, male head
Years of education, female head
Years in current job, male head
Years in current job, female head
Household head: Age in years
Dependency ratio: dependents /
breadwinners 15-60
Classification variables
Occupational status, male head
Self employed
Employed in public sector
Employed in private sector
Occupational status, female head
Self employed
Employed in public sector
Employed in private sector





Gender of h.head, default = male





* Natural logaritm of total expenditure per adult equivalent, ** Weighted least
squares regression.
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level.
7.84 	 0.01 	 §§§
0.01 	 0.00 	 0.07
0.01 	 0.00 	 0.08
0.00 	 0.00 	 0.01
0.00 	 0.00 	 0.07
0.00 	 0.00 	 -0.14
-0.04 	 0.00 	 -0.10
0.11 	 0.00 	 0.15
0.08 	 0.00 	 0.14
0.08 	 0.00 	 0.12
0.11 	 0.01 	 0.19
0.13 	 0.01 	 0.19
0.14 	 0.01	 0.15
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2.8. Why are people poor
To contribute to a documentation and understanding
of why people are poor, we apply two methods,
ordinary regression analysis and classification analysis.
2.8.1. Regression analysis
Table 2.6 presents the findings of a regression analysis.
As one might have expected the largest positive
contribution to consumption level comes from
employment, but contrary to what you might have
expected, the largest contribution come when the
female head (who is actually either a head in herself or
the spouse of a male head) is working. You might think
that this could be due to the fact that a working wife
more often has a working husband than the opposite,
but we have already controlled for whether the hus-
band is working so this is not the case. There are three
likely explanations, one technical and two substantial
ones:
• the straight forward explanation is that the wife is
earning more than the husband. As we will discuss
in the next chapter this is not as unlikely as one
might assume.
• another possible explanation is the gender obliga-
tion in the family. A wife and especially a mother
will by tradition be more responsible to ensure the
daily living of her family, hence she will spend
whatever Kwanzas she earns. A husband and a
father is to a larger degree giving priority to a) his
own consumption such as drinking - which may not
be fully recorded and b) long term investment
trying to ensure a better future for the whole family
and even save some money, both being investment
rather than consumption and hence not to be
recorded.
• finally, since a larger share of men are working
(refer to next chapter), the fact that a husband is
working sets the household less apart while a wife
working is still less common and hence makes a
larger difference from the average.
The large impact of working female heads is also
complemented by a positive effect of having a female
rather than a male head of the household.
Already this analysis points to the fact that self-employ-
ment pays off better than other employment. As we
will address later on this is mainly self-employment in
the informal sector. It is also interesting that people
working in the public sector can afford a higher
consumption than people working in the private formal
sector. Whether this is due to a large influx of gasosas
or otherwise is hard to know from the data analysis,
but this is again a strong verification of the special
economy of Angola.
The second strong effects are from education. When
we control for other factors, education pays off
whether undertaken by men or (even slightly more for)
women.
As one might expect, experience in the job pays off as
well, but we should add that this is when we control
for age. Age in itself has a strong negative impact, but
is partly balanced by the chance to gain experience.
Given the strong link (multicollinearity) between age
and experience we need however to be cautious when
interpreting these effects.
The very large negative impact is however from a pure
demographic source. Having only one or a few bread-
winners and/ or many dependents gives a dramatic
reduction in consumption levels measured per adult
equivalent as here.
As you would expect there are quite some geographical
differences. Since we have chosen Luanda as the refer-
ence there are more negative than positive impacts.
May be a surprise, but people in Cabinda has the
lowest consumption level. Benguela is the winner,
clearly ahead of Luanda. We should however stress
that we are talking about monetary consumption levels






Box on self targeting subsidies on inferior goods
The standard reason for subsidizing goods or services is to
mitigate the hardship certain groups are facing. Typical target
groups are identified as follows:
• from a general policy decision to redistribute resources
from better off to poor people,
• from a policy decision to redistribute resources from less
hard life-cycle periods to tough hardship life-cycle periods,
such as from other life-cycles to a period with small
children, and
• for health reasons to redistribute resource to vulnerable
groups such as children and pregnant/ nursing women.
In order to reach such target groups there are two options,
either by arranging large-scale bureaucratic schemes to
identify the target group and a food coupon system or to
subsidize certain commodities whoever buy these goods.
Bureaucratic food coupon systems are expensive to run, open
for corruption and still vulnerable for two failures, both to
identify non-eligible persons and not to identify eligible
persons. Hence self-targeting subsidy schemes might be a
better option.
The objective of the subsidy would still be to reach all eligible
individuals or families and still not reaching any non-eligible
individual or family. In reality you will never reach this
objective and there will be a leakage (type I) to persons
outside the target group and a leakage (type II) of eligible
persons not buying the subsidized good.
Any subsidy scheme will have to strike a balance. And lucky
enough information from a household budget survey will give
estimates on both types of leakage. For small subsidies where
we can assume that the subsidies have no impact on the
consumption pattern, the food commodity groups shares will
give the information straight ahead, while for large subsidies
you need to calculate the elasticities which tell you how
different groups will change their consumption pattern when
relative prices change.
We restrict our example to small subsidies, assume no
changes in food patterns, and focus on the extreme poor as
our target group. Table 2.3 tells us that Maize meallie meal
really is what the extreme poor eats more of than other
groups. By introducing a subsidy scheme for maize meallie
meal the extreme poor will in fact get a budget support which
in relative terms are more than twice as large as for the better
off, and almost twice as large as for the moderate poor.
If a scheme is to be introduced it is recommended to
measure food consumption in even further details in each
city. The focus would then be to split between different
meallie meals as maize, millet, sorghum, and cassava meallie
meal. The ideal commodity for subsidies is one that is both
very cheap and so inferior to the substitutes that people only
consume this as the very last resort, that is that they eat less
of this commodity even in absolute terms if their overall
income increases. In technical terms this means an elasticity
below - 1.00. Cassava meallie meal is likely to be such a
commodity in Luanda.
Cross-subsidies
A subsidy scheme might be financed through the ordinary
public budget or by taxing a luxury commodity. Usually a
family will increase their consumption of a luxury item faster
than their income or total consumption. There are hardly any
products which are luxury items in this sense at all income
levels, but meat, milk/diary products, and drinks (alcoholic
and non-alcoholic combined) are such luxury items for certain
income groups. Due to the need for controlling all producers
canned and bottled softdrinks, beer and other alcoholic
drinks will be the very best candidate.
By subsidizing maize meallie meal with 25 per cent of the
price and taxing drinks with 50 per cent you will transfer
resources from the better off to the poor. The better off will
end up being taxed with 0,7 per cent of their total consump-
tion, the moderate poor will receive a subsidy of 0,7 per cent
of their total consumption and the extreme poor will end up
receiving a subsidy of 3,0 per cent of their total consumption.
This might not sound much but it is roughly speaking equal
to what they pay for health or for education.
Calculations of cross-subsidies
	Ext e e Moderate	 Better
poor 	 poor 	 off
Budget share maize meal
Costs of maize meal, mill. NKw
Budget share drinks
Costs of drinks, mill. NKw
Subsidies: maize meal, mill. NKw
Tax: drinks, mill. NKw



































The classification analysis presented in figure 2.3 5 com-
plements this picture. 6Already the regression analysis
identified the large impact of education, especially female
education, but the classification analysis takes us one step
further, identifying this as the variable with the largest
impact when measuring the gap between sub-groups.
5 A list of abbrevations and accronyms for this and other tree
analyses is presented in table A.1. in annex 1.
6 The advantage of a classification analysis is that it always identifies
the variables that give the largest impact and doing this step by step
allows for different variables to be in focus for different sub-groups.
A disadvantage is however the lack of control for other variables.
Hence it might e.g. be difficult to disentangle the effects of age and
experience. Used as a companion to regression analysis there are
however hardly any drawbacks.
When we can concentrate upon the groups one by one
according to female education we are learning that the
average impact of employment in different sectors
rather conceive than enlighten us. For households with
higher educated women, the private formal sector
really pays off. For families with many breadwinners,
even the informal and the public sectors pay off very
well.
For households where the female head has a low
education, the occupation of the male head is essential.
As the figure shows, for this group the private formal
sector does not pay off at all, the informal sector is the
best choice and the very best is when both husband











































































When there are no female head in the household such
as when a grandmother, a younger sister or a single
man himself is running the kitchen, it is again edu-
cation that matters. If the male head is well educated
and there are few dependents, such as when parents
have passed away or are living at other locations and
youngster siblings are still living together, they do
pretty well. But an old man with low education
obviously struggles to survive.
2.8.3. Conclusion
As you will find in most societies and as you would
expect the two main conclusions would be:
• Employment pays off as a poverty alleviation
strategy and
• Education pays off as a poverty alleviation strategy.
However in the large cities in Angola this is only half of
the picture. The main conclusions are not that simple
and the main reason being the gender dimension.
Hence a more correct version of the main conclusions
are as follows:
• Employment for the female head of the household
has a large poverty reducing impact, and
• Education has a general poverty reducing impact,




The two main conclusions should be seen as guiding
principles both for the authorities and the households
themselves.
The policy recommendation for governmental
authorities, donors and NGOs alike would be as
follows:
• In order to reduce poverty, programs to promote
and further allow women to work should be
encouraged.
This should both include a policy to favor women in
public work programs and by encouraging and pre-
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paring for any means that might reduce the work-load
of women such as improved water supply and encour-
aging kindergartens and other types of child care.
• In order to reduce poverty, emphasis on education
should be continued and strengthened. The
emphasis should cover both girls and boys but a
special emphasis should be given to girls.
The policy changes should both include means to
retain quality such as the extension of the school day
from two to three hours and the reduction from three
to two shifts at school, and means to ensure access.
Access could be improved both by building schools and
ensure that school fees are not barriers stopping poor
families sending their children to school (refer to the
chapter on education) .
Households themselves are obviously trying to
organize their life in a manner that might reduce
poverty and there is not need for any public campaigns
to encourage this process. But public campaigns are
needed for other issues, especially to encourage house-
holds to organize daily life in a manner that would
allow the female head of the household to work. One
way is clearly for the husband to take his share of
domestic chores when the wife is earning money for
the daily bread on equal footing with him.
Poverty mitigation
In order to mitigate the impact of poverty, it is
recommended to consider a scheme for cross-
subsidization of inferior goods versus luxury goods.
The current poverty profiles points to maize meallie
meal and drinks as appropriate inferior and luxury
goods. It is however not recommended considering
maize meallie meal as an inferior good across all cities.
An updated household budget survey providing details
on staple grains and meallie meal for each large city is
not only recommended but also required.'
7 A sample size of 400-600 households per city will be required.
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Figure 2.4. Avoiding poverty, per cent above poverty line
Per cent above poverty line = better off
39 %
Education of female head
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3. Urban areas: Informal sector works
The informal urban sector is considered everything
from the opportunity of the poor to a dead-end way
out of unemployment. World Bank documents, such as
World Development Report 1995 (World Bank 1995)
highlights that their own labor is the main asset of the
poor. A recent UNDP report on poverty in Africa
(UNDP 1998) rather highlights that the urban poor
"tend to be mostly migrants from rural areas, having
migrated because they lacked productive employment.
More often than not, they are low-skilled, with little or
no education." While these two views may appear
inconsistent, they are rather two (very different)
perspectives of the same issue. As addressed in a joint
UNDP/ World Bank study by Moser and Holland
(1997: 4, 32-40),a more comprehensive perspective is
that "With labor the poor's greatest asset, a frequent
response by poor households to declining income is to
mobilize additional labor - principally women's labor,
but in the poorest households even children's labor.".
Moser and Holland continue by addressing the low
value of the poor's labor and how they are forced to
enter "competitive, dead-end occupations with low pay
and long hours".
Jointly these perspectives have determined how the
urban informal sector work has been approached.
Labor is the main asset of the poor, but it is likely to be
poorly educated and low valued. Hence it is likely that
in poor households, women and even children are
forced to enter the informal sector and are likely to
face competitive, dead-end occupations with low pay
and long hours.
8 The 1990 Luanda Household Budget and Nutrition Survey includes
a special report on Public Sector Employment. There are three
reasons to focus on informal sector employment rather than to
include public sector and/ or formal private sector employment. The
main reason is that the poor people tend to find their income in the
informal sector. Public sector people might be vulnerable for being
defined as redundant through a civil service reform, but they are still
not the poor layer of the urban population. The other reason is that a
policy to outline a redundancy policy requires data designed for this
purpose rather than general household data. The third reason is that
the existing report shows the need for a public sector reform to
handle this issue.
3.1. Introduction
What we today call the informal sector is often viewed
as the residual sector. In a sense this is a proper
definition. A number of well specified economic
transactions are well organized for in special sectors,
such as public service, export oriented extracting indu-
stry, import substituting production, domestic tran-
sport and other protected services and segments of
domestic production and services. The informal sectors
pick up what is left from or not suitable for the formal
sectors. But to understand the nature and potential of
the informal sector we need to recognize that it com-
prises a number of quite different segments, all in a
continuos development over the years. This includes
the following sub-sectors:
• Traditional informal sector segments for production
of goods and services in rural and urban areas,
and the domestic trade of goods between rural
and urban areas.
• Rural traditional production: traditional
rural production of agricultural and
other products;
• Urban traditional production: the small
scale urban production of inputs and
consumer goods for domestic rural and
urban use;
• Rural traditional trade: traditional small
scale rural - rural and urban - rural
trading of inputs for and produce of
rural production; and
• Urban traditional trade: traditional small
scale urban - rural and urban - urban
trading of inputs for production and
consumer goods for domestic rural and
urban use;
• Trading in imported goods
• Illegal activities
• Illegal export
• Other criminal activities
3.1.1. The traditional informal sector
segments
As stated in this list, there are a number of large tradi-
tional sub-sectors of the informal sector, being rural
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rural traditional trade and urban traditional trade.
Traditional rural production has rather been co-
existing than competing with commercial farming;
traditional urban informal production has rather been
complementing than competing with urban domestic
formal production; rural traditional trade has rather
been complementing than competing with parastatal
and formal trading; and urban trade has co-existed
with an urban formal trading sector.
Commercial farming used to focus on export produc-
tion i.e. mainly coffee and was hardly a big competitor
but rather co-existing with traditional rural production.
Parastatal and regulated trading was introduced to
ensure a stable supply and low prices of crops and
other agricultural produce in urban areas. Commercial
farming is mainly a well-separated segment rather than
a real competitor to informal rural production and
trading.
Parastatal and regulated trading is currently of limited
size and not able to affect the trading markets.
Traditional trading markets are a mixture of large
commercial structures and small scale trading. In
periods of and areas with civil unrest risks and uncer-
tainties are large and so is the potential profit. Again
such economic abnormalities create a special trading
structure which will not survive a future transition to a
predictable trading system.
3.1.2. Trading in imported goods
A protectionism economy like in Angola creates a
double trading bias. First, trading protection allows for
import substituting industries both in the formal sector
such as assembly-line factories and in the informal
sector to fill an endless number of gaps. Second,
import restrictions allow for large premiums on
imports, serving as monopoly margins. But the really
big premium originates from the artificial exchange
rate. Import licenses, quotas and access to currency
exchange at official exchange rate gives a profit margin
of hundred per cent more or less over night. We have
not been able to identify studies estimating the distri-
bution of the exchange rate premium and the import
monopoly premium. The wealth of the business com-
munity in Angola indicates that they retain a large
share, but the size of the trading segments in the infor-
mal sector would indicate that quite some of the
premium trickles down to the small scale traders in
import goods and dollars.
3.1.3. Illegal activities
Studies of criminal activities from an economic point of
view requires special methods well outside the scope of
this study. The survey data available does not allow for
this analysis.
3.2. Approach
In order to be able to draw some policy conclusion we
find it necessary to approach sub-sectors, which to a
certain degree are homogenous, and the two most
important homogenous sub-sectors are the urban
informal sector and rural crop production. This chapter
will focus on the urban informal sector, but analysis of
crop production requires a separate analysis.
Our approach for the urban informal economy analysis
comprises two steps, as follows:
• a description of the size and nature of the informal
urban sector addressing the segments listed above,
• an analysis of the economic return in different sub-
segments
3.3. Size and nature of the informal sector
3.3.1. From an individual point of view
Figure 3.1 and tables 3.1 to 3.4 show that 37 per cent
of people in the economic active age from 15 years to
60 years of age (both values included) are working in
the urban informal sector. It should be added that 28
per cent are either students or not economically active
and hence only 35 per cent are working in other
sectors than in the urban informal sector. Therefore,
you may say that the informal urban sector is where
the majority of the urban population finds their living,
but it is a better description to say that this is where
around half the urban population find their living.
One often gets the impression that the informal sector
is an arena for those who do not manage to find a job
in the formal sector, but the figures give another
message. The share of people working in the informal
sector is more or less equally high among the better
off, the moderate poor or the extreme poor and it is
again more or less the same in all age groups from 20
years and upwards. The lower share below 20 years of
age is a reflection of a number of these still being
apprentices or students and not that they are working
in the formal sectors etc.
Figure 3.1. Persons 15 to 60 years working in the informal sector
among various poverty groups, provinces, age groups
and gender
26
Reports 99/20 	 Poverty Alleviation Policy
Table 3.1. Persons 15 to 60 years working in the informal sector
among various poverty groups. Per cent

































Table 3.2. Persons 15 to 60 years working in the informal sector
in five provinces. Per cent
Yes














































Table 3.3. Persons 15 to 60 years working in the informal sector
among various age groups. Per cent












































Table 3.4. Persons 15 to 60 years working in the informal sector
among males and females. Per cent
Yes 	 No 	 Total 	 Number
Male
	 27 	 73 	 100 	 7 273
Female
	 47 	 53 	 100 	 7 572
Total
	
37 	 63 	 100 	 14 845
Across gender and province you will however find
differences. You find a substantially higher share of
women than men in the informal sector. We assume
that the main reason is access to employment in other
sectors. There are larger barriers to enter the formal
sector. This might of course also reflect that women
given their household and child care obligations might
need larger flexibility, something that can be found in
the informal sector. Likely barriers are formal gender
barriers as in the army, formal barriers indirectly being
biased as for formal education, combined formal/infor-
mal barriers as rigid regulations concerning pregnancy
and child raising, informal ones including both rigid
regulations and gender biased opinions. Hence for
women the informal sector is essential. Almost half the
women in urban areas are working in this sector. Since
27 per cent are students/ apprentices or not active, this
leaves only 1/4 of the women in urban areas to work in
other sectors.
There are large provincial differences and Luanda
stands out, almost like the women. In Luanda 41 per
cent are working in the informal sector. 26 per cent are
students/ apprentices or not active, leaving only 1/3 to
work in other sectors. Again the likely explanation is
the lack of other types of employment. In general the
share of people working in the public administration is
higher outside Luanda. You will also find more agricul-
tural work even in urban and peri-urban areas in some
provinces and more people in the army in some.
3.3.2. From a household point of view
To learn about the overall effects of the situation we
have looked upon the household as a unit to learn how
large share of the households having one or more
members working in the informal sector and hence
being dependent of the income this sector can give.
Table 3.5 to 3.10 show that 72 per cent or almost 3 of
4 households have at least one member working in the
informal sector. There are very few differences across
poverty group or by social sub-groups. These tables
further document the large importance of the informal
sector for both better off and moderate poor/ extreme
poor. Dependency ratio and household size hardly
matters except that the very smallest and the very
largest households as you would expect are slightly
different. At the household level, the age of the head
does not matter. Even the gender differences have
really diminished and almost disappeared.
The only remaining dimension making a difference is
the geographical one. Luanda still stands out, and here
78 per cent or 3/4 of the households have somebody
working in the informal sector. In addition Benguela has
moved up from Moxico and stands apart from the others
with 63 per cent or 2/3 of the households having some-
body working in the informal sector. Luanda has both
the strategic location creating a lot of trickle down
opportunities from imports and a large influx of des-
locados, both factors increasing the informal sector. For
Benguela this is more difficult to tell but probably the
explanation is the same. The geographical location
allows obviously for a large trickle down import marke-
ting in all of Luanda, Benguela and Cabinda, but not in
Moxico and Huila. The influx of refugees creating a
pressure and large supply of working people is substan-
tial in all provinces except Cabinda. Hence, it might be
the combination of a large demand for work by immi-
grates and a large number of opportunities created by
the trickle down import marketing. This issue deserves
further investigation and it will be one of the issues
when we now turn to the more detailed picture.
3.3.3. Informal sector industries and
professions
Tables 3.11 to 3.13 show where to find the bulk of
informal sector activities. Table 3.11 shows that 3/4 of
people working in the informal sector work in
commerce. Obviously retail trade at fixed locations,
petty street vendors, wholesale trade, and illegal
imports/exports are different worlds. Still there are
some similarities such as flexibility, a low threshold for
27
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Table 3.5. Households with at least one member working in the
informal sector among various dependency ratio
groups*. Per cent 
Table 3.11. Branch of activity for persons 15 to 60 years among
persons working in the informal sector or not. Per cent 
No 	 Yes 	 Total   
	No member At least one	 Total 	 Number 	 Agriculture/fishing 	 5 	 2 	 4
<= 0.5 	 29 	 71 	 100 	 1 203 	 Manufacturing/mining 	 10 	 9 	 9
0.5<, & <= 1.0 	 27 	 73 	 100 	 1 164 	 Construction 	 5 	 3 	 4
1.0<, & <= 2.0 	 30 	 70 	 100 	 1 153 	 Utilities 	 6 	 3 	 5
< 2.0 	 26 	 74 	 100 	 367 	 Commerce 	 14 	 74 	 44
Total 	 28 	 72 	 100 	 3 887 	 Banking/financial services 	 1 	 0 	 1
* dependency ratio = dependents (0-14,61 & above) 	 / economic active (15-60) 	 Professional(civil serv.,army) 	 59 	 9 	 34
Total 	 100 	 100 	 100
Number 	 3 925 	 2 996 	 6 921
Table 3.6. Households with at least one member working in the
informal sector among household in various size. Per
cent
Table 3.12. Status of occupation for persons 15 to 60 years among
No member At least one Total 	 Number 	 persons working in the informal sector or not. Per cent
1-2 	 44 	 56 	 100 	 282
3 	 33 	 67 	 100 	 351
4	 28 	 72 	 100 	 466
5 	 30 	 70 	 100 	 523
6 	 29 	 71 	 100 	 494
7 	 28 	 72 	 100 	 461
8 	 20 	 80 	 100 	 429
9 	 27 	 73 	 100 	 556
10+ 	 22 	 78 	 100 	 325
Total 	 28 	 72 	 100 	 3 887
Table 3.7. Households with at least one member working in the
informal sector among various poverty groups. Per
cent
No member At least one 	 Total 	 Number
Better off 	 29 	 71 	 100 	 1 445
Poor 	 27 	 73 	 100 	 2 015
Extreme poor 	 30 	 70 	 100 	 427
Total 	 28 	 72 	 100 	 3 887
Table 3.8. Households with at least one member working in the
informal sector in five provinces. Per cent
No member At least one 	 Total 	 Number
Luanda 	 22 	 78 	 100 	 2 072
Moxico 	 52 	 48 	 100 	 296
Cabinda 	 58 	 42 	 100 	 426
Benguela 	 37 	 63 	 100 	 656
Huila 	 59 	 41 	 100 	 437
Table 3.9. Households with at least one member working in the
informal sector among male headed & female headed
households. Per cent
No member At least one 	 Total 	 Number
Male 	 29 	 71 	 100 	 3 062
Female 	 26 	 74 	 100 	 825
Total 	 28 	 72 	 100 	 3 887
Table 3.10. Households with at least one member working in the
informal sector among various household head age
groups. Per cent
	No member At least one	 Total 	 Number
17-29 	 27 	 73 	 100 	 743
30-39 	 30 	 70 	 100 	 1 446
40-49 	 28 	 72 	 100 	 956
50 & above 	 27 	 73 	 100 	 742
Total 	 28 	 72 	 100 	 3 887
No 	 Yes 	 Total
Wage employee, Government 	 51 	 4 	 26
Wage employee, form. priv. sect. 	 21	 8	 14
Employed, informal sector 	 9 	 5 	 7
Self-employed 	 12 	 81 	 48
Employer 	 1	 1 	 1
Unpaid worker, volunteer 	 7 	 2 	 4
Total 	 100 	 100 	 100
Number 	 3 446 	 2 947 	 6 393
first time entrance and the possibility to increase
business over time. By collapsing manufacturing/
mining and construction we find another distinctive
group being work requiring not formal, but still certain
skills. Two other groups are rather small, one being
utilities and one being agriculture/fishing. For people
not working in the informal sector, the pattern is
completely different. The main group is professional
activities were 59 per cent are working. The informal
sector professional branch is an interesting group. You
would expect professionals to be able to get formal
employment and hence all of them are likely to have
been pulled towards the informal sector. In other
branches you would expect that quite a large share are
rather pushed into this sector by lack of other oppor-
tunities. As a total 9 per cent of people working in the
informal sector are in a professional branch. The infor-
mal exchange of money is quite visible in Luanda, but
back in 1995 there were not many reporting this as
their primary employment.
Table 3.12 complements the picture. The large majority
or 4 of 5 people working in the informal sector are self-
employed. Only 5 per cent are employed. Again there
are some strange classifications such as people who are
working in the informal sector during the last 7 days
saying their primary occupation during the last 12
months was wage employees in the public or private
formal sector. This is again likely to be a combination of
real changes and misunderstandings. Excluding these
cases, we end up with 9 of 10 people working in the
informal sector being self-employed. The sector might
still be organized by sub-contracting arrangements, but
obviously the pattern is a combination of extreme
flexibility and insecurity.
28
0 	 0 	 5 	 164
0 	 0 	 8 	 289
0 	 0 	 5 	 144
0 	 0 	 5 	 158
0 	 1 	 15	 498
	
1 	 31
0 	 4 	 63 	 2 123
1 	 5 	 100 	 3 407
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Table 3.13 tells us how branches and occupational
status are mixed. If these two dimensions were
independent we would expect to find the largest group
being 60 per cent as self-employed in commerce. If fact
we find 67 per cent, meaning that the pattern of
extreme flexibility and insecurity is even larger in
commerce than on average. Unfortunately there are
too few employers and too few unpaid workers in the
informal sector to allow for further analysis of these
groups. There are slightly more, but still too few self-
employed in agriculture/ fishing to allow for further
analysis. Hence we will focus on the following groups:
• Self employed in commerce, 67 per cent of persons
working in the informal sector;
• Self-employed in manufacturing, construction and
utilities, 10 per cent of persons working in the
informal sector;
• Professionals being self-employed or employed in
informal sector, 3 per cent of persons working in
the informal sector; and
• Non-professional employees in any branch of
informal sector, 4 per cent of persons working in
the informal sector.
The main focus will be on the two first ones.
It is more or less impossible to identify certain sub-
segments being dependent of the current policy and
others being structural sub-segments which you find in
more or less the same number and type in any country
in Africa. The sheer size of commerce tells you how-
ever that there are artificially many people working in
commerce. The big majority of the "extra" number
finding a living in commerce is likely to trade in
imported goods or related services, but the survey does
no allow for identifying these.
The situation is likely to be the opposite among the
producing segments. You will find a small sub-segment
created by the policy both through import substituting
production and services to replace missing public
service such as water supply. But you should also
expect to find a large share of people producing for the
local demand and market and hence likely to retain
their living also after a future policy change.
We will expect that the producing segment is better
suited to meet a policy change and we will advocate the
need to learn more about the income and educational
requirement in this sub-sector in order to understand
what is needed to meet future policy changes. For
informal commerce the most important task is really to
test whether there is a low return for many and
especially for people with low or no education.
Informal sector professional are an interesting category
likely to be able to adapt to any situation, and we
assume this to be an interesting reference category.
Employees in the informal sector are likely to be a real
mix. Some are likely to be employed by informal sector
business doing very well and it would be very interes-
ing to learn about their background. But you are also
likely to find people accepting very poor conditions.
In the next paragraph we will turn to a multivariate
analysis to learn more about these groups. We will
focus on the four groups listed above with a special
29
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emphasis on persons self-employed in the informal
commerce sector and persons self-employed in the
informal productive sector. As already stated the focus
is on the income on one hand and on the requirements
and background i.e. education, stable living, and
experience. We will also include household informa-
tion but this requires a very careful interpretation.
Measures like poverty are related to the household and
should not be mixed with the single person's income.
Still, as the analysis conducted by de Sousa (1998)
shows, combining and interpreting information from
both individual and household level might yield very
interesting knowledge and understanding.
3.4. Size and nature of the informal sector
sub-segments
We will first sort out the background of people working
in each sub-segment of the informal sector in order to
understand more about how opportunities varies and
what resources are needed.
3.4.1. Informal commerce
Figure 3.2 shows that more than 2 of 5 persons or 42
per cent are employed in the commerce sector. This
includes any type of informal sector service, but still
the figure is very high. Our main interest is however to
learn more about how this share varies and whether
variations in opportunities i.e. across provinces or
rather individual resources such at gender, education
and experience matter.
Interestingly enough, while we already have seen that
the share working in informal sector varies consider-
ably across provinces, the most important dimension
here is individual resources. The commercial informal
sector is definitely the working arena for people with
low resources. While only 19 per cent of men are
working in the commercial informal sector, 65 per cent
of women are. For women the share among the well
educated are only 14 per cent, but increases dramati-
cally to 85 per cent among women without formal
education. We find the same tendency among men but
considerably weaker. 21 per cent of men with a short
experience from their current job are working in the
informal commerce sector while none with long
experience and long education.
As you would expect there are also some variations
across provinces and in all groups Luanda has the
highest share and Moxico and Cabinda have the lowest
shares. The shares in Benguela and Huila varies, but
the typical order is that the share of people working in
informal commerce decreases from Luanda to
Benguela, Huila, and Moxico and further down to
Cabinda.
The pattern is obviously that informal commerce
increases in provinces with a large number of
deslocados, but the share does not vary significantly
between newcomers and people who are living in the
same location where they were born. A possible
explanation is that a large influx of deslocados might
squeeze more people into informal commerce, but not
necessarily the deslocados themselves. Another possi-
bility is that deslocados are feeling safe in coastal
urban areas i.e. the same areas where import allows
for a lot of trickle down trading.
Figure 3.3 gives some more details and show that
young men and women are systematically more
frequently working in informal commerce than the
older ones. There are two likely explanations; one push
and one pull reason. The youngsters have more trouble
to find other and more safe employment and hence
this is the only opportunity for many. On the other
hand, young people are always flexible and eager to
sort out new opportunities and hence they are
definitely more attracted to high risk/potentially high
reward sub-segments of the labor market.
3.4.2. Informal manufacturing, construction
and utilities
Figure 3.4 shows that there is a completely different
structure for informal sector manufacturing, construc-
tion and utilities. This is a male sector, 10 per cent of
men are working here, while only 2 per cent of
women. For both men and women the main differ-
ences are due to the supply side, the opportunities for
this type of work. The pattern is really evident for men.
The larger the city, the larger share of people working
in this sub-segment. In Luanda and Cabinda 11 per
cent are self-employed in manufacturing, construction
and utilities, in Benguela 6 per cent and in Moxico and
Huila 3 per cent.
The group of women is small and vulnerable for random
effects. The share of women being self-employed in
manufacturing, construction and utilities is for some
reason 17 per cent in Moxico, far from what you would
expect. This might either be due to special opportunities
such as contract work for women, but more likely a
random effect. The share is also higher than average in
Benguela i.e. 4 per cent, on average in Luanda and
Cabinda and lower in Huila i.e. below 1/2 per cent.
Only at this stage individual resources do matter. For
the large groups, being men and women in Luanda and
Cabinda, a pattern of stability is presented. For men
the share increases from 8 to 16 per cent when the
experince in the job increases and for women the share
increases from 0 to 2 per cent when the age increases.
Formal education is however hardly an asset, for most
groups it does not matter, for men in rural provinces
i.e. Moxico and Huila it even reduces the probability of
being self-employed in manufacturing, construction
and utilities. Only among women in Benguela you find
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3.4.3. informal sector employment
Figure 3.5 shows the probability of being employed in
the informal sector and presents a third pattern. We
should stress that quite few are employed in the informal
sector. Self-employed people either being independent
or organized by sub-contracting work dominate the
informal sector. However there is some room for larger
informal establishments with employees as well. Here
the share varies in an opposite U-form with education.
There are very few employees among those without
education, some more among those with some
education and then the share decreases, probably
because better educated persons tend to go for either
the formal sector or create their own business.
Experience is the keyword for employment in informal
sector. Except for a very small group all other groups
are split according to experience, and longer experi-
ence systematically gives a higher share employed in
the informal sector. The share varies from 0 per cent
among the better educated with low or no experience
to 3-4 per cent among those with very little (none) or
very long education and long experience and up to 17
per cent among people with some but low education
and long experience.
Opportunities do not vary that much, but for certain
groups the probability is significantly higher in Luanda
and partly also in Benguela.
3.4.4. Informal sector professionals
Figure 3.6 gives the figures for the informal sector
professional sub-segments and displays a fourth
pattern. It is likely to display the start of a new
development trend where professionals fresh from
school and university start their own business rather
than going for the formal sector. This sub-segment is
hardly found in Cabinda. In the other provinces young
professionals or older professionals with low education
dominate it9 . So far, or at least in 1995 it was a small
sub-segment, but it shows that young professionals are
ready to and able to start their own business and this is
a segment with a clear potential for growth.
3.5. Economic return in informal sector
Tables 3.14 and 3.15 give an overview of the factors'
affecting the salary 11 from the principal occupation.
The table does not split between supply and demand
side variables but rather according the variable type.
9 It should be added that professional work here includes both
professions requiring long formal education and informal sector
professions where apprenticeship might replace the formal education.
10 All factors listed were included in the regression analysis, but non-
significant predictors were removed one by one before reaching a
model with only significant predictors.
11 Salary is distributed in a very skew matter and it was necessary to
transform it before conducting a regression to test the effects of
different factors. We used a natural log transition. This makes the
interpretation of the magnitude of effects less intuitive.
Table 3.14. Salary* from principal occupation for persons 15 to 60
years, weighted linear regression**, reduced form,
complete modell
	E i t 	 Std. Standard
	




Experience in current job
Age in years
Dependency ratio: dependents /
breadwinners 15-60
Classification variables
Informal sector labor market,
default = formal sectors




mployed in informal sector
Non-professional employees in any
branch of informal sector





Poverty, default = better off
Gender, default = male





* Natural Iogaritm of salary from principal occupation, ** Weighted least
squares regression
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1°/0 level
Table 3.15. Salary* from principal occupation for persons 15 to 60
years, weighted linear regression**, reduced form,
significant modell
Estimate Std. Standard




Experience in current job
Classification variables
Informal sector labor market,
default = formal sectors




employed in informal sector
Non-professional employees in any
branch of informal sector









* Natural logaritm of salary from principal occupation, ** Weighted least
squares regression
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The supply side or opportunities tend to dominate. Not
only is self-employment in informal commerce the
largest sub-segment, but it is also the sub-segment
offering the highest return to work. There is then a
jump to self-employment in manufacturing, construc-
tion and utilities and again a jump to other sub-seg-
ments and across provinces.
It is important to stress that this does not mean that
individual resources are not paying off ! As documen-
ted and discussed in the previous paragraphs, indivi-
dual resources are needed to be able to establish
oneself as self-employed in the informal sector. But
establishment seems to be the threshold, when
established, the payment varies less with individual
resources than sub-segment and provinces.
However, individual resources do have a certain
return. Education and age increase salary. The
measurement of experience is difficult. Only
experience from current job has been measured. It
seems as if this is a drawback. But a more likely
explanation is that persons with the ability to respond
to market changes are better able to create their own
work. They might have an equal or even longer
relevant work experience, but they are also flexible
enough to change when opportunities arise and hence
tend to have a lower experience in their current job.
Household variables like dependency ratio and poverty
hardly have any significant effect. Dependency ratio
has no effect and poverty only a low effect. We expec-
ed poverty to have both a positive and a negative
effect. Since the individual salary is a contribution to
avoid poverty, poverty tend to be related to a low
salary and hence a positive relation. On the other
hand, the salary of others tends to reduce the pressure,
or the need for a high salary and opposite, and hence
poverty might serve as an incentive to increase the
salary. Overall it has a negative effect.
Strange enough, salary does not vary between genders
when we have controlled for the other factors listed.
Hence gender is important for being able to start one's
own business but not for economic return.
People who have lived at the same location as where
they were born do not have a different salary from the
others. We saw that there were also no differences of
the probability of being able to start as self-employed.
Newcomers being more desperately needing some
income and willing to accept to work for a lower return
could explain that, but when these groups turn out to
have the same payment it requires some further
explanation. One reason might be that people migrating
have more immaterial resources than average and that
this compensates for being a newcomer. Another
explanation is partly a mirror of this. People who have
never moved might be passive and lacking immaterial
resources. Knowing their locality might bring them up to
average, but not above.
3.5.1. Salary in different informal sector sub-
segments
The next step is to sort out whether factors affecting
salary level are different across sub-segments.
Figure 3.7 shows that in the overall picture the
similarities are more striking than the differences. This
figure shows the share having a salary above the
median. Due to a high frequency just at the median, 52
per cent have a salary on or above the median. This
share varies considerably across the sub-segments. The
variations in average salaries are reflected straight
ahead in the shares earning above the median across
segments and sub-segments. In informal commerce
and informal manufacturing, construction and utilities,
85 and 74 per cent have a salary above the median.
The situation in the formal sector is really a disaster
showing that among non-professionals in the formal
sector only 28 per cent have a salary above the
median. Among professionals in the formal sector the
share is even down to 11 per cent.
Interestingly enough salary opportunities is the second
most important variable to split the groups across
provinces. Luanda and Cabinda tend to offer better
salary opportunities within all sub-segments.
Also individual and household resources make signifi-
cant splits. Poverty is partly just related to a low salary
and partly we find a compensation or pushing effect,
where a few persons from extreme poor households
have managed to become self-employed in informal
commerce and making a salary above median. It is also
a tendency but quite a weak one that people in families
with a high dependency ratio are exposed to and
manage to response to the same compensation or
pushing effect having a larger than average share with
a salary above the median. In the informal sector age
and experience are clearly negative resources, young
people manage to be flexible and gain from that.
Education and gender do not have any effects in the
informal segments. In the formal sector women have a
lower share with salary above the median and educa-
tion give a mixed effect.
We will now return in some more details to which
factors do affect the salary level within each of the
informal sector sub-segments.
3.5.2. Salary in informal commerce
In order to learn about different mechanisms across
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Table 3.16. Salary* from principal occupation for persons 15 to 60
years self-employed in informal commerce, weighted
linear regression**, reduced form, complete modell
	Estimate	 Std. 	 Stand-
	
B 	 Error 	 ardized Sig.Beta
Intercept 	 18.22 	 0.48 	 §55
Continous variables
Educational level 	 0.07 	 0.03 	 0.10 	 §§
Experience in current job 	 -0.02 	 0.01	 -0.07 §55
Age in years 	 0.01 	 0.01 	 0.06
Dependency ratio: dependants /
breadwinners 15-60 	 -0.05 	 0.08 	 -0.02
Classification variables
Province, default = Luanda
Moxico 	 -1.32 	 0.70 	 -0.07 	 5
Cabinda 	 0.55 	 1.23 	 0.02
Benguela 	 -0.75 	 0.44 	 -0.06 	 5
Huila 	 0.80 	 0.40 	 0.07 	 §§
Poverty, default = better off 	 -0.38 	 0.12 	 -0.11 555
Gender, default = male 	 0.31 	 0.13 	 0.09 	 §§
Always lived here, default = yes 	 -0.10 	 0.25 	 -0.01 	 5
Significance for model 	 0.00
R-square 	 0.05
Adjusted R-square 	 0.03
Number of observations 	 764
* Natural logaritm of salary from principal occupation, ** Weighted least
squares regression.
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level.
Table 3.17. Salary* from principal occupation for persons 15 to 60
years self-employed in informal commerce, weighted
linear regression**A232, reduced form, significant
modell
Regressor 	 mate B 	 Error ardized Sig.
	
Esti- 	 Std. Stand-
Beta
Intercept 	 18.87 	 0.17 	 §55
Continous variables
Educational level 	 0.06 	 0.03 	 0.09 	 §§
Classification variables
Province, default = all except Moxico
Moxico 	 -1.39 	 0.69 -0.07 	 §§
Poverty, default = better off 	 -0.37 	 0.12 	 -0.11 §55
Significance for model 	 0.00
R-square 	 0.02
Adjusted R-square 	 0.02
Number of observations 	 765
§ Natural logaritm of salary from principal occupation, §§ Weighted least
squares regression
Significance: * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, ***
significant at 1% level
As presented in tables 3.16 and 3.17 10, for informal
commerce, the patterns are just the same as for all
people having a salary from any sub-segment. Even the
size of the standardized regression coefficients is the
same when looking at the complete model. However
when we remove the non-significant factors one by one,
the remaining ones have to cover quite some "noise"
and we end up as presented in figure 3.17 with only
three significant regressors.
An equally important finding is that these models are
only able to explain small fractions of the variations in
salary. The main variations are causes by other factors.
Table 3.18. Salary* from principal occupation for persons 15 to 60
years self-employed in informal sector manufacturing,
construction and utilities, weighted linear
regression**, reduced form, complete modell
	 sti-mate	 Std. 	 Stand-
	
B 	 Error 	 ardized 	 Sig.Beta
Intercept 	 18.36 	 1.27
Continous variables
Educational level
Experience in current job
Age in years
Dependency ratio: dependants /
breadwinners 15-60
Classification variables





Poverty, default = better off
Gender, default = male





§ Natural logaritm of salary from principal occupation, §§ Weighted least
squares regression
Significance:§ significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§ significant
at 1% level
Table 3.19. Salary* from principal occupation for persons 15 to 60
years self-employed in informal sector manufacturing, construction
and utilities, weighted linear regression***, reduced form,
significant modell
Regressor
	 Estimate 	 Std. 	 Stand-
	
B 	 Error 	 ardized 	 Sig.Beta
Intercept 	 18.22 	 0.48 	 §55
Continous variables
Experience in current job 	 -0.02 	 0.01 	 -0.07 	 §55
Classification variables
Province, default = Luanda
Moxico 	 -1.32 	 0.70 	 -0.07 	 5
Significance for model 	 0.00
R-square 	 0.13
Adjusted R-square 	 0.12
Number of observations 	 151 
* Natural logaritm of salary from principal occupation, ** Weighted least
squares regression
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level
3.5.3. Salary in informal manufacturing,
construction, and utilities
As presented in tables 3.18 and 3.19 10, the patterns are
in general the same for informal manufacturing,
construction, and utilities as for all people having a
salary from any sub-segment, but there are some
differences. Some of the effects are larger and many
are not significant. Only poverty changes sign from
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Table 3.20. Salary* from principal occupation for persons 15 to 60
years non-professional employees in informal sector,
weighted linear regression**, reduced form, complete
modell
Table 3.22. Salary* from principal occupation for persons 15 to 60
years self-employed and employed professionals in








Experience in current job
Age in years
Dependency ratio: dependants /
breadwinners 15-60
Classification variables





Poverty, default = better off
Gender, default = male






Estimate 	 Std. 	 Stand-
	
B 	 Error 	 ardizedBeta
-0.03 	 0.05 	 -0.06
-0.01 	 0.01 	 -0.13
-0.09 	 0.02 	 -0.56






























Experience in current job
Age in years
Dependency ratio: dependants /
breadwinners 15-60
Classification variables





Poverty, default = better off
Gender, default = male






Estimate 	 Std. 	 Stand-
	









































* Natural logaritm of salary from principal occupation, ** Weighted least
squares regression
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level
Table 3.21. Salary* from principal occupation for persons 15 to 60
years non-professional employees in informal sector,
weighted linear regression**, reduced form,
significant modell
Regressor
	 Estimate 	 Std. Standardized
	
B 	 Error 	 • 	 Beta
Intercept 	 21.62 	 0.68
Continous variables
Age in years 	 -0.09 	 0.02 	 -0.54
Significance for model 	 0.00
R-square 	 0.29
Adjusted R-square 	 0.28
Number of observations 	 63
* Natural logaritm of salary from principal occupation, ** Weighted least
squares regression
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level
The most important result is that when removing non-
significant factors one by one, we end up with only two
significant factors as presented in table 3.19. The up-
country rural province Moxico offers a lower salary in
this sub-segment as in other sub-segments. Second, a
long experience in the current job, or rather the lack of
ability to be flexible either due to specialization or risk
aversion yields a lower salary.
3.5.4. Salary for informal sector employees
From the tree diagram analysis we learned that
informal sector employment is most widespread among
persons with some but low education, in Luanda and
among persons with long experience in their work. The
* Natural logaritm of salary from principal occupation, ** Weighted least
squares regression
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level
Table 3.23. Salary* from principal occupation for persons 15 to 60
years self-employed and employed professionals in
informal sector, weighted linear regression**, reduced
form, significant modell
Estimate 	 Std. Standardi
B 	 Error zed Beta









* Natural logaritm of salary from principal occupation, ** Weighted least
squares regression
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level
group is not large and one should expect few 3.21.
demonstrate this, but they also show that this signifi-
cant factors and large amplitudes. Table 3.20 and
small model is able to explain a decent part of the
variation in salary and add an important piece of
information showing that payment really decreases
with age. The effect is so large that we might talk
about two small but still separate sub-segments, one
for stable and older people having a very low salary







-0.07 0.03 -0.28 §§
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3.5.5. Salary among informal sector
professionals
In the tree-diagram analysis, we found a different
pattern among the professionals. For the regression
analysis we have extremely few observations and are
only able to sort out large effects. As presented in
tables 3.22 and 3.23 11 age has again a significant effect
showing that older people earn significantly less. But
the effect is smaller and the share of variance
explained is lower than for employees.
3.6. Summary and conclusions
3.6.1. Policy oriented summary
The analysis of the informal sector gave some stunning
results, of which some reflected our assumptions but
carried them further and added some interesting other
results as well.
Given the import restrictions (financial regulations and
civil war barriers) and the artificial exchange rate
caused by a non-convertible currency, we expected to
find informal sectors blown up in big coastal cities.
This assumption was more than confirmed. The infor-
mal sector is huge and even in relative terms larger in
provinces with big city concentrations like Luanda and
Benguela/ Lobito. The small surprise is a smaller
informal sector than average in Cabinda.
Again as expected, the informal sector is clearly gender
biased, and as expected in favor of women.
But otherwise, there are not many biases in the infor-
mal sector; in fact this is a sector for educated and
non-educated, young and old alike. The household
background does not vary either, the share working in
the informal sector is more or less the same across
better off, poor or non-poor households, across
dependency ratio, across household size, and across
gender and age of head of household.
With other words, in a sector perspective, the informal
sector is determined as follows:
• from the supply side or working opportunities, as a
traditional informal sector + trickle down trading,
and
• from the demand side or working people, as a
sector welcoming the flexibility usually demanded
and offered by women.
We expected to find a large influx of trickle down
trading but this is a serious underestimate, informal
sector commerce dominates not only the informal
sector but the overall labor market. Roughly speaking 1
of 2 or rather 9 of 16 persons having a registered
income from their principal work are working in the
informal sector and 7 of these 9 persons are self-
employed in informal commerce. Some of these are
working in traditional sub-segments but obviously a
large fraction is working in the trickle down trading
sub-segments. You will also find that 1 of 16 are
employed in traditional informal production and the
last 1 of 16 is either employed in the informal sector or
working as an informal professionals.
To put this is perspective, in Zimbabwe, around 1 of 10
are self-employed and 1/4 are working in commerce
(formal + informal) (Social Development Fund 1997) .
It is therefore likely that more than half of those self-
employed in the informal sector in urban Angola are
working in informal trickle down commerce.
The trickle down commerce is created by both push
and pull effects. Overall policy and the civil war create
opportunities pulling people to this segment and the
lack of other employment opportunities push people
into this segment. Hence we would expect to find a
number of different sub-segments providing different
opportunities and attracting different people.
We would of course like to analyze sub-segments
identified from the initial policy discussion and
especially to split between traditional trading and
trickle down trading. Unfortunately it is not possible to
go that far, but it is also of interest to analyze the
different pattern across the four sub-segments already
identified i.e. informal commerce, informal production,
informal employment and informal professional work.
The tabulation analysis showed that the informal
sector was relatively larger in large cities/ports, that
the majority of the work force was women, but
otherwise open for any social group. Informal
commerce has a more distinctive pattern. This is the
arena of what you usually consider as marginal groups,
the shares are higher among low educated, among
young, and among women, and also relatively large in
large cities/ports. Informal production is more
common in large cities/ports but otherwise different.
Men dominate this sub-sector. Experience and age
increase the probability of working here. Informal
employment is equally common in all provinces and
among women and men. This is however an arena
where you find a larger share of people with some but
not much schooling and a lower share among the
young ones. The special pattern of informal pro-
fessional work (remember this includes even non-
formal professions) is a high share among two groups,
young ones and older ones with low education.
In a joint perspective the tree-diagram analysis shows
us that the informal sector comprise a traditional part
(production, some commerce and employment) domi-
nated by mainstream groups and a policy-created part
dominated by marginal groups, people below 30 (all
levels of education), people (above 30) with low edu-
cation, and women (with low or middle education) .
The interesting question was then whether the infor-
mal sector really has a dual nature with self-employed
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marginal groups with low salaries. As shown by the
regression and tree-diagram analysis of salary and the
share having a salary above the median, the picture is
far more complicated. There are two common trends.
First the salary is clearly highest in informal commerce
followed by informal production. Second, the salary is
always highest in Luanda and lowest in Moxico.
Education might not pay off on average for your chance
to end up in the informal sector, but is does pay off in
the form of higher salary. This is not the case with
experience, on average this does not pay off at all. In fact
flexibility turns out to be more important and experience
ends up having a negative impact on your salary.
Equally import is the finding that gender, age and migra-
tion do not have any over all effects on your salary.
3.6.2. Conclusions
With the reservation that we have not been able to
trace all potential factors e.g. networks to private firms
and public sector and not to split the labor market in
all adequate sub-segments, all the data analysis
confirms a picture of a very import informal sector
comprising the following sub-segments:
• sub-segments found in any country across the
continent and
• policy created sub-segments unique for countries
with the combination of three factors, large natural
resources, civil war/ civil unrest, and a projectionist
economic policy.
Jointly these sub-segments are open for both main-
stream and marginal groups and give opportunities
(mainly self-employment) for an unusually large share
of the population. The surplus created by abnormalities
in the economy trickles down in a wide-spread fashion.
Luanda is the winner within all segments and Moxico
the looser, while the other provinces all are gaining
within some sub-segments. Women form the majority
and while education is not needed to find oppor-
tunities, it pays off through a higher salary. Otherwise
the informal market is remarkable by its equity along
the standard dimensions as measured here.
3.6.3. Policy conclusions
You might draw two really different policy conclusions
from this description. The tempting one is the surface
conclusion. Direct and indirect effects of the current
policy create a trickle down informal commerce sector
ensuring a widespread distribution of the economic
abnormalities of the economy. The informal sector
salary enables equally well or even better than the
formal sector salaries to reduce and avoid poverty. In
fact the opportunities found in the informal commerce
segment is also deemed to put a positive pressure on
the salaries in the formal sub-segments and hence
improve the living conditions for people working in
these sub-segments.
Left at this level, you might be tempted to conclude
that the market itself will ensure poverty reduction.
This is however a misplaced conclusion and so for
three reasons:
• The lion's share of the surplus channeled this way
by the economic policy will remain with the
primary line actors, such as importers and civil
servants with a position and insight allowing them
in a legal manner to exploit the situation.
• The artificial restrictions create an inefficient
economy with a lower than optimal surplus.
• The artificial produce and service market segments
and labor sub-segments give wrong signals to the
individuals. Any economy will suffer from a labor
force trained by their own improper experience not
from sustainable economic activity but from a special
form of networking and a continuos and flexible
adaptation to new opportunities. To put it in pers-
pective. In South Africa a generation of black youth
boycotted education due to the apartheid situation.
They might have helped to speed up the processes
leading to a majority Government, but they also
ended up as the lost generation. This not only might,
but for sure will be the outcome for a smaller or
larger share of the population now working in
informal commerce. And in the case of Angola it will
hardly serve any other positive purpose.
The latter reason might be the most important from a
human point of view. During the current policy regime
the current youngsters in the informal sector will loose
the competition with new and flexible generations.
Under a new policy regime they will loose the compe-
tition towards both the older generations working in
the more normal sub-segments and towards the new
generations receiving education and gaining experi-
ence from the same more normal segments.
Hence the sector policy conclusions are twofold:
• Prepare people for the changes by providing training,
being vocational training and apprenticeship, and
• Change the policy regime in a step-wise manner.
The latter means to plan for a well scheduled
change over such as a five year period including the
following steps listed in order of importance:
• replacing import quotas with import tariffs,
• reducing but not removing import tariffs over time,
• establishing a system of monitoring prices with
active dissemination of market and price infor-
mation, and
• moving to a convertible currency.
The policy changes listed above are special because
they are needed in order to smoothen the change of
the labor market, a change that inevitably will have to
take place at some point in time, either in a an abrupt
and devastating manner or in a more stepwise order.
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Figure 3.3. Share working in informal sector, commerce among various groups of laborforce, detailed












































































Box on vouchers for apprenticeship
It is worldwide experience that a Government is not well suited Various countries as different as Malawi, India and Norway
to be the sole actor to arrange for end vocational training nor are realizing the limitations of large scale public institutions
apprenticeship and so for two reasons: and the advantages of an apprenticeship system but also the
• a large scale public institution will inevitably be too large
and slow to adapt to the numerous opportunities for small typically the apprentice or his/her parents will have to pay
declining interest by employers to hire apprentices. While
the employer in India, the Government and donors willscale production and service niches open for private
typically subsidize the apprentices in Malawi and Norway. Inentrepreneurs and
Malawi the school leavers in some areas are offered a• a large-scale public training institution will hardly be able to
voucher free of charge which they might use as payment toensure a continuous upgrading of equipment and tools
a small-scale employer hiring the apprentice for a certainadapted to the changing markets.
period of time with an option for renewal. It is important toPublic vocational training might prepare well for formal large
strike a sound balance between controlling and efficiency.scale manufacturing allowing the private firms to continue with
The control system should be outsourced to NGOs andon the job training. But for the small-scale formal sector and
limited to checking at time of renewal of the apprenticeshipthe informal sector public training will hardly do.
voucher.
On the other hand the century old apprenticeship system is not
In the case of Angola an apprenticeship program shouldwithout limitations. It is often focused on traditional craft and
focus on commodity and service production but with cleareven there new equipment and tools and other changes in
limitations on retail trade.production structures are often reducing the need of a master
for an apprentice to serve as an assistant. But the youngsters
still have a need to learn a trade and the society needs them.
Hence the Government should provide some support.
Figure 3.2. Share working in informal sector, commerce among various groups of laborforce











Figure 3.4. Share working in informal sector: manufacturing, construction and utilities among various groups of laborforce























































Figure 3.5. Share working in informal sector: employed non-professionals among various groups of laborforce
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Figure 3.6. Share working in informal sector: professionals among various groups of laborforce
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4. Analysis of poverty in rural areas
The main finding from several poverty studies across
the African Continent, such as reported from Zambia
(CSO 1994, 1998) and Zimbabwe (The Social Develop-
ment Fund 1997) and on a summary basis (World
Bank 1997), is that poverty is more widespread in rural
areas. As for urban areas it is often stated that the
main asset of the rural poor is their labor. But there
also seems to be an agreement by different studies
such as (UNDP 1998, Wold 1997 and World Bank
1997) that the poor lack access to sufficient credit,
infrastructure and competitive markets. The UNDP
study also refers to lack of productive land, but while
the study covers the overall African continents, it only
refers to the quite few densely populated countries as
Malawi and Rwanda.
It is outside the scope of this report to analyze the
causes of rural poverty as such. The approach is rather
limited to analyzing the distribution of poverty. This
will then allow identifying some likely causes of pover-
ty in rural areas, but does not pretend to provide a
comprehensive list of causes and the relative impor-
tance of the different causes of poverty.
4.1. Two poverty line approaches, two poverty
lines, and two levels of poverty — one in
urban and one in rural areas.
As outlined in chapter 10 we have finalized the calcula-
ten 	 12 	 identifiedststarted bd INE na d i ntif	 twosseparate 
absolutev rpo e ty lines, one for urban areas and one for
rural areas. The food component of these poverty lines
are both based on the FAO recommendation for 2100
kcal for each adult equivalent per day following the
average food consumption pattern in rural and urban
areas respectively. We have then added a non-food
component using the same share of non-food versus
food consumption as for the 10 per cent or decile with
a consumption just around the poverty line, again for
rural and urban areas respectively. As presented in
chapter 10 this approach gives an absolute poverty line
in urban areas in February 1995 of NKw 55 300 000
(KwR 55 300) or KwR 19 292 000 in October 1996
prices and it gives an absolute poverty line in rural
12 Not published.
areas of KwR 3 828 567 in October 1996. The gap
between these lines is not related to different poverty
levels since the approach is the same, but due to a
cheaper consumption pattern in rural areas and price
differences, being both price level differences between
rural and urban areas and a different pace of price
changes from early 1995 to late 1996.
As discussed in chapter 2, 61.1 per cent of the urban
population are poor (moderate or extreme poor) . The
absolute poverty line in urban areas is lower and only
40.2 per cent are moderate or extreme poor in urban
areas based upon this poverty line 13 . People in rural
areas are considerably worse off and 78.0 per cent are
moderate or extreme poor according to the absolute
poverty line in rural areas 13 .
4.2. Poverty in rural areas following a rural
absolute poverty line.
As the relative poverty line presented in chapter 2, the
absolute poverty line allows for an analysis of in which
areas and socio-economic groups you find the highest
levels of poverty.
Figure 4.1. Rural poverty and extreme poverty in various
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Figure 4.2. Rural poverty and extreme poverty in various
provinces and by various groups of gender and age of
head of household
• PO - index E3 P1 - index D P2 - index
Figures 4.1 and 4.2. and table 4.1 give us the general
picture, presenting poverty head count for extreme
poor, moderate poor and all poor; poverty gap; and
poverty severity across provinces and by gender and
age group of the head of household.
As shown by figure 4.2 women headed households
have on average a higher poverty head count, poverty
gap and poverty severity than male headed; house-
holds with a head above 50 are worse off than younger
ones along all these three dimensions; while the
picture is more complex across provinces. The poverty
gap and poverty severity are highest in Cunene, while
the poverty head count is larger in Huambo, Huila and
Kwanza Sul.
The urban data on contribution to poverty indices
showed that the poverty gap and the poverty severity
piled up in certain areas and group. This is hardly the
case in rural areas. In fact the contribution to poverty
incidence, poverty gap and poverty severity follows
almost as by calculation from the poverty level and
population share in each province and group. The one
exception is across age. Poverty incidence increases
across age and hence you would expect a certain
increase also in hard core poverty measured by poverty
severity across age. This is clearly the case, not only so,
in fact poverty severity increased more than the
poverty level measured by poverty incidence. Hard
core poverty really piles up among the old households.
At that age, the children have left and settled by
themselves and the reduced production capacity and
lack of ability to undertake seasonal migration for
work are only partly outset by experience, well
cultivated soil and support from younger family
members.
Poverty incidence might be higher in Kwanza Sul,
Huambo, Huila, and among women headed
households, but poverty severity does no pile up here.
When the fieldwork was conducted in the second half
of 1996, the civil unrest was prevalent in more than
half the provinces. Some province were fully controlled
by the Government and enjoyed a peaceful situation
such as Cabinda, Bengo, Benguela and Huila. But pro-
bably the most common situation was one of a relative-
ly peaceful but labile situation , which still only offered
access to markets for a small or larger proportion of
the rural population.
The level of civil unrest can however not explain the
provincial differences in poverty levels. Cabinda
(Government controlled) stands apart with a very low
poverty head count and there is quite a step to the next
group being Bengo (Government controlled), Kwanza
Norte (UNITA controlled back in 1994 and still con-
iderable UNITA influx in 1996) and Benguela (Govern-
ment controlled) . Hence the general impression is that
Government control combined with location along the
shore or as hinterland of the capital either really gives
more opportunities and hence lower poverty levels
and/or just higher prices and incomes. As being com-
mon, provinces with a low poverty level also has a low
poverty severity. While Cunene is in the middle concer-
ning poverty level, it clearly has the most unequal
poverty distribution. We assume this reflect an even
more isolated situation than the other up-country
provinces.
Interestingly enough the expected higher poverty level
among women headed households are hardly con-
firmed and it turns out that the youngest families have
a significantly lower poverty rate than older families,
again contrary to what one would expect. This is a
pattern consistent with the urban one. The groups that
are flexible and easily adapt to a changing environ-
ment, either because they are forced as the women
headed households or because they usually are flexible
and ready for changes as the younger families, have
the lower poverty rates. The unequal distribution of
poverty is clearly even in relative terms larger among
the older households than the younger ones. It looks in
fact as if quite large shares of younger families do
manage the lack of stability.
Only further analysis of income sources and patterns
will tell the full story, but this is a very interesting
finding and a strong argument for a dedicated analysis
of small-scale farmers under the current financial
regime and lack of transportation.
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Table 4.1. Rural poverty, extreme poverty and poverty indices in various provinces and by various groups of gender and age of head of
household. Per cent and index value 0 -1
Poverty
Better off 	 100.0 	 0.0 	 0.0
Poor 	 0.0 	 100.0 	 0.0
Extreme poor 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 100.0
Province
Cabinda 	 69.3 	 10.9 	 19.7
Kwanza Norte 	 35.5 	 12.0 	 52.5
Kwanza Sul 	 16.0 	 11.8 	 72.2
Benguela 	 33.6 	 12.5 	 53.9
Huambo 	 12.1 	 6.7 	 81.2
Namibe 	 32.5 	 6.5 	 61.0
Huila 	 13.6 	 6.5	 79.9
Cunene 	 22.7 	 4.0 	 73.3
Bengo 	 47.2 	 5.6 	 47.2
Gender of head
Man 	 22.7 	 8.8 	 68.5




















































0.00 	 0.22 	 0.00 	 0.00	 0.00
0.02 	 0.08 	 0.11 	 0.02 	 0.01
0.48 	 0.70 	 0.89 	 0.98 	 1.00
0.05 	 0.05 	 0.02 	 0.01 	 0.01
0.22 	 0.08 	 0.07 	 0.06 	 0.06
0.35 	 0.13 	 0.14 	 0.14 	 0.14
0.26 	 0.09 	 0.08 	 0.07 	 0.07
0.38 	 0.39 	 0.44 	 0.45 	 0.45
0.28 	 0.03 	 0.02 	 0.02 	 0.02
0.42 	 0.15 	 0.17 	 0.18 	 0.19
0.50 	 0.03 	 0.03 	 0.03 	 0.04
0.20 	 0.05 	 0.03 	 0.03 	 0.03
0.33 	 0.76 	 0.75 	 0.74 	 0.74
0.36 	 0.24 	 0.25 	 0.26 	 0.26
0.24 	 0.28 	 0.25 	 0.22 	 0.21
0.33 	 0.26 	 0.27 	 0.27 	 0.26
0.38 	 0.18 	 0.19 	 0.20 	 0.20
0.40 	 0.27 	 0.29 	 0.31 	 0.32
0.33 	 1.00 	 1.00 	 1.00 	 1.00
4.3. Consumption pattern among rural extreme
poor, moderate poor and better off
Figure 4.3 and table 4.2 show surprising differences in
consumption pattern across poverty level. One of the
first recognized pattern of consumption was that the
food share of consumption decreases both across groups
and over time when the consumption level increases
and this pattern is known as Engel's law. Consumer and
expenditure surveys in high income developed countries
have shown that Engel's law needs some modification
and it is not valid in all cases. First, Engel's law
addresses food ingredients and not ready-made food
and second, it is not design to address luxury food
items. In these cases the food share increases with
income at the upper end of the income distribution.
More surprisingly this is also the case in rural Angola.
The extreme poor has a lower food share than the better
off. The main explanation is likely to be other absolute
necessities, such as expenses for energy and what is
called domestic expenses such as soap bars. Interestingly
enough even school fees are considered a necessity
among the extreme poor who manage to squeeze them
in. Since these are fixed, it means a larger share of total
expenditures is allocated for education among the
extreme poor. But still this pattern is not common and
would definitely deserve some further investigation.
The pattern across provinces varies in a pattern hard to
understand without further information. The pattern in
various groups after gender and age of the head of
household is more common. Women headed house-
holds and the oldest ones have the highest poverty
level and the highest food budget share.
Table 4.3 tells us that the food commodity consump-
tion pattern is more like what we expected. The
extreme poor spend more than 1/4 of their total budget
on maize meallie meal and very little on luxury goods
as sugar and rice. However they spend a substantial
share on fish. Expenses on salt are as for education.
The absolute amount is smaller among the extreme
poor, but the share is still higher.
The provincial differences are large and reflect both
local food habits like cassava meallie meal in Cunene
and a lower poverty level and higher rice consumption
in Cabinda. Again men headed households and
younger households have a more luxury oriented
consumption pattern including a large share of food
items as rice and cooking oil.
4.4. Causes of poverty
4.4.1. Civil war and unrest
It is outside the scope of this study to analyze the direct
effects of civil war and unrest. It is in fact also very hard
to disentangle indirect effects of the civil war and
unrest. The lack of security might obviously be devas-
tating at the household level and really discourage
anything that requires a long time horizon such as crop
cultivation for sale. It is also devastating at community
and provincial level by cutting off trade links and other
connection to central areas and market places. But how
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Table 4.2. Commodity group consumption expenditures in per cent by various rural poverty groups, provinces, gender and age of head of
household. Per cent
Food 	 Health Education Transport Housing 	 Energy Domestic Clothing Agricultur 	 Other 	 Total Number	al xp.	 exp.
Poverty
Better off 	 74.1 	 3.2 	 0.5 	 1.0 	 0.8 	 6.3 	 6.5 	 3.0 	 1.0 	 3.6 	 100.0 	 641
Poor 	 74.9 	 3.3 	 0.7 	 0.7 	 0.8 	 6.5 	 6.6 	 3.0 	 0.8 	 2.6 	 100.0 	 244
Extreme poor 	 70.2 	 3.1 	 1.4 	 0.9 	 1.0 	 7.6 	 7.5 	 3.3 	 1.6 	 3.3 	 100.0 	 2023
Province
Cabinda 	 67.9 	 5.0 	 1.8 	 0.9 	 0.2 	 6.0 	 6.4 	 6.5 	 2.0 	 3.3 	 100.0 	 137
Kwanza Norte 	 71.4 	 2.7 	 0.9 	 1.3 	 0.5 	 8.8 	 8.1 	 2.4 	 0.2 	 3.5 	 100.0 	 242
Kwanza Sul 	 51.4 	 7.0	 1.8 	 2.4 	 4.5	 7.5 	 9.3 	 5.1 	 2.8 	 8.1 	 100.0 	 381
Benguela 	 75.9 	 2.3 	 0.6 	 1.1 	 1.9	 5.9 	 6.0 	 2.8 	 0.9 	 2.8 	 100.0 	 271
Huambo 	 82.3 	 1.3	 1.1 	 0.5 	 0.2 	 4.9 	 4.6 	 1.8 	 1.6 	 1.7 	 100.0 	 1 134
Namibe 	 78.6 	 5.8 	 0.2 	 0.0 	 0.1 	 4.4 	 3.7 	 0.9 	 0.0 	 6.3 	 100.0 	 77
Huila 	 73.6 	 3.8 	 1.3 	 0.3 	 0.3 	 5.8 	 6.3 	 5.0 	 1.0 	 2.5 	 100.0 	 447
Cunene 	 68.7 	 5.3 	 0.1 	 0.1 	 0.0 	 8.0 	 7.1 	 4.0 	 0.5 	 6.1 	 100.0 	 75
Bengo 	 71.5 	 3.7 	 1.7 	 1.4 	 0.6 	 6.0 	 7.0 	 2.9 	 0.8 	 4.3 	 100.0 	 144
Gender of head
Man 	 72.5 	 3.3 	 1.1 	 1.0 	 1.2 	 6.1 	 6.3 	 3.5 	 1.5 	 3.6 	 100.0 	 2 197
Woman 	 76.6 	 2.8 	 1.3 	 0.6 	 0.4 	 6.3 	 6.2 	 2.2 	 1.2 	 2.5 	 100.0 	 706
Age of head
15-29 	 72.9 	 2.6 	 0.5 	 1.1 	 1.0 	 6.9 	 7.1 	 3.7 	 1.6 	 2.7 	 100.0 	 819
30-39 	 73.9 	 3.5 	 1.3 	 0.9 	 1.0 	 5.7 	 5.9 	 3.4 	 1.1 	 3.3 	 100.0 	 769
40-49 	 72.8 	 2.9 	 1.9 	 0.8 	 0.7 	 6.1 	 6.1 	 3.2 	 1.5 	 3.9 	 100.0 	 519
50+ 	 74.3 	 3.6	 1.2 	 0.7 	 1.0 	 5.8 	 5.8 	 2.5 	 1.4 	 3.7 	 100.0 	 790
Total 	 73.5 	 3.2 	 1.2 	 0.9 	 1.0 	 6.1 	 6.3 	 3.2 	 1.4 	 3.3 	 100.0 	 2 903
100 % -               
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Table 4.3. 	 Detailed food consumption expenditures in per cent by various rural poverty groups, provinces, gender and age of head of
household










Better off 5.08 19.01 0.58 1.75 6.37 12.58 2.12 0.82 9.17 4.49 0.16 2.64 5.67 2.83 2.63 75.90 24.10 100.00 641
Poor 3.17 24.74 0.84 1.65 4.05 13.16 1.07 1.44 11.05 3.66 0.12 1.16 5.20 4.18 0.89 76.39 23.61 100.00 244
Extreme poor 4.17 26.85 0.93 0.84 1.63 16.51 1.20 1.13 6.05 1.73 0.01 0.72 3.89 5.89 0.86 72.41 27.59 100.00 2023
Province
Cabinda 7.26 0.59 1.20 2.25 10.45 14.50 1.68 0.19 3.87 8.97 0.11 3.66 8.47 2.29 2.46 67.93 32.07 100.00 137
Kwanza Norte 3.41 2.83 0.22 3.04 7.43 18.97 0.93 0.16 11.74 5.17 0.00 0.98 2.61 11.54 2.40 71.43 28.57 100.00 242
Kwanza Sul 1.65 4.97 2.19 1.83 1.74 21.12 0.72 0.48 5.36 1.27 0.01 1.87 3.23 3.98 1.00 51.43 48.57 100.00 381
Benguela 5.50 33.38 0.58 0.38 1.38 13.38 0.86 1.92 7.42 0.39 0.17 0.08 2.85 3.62 3.98 75.88 24.12 100.00 271
Huambo 1.12 46.62 0.27 0.01 1.13 12.74 0.49 1.68 6.47 0.12 0.03 0.01 5.96 5.37 0.31 82.32 17.68 100.00 1 134
Namibe 10.23 28.37 0.38 0.07 3.76 5.08 2.44 0.49 6.85 5.15 0.25 2.18 5.71 7.32 0.35 78.63 21.37 100.00 77
Huila 7.92 19.33 0.88 1.44 2.95 18.22 1.78 1.09 7.73 5.51 0.01 0.32 2.42 3.18 0.85 73.64 26.36 100.00 447
Cunene 20.56 0.46 3.48 0.00 1.87 4.31 17.83 0.00 1.46 2.25 0.00 7.19 2.02 7.31 0.00 68.74 31.26 100.00 75
Bengo 8.51 4.30 0.12 3.44 5.97 12.54 1.01 0.33 12.97 5.55 0.20 5.65 4.08 4.23 2.60 71.49 28.51 100.00 144
Gender of head
Man 4.31 23.26 0.91 1.20 3.13 15.23 1.60 1.04 7.36 2.57 0.06 1.44 4.39 4.77 1.22 72.48 27.52 100.00 2 197
Woman 4.21 30.47 0.62 0.79 1.98 15.88 0.73 1.25 6.37 2.23 0.03 0.30 4.34 6.10 1.26 76.56 23.44 100.00 706
Age of head
15-29 3.36 24.34 0.80 0.82 3.90 13.35 1.12 1.35 8.73 2.72 0.09 0.71 5.05 4.50 1.99 72.86 27.14 100.00 819
30-39 4.17 26.56 0.69 1.09 2.67 15.40 1.80 1.28 7.09 2.17 0.04 1.17 4.47 4.24 1.04 73.89 26.11 100.00 769
40-49 4.36 24.49 1.19 1.63 3.19 15.20 1.45 0.97 6.13 2.47 0.08 1.48 4.50 4.65 0.98 72.77 27.23 100.00 519
50+ 5.32 24.45 0.80 1.08 1.78 17.62 1.25 0.69 6.23 2.61 0.00 1.47 3.47 6.69 0.81 74.27 25.73 100.00 790
Total 4.29 25.00 0.85 1.11 2.87 15.38 1.39 1.08 7.14 2.50 0.05 1.18 4.37 5.08 1.24 73.52 26.48 100.00 2 903
4.4.2. Other causes of rural poverty
It turns out that the main causes of poverty appearing
in the regression analysis are location or province. As
for the analysis between rural and urban areas, it is
hard to disentangle the different effects, in this case
being different poverty levels or different price levels.
The only way would be to construct separate poverty
lines for each province. This is outside the scope of this
study, and we rather accept that it is not possible to
sort out the geographical impact. Hence "noise" from
the geographical effects might hide other causal links
making it harder to verify an impact of other factors.
However, the regression analysis presented in tables
4.4 and 4.5 show that poverty increases when:
• the age of the head of household increases,
• if the male head can not read and write a simple
phrase, and
• if the female head works as a crop farmer rather
than does another type of work.
It also shows that there are no significant impact on
poverty if the female head can not read and write a
simple phrase, whether the main head is a women or a
man, whether they have lived at the present location
for more than four years or not, whether the depend-
ency ratio is low or high, nor an impact from other
types of job.
Also the classification analysis as presented in tables
4.4 and 4•5 9 show that the main reason behind poverty
appears to be location or province. An analysis
allowing for different causal factors in the different
groups of provinces yields however additional infor-
mation. Again the reading and writing ability of the
male head and the age of the main head are important.
Even the occupation of the male head has an impact
within two provinces (Kwanza Sul and Cunene) and
among the middle aged in two other provinces
(Huambo and Huila) . Finally a large dependency ratio
gives increased poverty
4.5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
4.5.1. Conclusions
The main conclusion is pretty strong and straight-
forward. Poverty might be substantial in urban areas,
but following a common approach, the absolute poverty
line, the share of moderate and extreme poor people is
almost twice as high in rural areas, 78 per cent in rural
areas versus 40 per cent in urban areas.
Our hypothesis is that the isolation of large rural areas
is the main reason. Civil unrest, lack of a proper main-
tained road infrastructure and lack of transportation
opportunities have for years forced a large share of the
rural population into a very unsound mixture of almost
subsistence farming combined with emergency relief in
certain areas and periods. Hence the rural population
has lost both opportunities and incentives to produce
for marketing.
Only further analysis of the Inquerito aos Agregados
Rurais (Departamento de Estatistica e de Informåtica
1997) might allow us to gain support or rather reject
this hypothesis.
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Table 4.4. Rural areas: total expenditures per adult equivalent*,
weighted linear regression**, reduced form, complete
modell
Esti- Std. Stand-
mate B Error ardized Sig.Beta
Intercept
Continous variables
Age of household head
Dependency ratio: dependents /
breadwinners 15-60
Yerrs at current residence
Classification variables





















Male head: Read and write a simple
frase
Female head: Read and write a simple
frase






* Logaritm of total expenditure per adult equivalent, ** Weighted least squares
regression
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level
4.5.2. Policy recommendations
Currently both the Government and donors alike seem
to accept that the civil unrest is deemed to lead to a
continued migration to urban areas, especially to the
Luanda area and the policy issue is hardly how to
improve the situation in rural areas enough to reduce
this migration pattern.
And there are definitely valid reasons not to invest in
improved infrastructure in areas with civil unrest, but
there is an equally obvious need to reduce the influx to
areas like Luanda. Youngster who have grown up in a
large city will never be very likely to return to rural
areas and it is now the base for a policy for the future
is needed.
Table 4.5. Rural areas: total expenditures per adult equivalent*,






Age of household head
Classification variables
Occupational status. female head. default=not
farmers
Farmers















* Logaritm of total expenditure per adult equivalent, ** Weighted least squares
regression
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level
It is important to recognize that there is not only one,
but two reasons for the low sale of agricultural pro-
duce from rural to urban areas, one linked to supply
and one to demand:
• supply side - as already discussed the obvious reason
for the low sale of agricultural produce from rural
to urban areas is the lack of a maintained physical
infrastructure and transport opportunities, and
• demand side - both donors and the Government are
implementing a policy that encourages trade.
Donors directly destroy the market for national
farmers by continuing to finance import of food
commodities for emergency relief rather than
buying from farmers in the hinterland. The Govern-
ment also destroys the market for national farmers
but they do it indirectly by retaining the artificial
currency which makes is extremely profitable for
traders to import food commodities rather than
relying on own consumption.
A proper policy to encourage the rural population to
stay in their villages is to give a new emphasis to
buying food from the hinterland. This approach do not
require an end to civil unrest and will serve as both a
short and long term incentive for rural people to
remain in their villages. Such a program should
comprise the following main element:
• the main element will be to build a strategic food
reserve by a program to buy staple food that store
well (e.g. maize and millet but not cassava) to be
operational both in large surplus and normal years.
Regressor
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Figure 4.5. Extreme poverty in rural areas, per cent below extreme absolute poverty line
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Such a program should be coordinated by the Govern- 	 • marketing opportunities are serving as an incentive
ment with assistance from a main donor such us UNDP 	 to the rural population, an incentive that might
or UNICEF but the operations as such would gain from 	 even improve the transition to a peaceful situation
being decentralized to public authorities and a series of
	
in the future, and
donors. 	 • such as reserve means that the Government and
donors are better prepared when future emergency
The great advantage of a strategic food reserve 	 situations develop.
program is the two-sided effect:
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5. Urban areas: Education
It is a consistent finding across the world that education
pays off both for the country and the individual. The
analysis in chapter 2 confirmed that this is also the case
in urban Angola. Parents are aware of education for
their 	 for the future.the best 	 e fuir children being  st investmen
Also poor parents are only too aware of this fact. But as
stated in Moser and Holland (1997) labor is often the
only asset of the poor household. Whether they are "old"
members of the urban poor or as assumed by UNDP
(1998) tend to be migrants from rural areas, having
migrated because they lacked productive employment"
and "More often than not, they are low-skilled with little
or no education", their labor might be an asset but only
a low value asset. Hence as Moser and Holland (1997)
find "...cumulative evidence shows that the poorest
households, those in which adult workers are unable to
earn enough to keep the family afloat, are most likely to
send their children out to work."
Whether this happen Angolain An  is however  not only the
result of lack of resources in the poor household, but
also caused by quality of education. Without proper
reflection one might think that if the costs of schooling
is low or even free, the poor parents are equally likely
to send their children to school as the better off. But as
stated above the poor households might suffer even
more from a low quality school, since the lack of
quality tends to require a repetition of several grades.
5.1. School attendance
To break the vicious circle of poor people not being
able to send their children to school yielding unedu-
cated children not being able to earn a decent living
and therefore ending up in poverty themselves, the
focus should be on access to primary education for
poor versus non-poor children.
Let us first look at the general pattern of school atten-
dance among children in primary school age. Figures
5.1 and 5.2 and tables 5.1-5.3 show school attenance
across province, gender, and age. There are three
levels of school attendance among the provinces. In
Cabinda and Benguela more than 80 per cent of
children at school age attend school, in Luanda and.
Huila between 75 and 80 attend and in Moxico only
Figure 5.1. School attendance in various poverty groups,
provinces & gender; per cent






• Attending 0 Not attending
Figure 5.2. School attendance in various age groups, per cent
• Attending 	 0 Not attending
71 er cent attend. It is difficult to triangulate or compare
these figures with overall figures from the school
authorities. Since information on children in each
catchment area is not available, you can not calculate
attendance rates. Perfil Estatistico Economico e Social
1991-94 (INE 1995: 122) tells however that Moxico has
the lowest students/class and students/ teacher ratios,
Luanda comes next and Benguela is the worst, hence the
exact opposite order. Careful interretation is needed, but
this would indicate that the most likely factors behind
different school attendance are poverty among the
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Table 5.1. School attendance in five provinces. Per cent
Attending 	 Notattending
Luanda 	 77 	 23 	 100 	 5 780
Moxico 	 71 	 29 	 100 	 589
Cabinda 	 83 	 17 	 100 	 1003
Benguela 	 86 	 14 	 100 	 1997
Huila 	 79 	 21 	 100 	 1250
Total 	 78 	 22 	 100 	 10619
large drop and would worry the educational authori-
ties. The good news if of course the high attendance
rate among the moderate poor families. The extreme
poor at around only 10 per cent and hence they might
be assisted by special policy arrangements. The likely
explanation is that families will really do their best to
keep children at school unless they really are forced to
utilize their labor for survival.
Total 	 Number
Even within the provinces, the general tendency is that
Table 5.3. School attendance among various school age groups. 	 the big drop in school attendance is from moderatePer cent
poor to extreme poor families. However in Cabinda
	Attending	 of 	 Total 	 Number 	 and Huila attendance drop step by step from the betterattendi9 
Boys 	 79 	 21 	 100 	 5 312 	 off to the moderate poor to the extreme poor.
Girls 	 78 	 22 	 100 	 5 307
Total 	 78 	 22 	 100 	 10 619 	There are reasons to expect poverty to have a larger
impact for girls than boys. Lucky enough this is not the
	Table 5.3. School attendance among various school age groups. 	 case. Extreme poverty leads to equal drops in school
Per cent 	 attendance for girls and boys.
Attending 	 Notattending
6 	 52 	 48 	 100 	 1 194
7 	 70 	 30 	 100 	 960
8 	 84 	 16 	 100 	 1 083
9 	 83 	 17 	 100 	 900
10 	 89 	 11 	 100 	 1073
11 	 88 	 12 	 100 	 758
12 	 87 	 13 	 100 	 1125
13 	 88 	 12 	 100 	 813
14 	 83 	 17 	 100 	 940
15 	 74 	 26 	 100 	 870
16 	 70 	 30 	 100 	 903
Total 	 78 	 22 	 100 	 10619
Table 5.4. School attendance among various poverty groups.
Per cent
Attending 	 Notattending
Better off 	 81 	 19 	 100 	 2652
Poor 	 79 	 21 	 100 	 5272
Extreme poor 	 69 	 31 	 100 	 1228
Total 	 78 	 22 	 100 	 9152
From a gender point of view the situation is optimistic,
school attendance is equal among girls and boys.
There are more reasons to be worried by low school
attendance among the 6 and 7 years old. Since this
survey was conducted in urban areas only, this would
hardly be due to a long distance walking to school. As
you would expect, school attendance tends to drop
between the secondary school age groups.
Let us now look at how poverty affects school atten-
dance, refer to figure 5.1 and table 5.4.
As you would expect poverty causes lower school
attendance. The big drop 	 from 	 offis however 	 better f
and moderate poor families (around 80 per cent) to
extremely poor families (around 70 per cent) . This is a
This is not the case with school attendance across age.
School attendance varies differently over age for better
off, moderate poor and extreme poor families. The
better off are reluctant to send their 6 year old children
to school, but from 7 to 16 years of age school atten-
dance is quite high, while still declining over the years.
The moderate poor are reluctant to send both the 6
and 7- year-old children to school and at 15 and 16
years of age attendance rate is dropping considerably.
The extreme poor are more reluctant to send young
children to school and the attendance rate drops even
earlier in the other end. Only children between 10 and
13 have a decent attendance rate.
5.2. Efficiency and repetition
Public resources are stretched in the educational as
well as other sectors and the need to ensure efficiency
is large. Obviously one would be interested in ensuring
that a large proportion of children not only attend
primary school for some years, but even complete the
primary school and achieves functional literacy. With
degrading resources per student one would expect the
Figure 5.3. School grade attendance in various school age
groups*, per cent
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Table 5.5. School grade attendance among various school age groups. Per cent
6 	 7 	 8 	 9 	 10 11 	 12 	 13 	 14 	 15 	 16 	 Total
	6 	 3 	 2 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 10
	
22 	 14 	 11 	 6 	 3 	 0 	 1 	 16
	
28 	 28 	 22 	 17	 10 	 4 	 1 	 18
	
22 	 26 	 21 	 22 	 17 	 9 	 9 	 15
	
14 	 18 	 25 	 25 	 21	 24 	 13 	 15
	
5 	 8 	 12 	 16 	 20 	 28 	 20 	 11
	
1 	 2 	 6 	 11 	 19 	 19 	 23 	 8
	
0 	 1 	 1 	 2 	 7 	 8 	 20 	 4
	
2 	 1 	 0 	 2 	 3 	 7 	 12 	 4
	
100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
	










































































Table 5.6. School grade attendance among various school age and poverty groups. Per cent
6 	 7 	 8 	 9 	 10 11 	 12 	 13 	 14 	 15 	 16
Better off
1st grade 	 75 	 35 	 19 	 11 	 3 	 4	 2 	 0
2nd grade 	 16 	 43 	 41 	 31 	 19 	 18	 10 	 4
3rd grade 	 3 	 16 	 25 	 35 	 27 	 22 	 21 	 16
4th grade 	 0 	 2 	 10 	 21 	 22 	 20 	 19 	 21
5th grade 	 0 	 0 	 3 	 1 	 16 	 20 	 20 	 27
6th grade 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 1 	 10 	 13 	 17 	 15
7th grade 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 1 	 0	 0 	 8 	 13
8th grade 	 0 	 0 	 1 	 0 	 0	 2 	 3 	 4
None 	 6 	 3 	 2 	 0 	 2 	 1 	 0 	 1
Total 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
Poor
1st grade 	 77 	 55 	 21 	 13 	 7 	 2 	 2 	 0
2nd grade 	 13 	 28 	 46 	 33 	 22 	 12 	 12 	 7
3rd grade 	 1 	 11 	 22 	 30 	 29 	 31 	 20 	 14
4th grade 	 0 	 1 	 4 	 17 	 23 	 29 	 23 	 22
5th grade 	 0 	 0 	 2 	 4	 12 	 17 	 28 	 23
6th grade 	 0 	 1 	 0 	 0 	 2 	 4	 10 	 19
7th grade 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 1 	 3 	 5 	 10
8th grade 	 0 	 0	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 1
None 	 9 	 3 	 5 	 3 	 3 	 2 	 0 	 3
Total 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
Extreme poor
1st grade 	 84 	 35 	 20 	 24 	 3 	 4 	 3 	 0
2nd grade 	 1 	 53 	 35 	 30 	 34 	 9 	 8 	 1
3rd grade 	 1 	 12 	 35 	 25 	 28 	 33 	 35 	 33
4th grade 	 0 	 0 	 5 	 21 	 14 	 27 	 15 	 23
5th grade 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 15 	 17 	 20 	 25
6th grade 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 4	 10 	 14 	 7
7th grade 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 4	 9
8th grade 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 2 	 0 	 0 	 2
None 	 14 	 0	 5 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0
Total	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
Number 	 317 	 450	 648 	 616	 813 	 605 	 909 	 687
teaching to suffer. As we have seen this has not really
lead to lower attendance among the peak age group,
but one would expect that a growing number need to
repeat grades, demanding more resources and leading
to a vicious circle of less resources per student, more
repetition and less resources. Table 5.5 gives an
overview of the grade and age pattern.
The story told in figure 5.3 and table 5.5 is a grim one.
The mode grade (the most frequent grade) is grade 1 for
2 years, grade 2 for another 2 years and even grade 3
for another three years. In fact the mode grade is still
7 for the 16 years old students. Roughly speaking the
typical student finishes school 4 years too late and
spends 3 years repeating grades. In fact we are close to a
situation where repetitions requires 50 per cent extra
resources compared to a situation with no repetition.
This is a very poor performance from a budget or
efficiency perspective, but turned around it documents
a large potential for increasing efficiency by creating a
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Table 5.7. School grade/ age lag among various poverty groups.
Per cent
Better off	 Poor




























Table 5.8. School grade/ age lag three years and more among
various age and poverty groups. Per cent













Table 5.9. School grade/ age lag three years and more among
boys and girls in various poverty groups. Per cent
Better off 	 Poor 	 Extreme poor
Boys 	 29 	 70 	 30
Girls 	 28 	 71 	 30
Tota I
	
28 	 70 	 30
5.3. Equity and indirect efficiency
Given the shorter period of a decent attendance ratio
among the moderate poor and the extreme poor, one
would expect them to suffer most from the vicious
repetition circle, refer to table 5.6.
The picture is however not that straight forward. The
better off children completes the first grades faster but
will then tend to repeat grades more or less to the
same degree. The second difference is that they
continue the climbing and the typical 16 years old
better off student will attend secondary school.
The typical extremely poor child will repeat the early
grades as the average but never reach as high up in the
grades as the average student and quite few will attend
secondary school.
The typical extremely poor child will really repeat
classes a number of times and at the age of 13 when
they are supposed to complete primary school, she is
still attending third grade.
These attendance rates over age demonstrate first a
very low efficiency and second that while the school
attendance at peak age groups are not that different
across poverty levels, this only hides a large discre-
pancy and inequality in access to primary schooling
among extreme poor and moderate poor versus better
off children.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 tell the proportion of children
having started too late and/or repeated 3 classes or
more. They also give another perspective to the same
story as the grade/age matrix. Table 5.7 shows that
multiple repetition is equally common among better
off, moderate poor and extreme poor. Tables 5.8 shows
that this pattern holds across age groups and gender.
But when you look at the proportion across grades you
will discover that the while the better off also are
multiple repeaters to a large extent, the proportion of
multiple repeaters among the poor and especially
among the extreme poor are growing high at lower
grades. Table 5.9 shows that the pattern is equally
worse among boys and girls.
The complete picture seems to be that all children are
repeating a number of times drawing heavily on con-
strained resources. The better off children are however
still able to complete primary school to a quite large
extent, while the poor children and especially the
extreme poor start late and start repeating quite early,
ending up never being able to complete primary
school.
Hence breaking the vicious circle of low resources and
repetition seems to be the challenge from both an
efficiency perspective and a pro-poor policy point of
view. The late change in number of shifts is an impor-
tant step in this direction. At the time of the survey in
1995 and up to 1997 schools maintained 4 shifts a day
with very short school days like 2 hours for each shift.
Additional private tuition/ school was needed but only
non-poor could afford this. Situation has changed as of
1998, with only 2 shifts and longer days. The draw-
back is long lines and parents having to pay gasosas to
enroll their children. If the system of gasosas is allowed
to develop, the better off will again gain, but if not, the
improved quality combined with a higher threshold to
enroll might both increase efficiency and turn out to be
a pro-poor policy.
5.4. Factors affecting school attendance
Theoretically variations in school attendance are
affected by the expected return to education, by the
quality (including quality of premises, quality of
teaching and distance to school) and price of schooling
and the household resources. Unfortunately except for
the latter, this information is not available. However
the triangulation of existing information indicates that
household resources are the most important factors
affecting variations in primary school attendance and
this limited analysis might still be interesting from a
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Factors affecting school attendance are analyzed by a
classification analysis presented in a tree-diagram 14 .
With our focus on poverty we have forced poverty as
the first predictor variable and then allowed the others
to enter the analysis according to how they are able to
split the schoolchildren in attendees and non-
attendees. The tree diagram in figure 5.4 shows that
poverty level has the expected impact, and the details
give additional insights. While the school attendance
rate decrease from better off to moderate poor people,
the decrease is only from 81 per cent to 79 per cent.
But then it drops to 69 among the extreme poor. As we
might expect, the age group is important among better
off as well as both poverty groups. The attendance rate
among the very young children, 6 and 7 years of age is
the lowest, and the rate among the core group 8 to 14
years is the highest. There are however interesting
differences among the better off versus the poverty
groups. Among the better off, 67 per cent of 6-7 year
old children will attend school, 86 per cent of 8-14
years old and 77 per cent of 15-16 years old will still
be in school. Among the poor, only 58 per cent of 6-7
year old children will attend, but this rate increases to
the same level as among the better off, in fact 87 per
cent of 8-14 years old children will attend and 71 per
cent will still attend at 15-16 years age. With other
words, poor children will clearly be more likely to start
schooling late, but then catch up at core age and not
loose out very much at 15-16 compared with the better
off.
The big losers are the extreme poor. 49 per cent or less
than half of the very young will attend, and the
extreme poor will never catch up anything, on the
contrary, among the core group of 8 -14 years, only 77
per cent will attend and only 65 per cent of the 15-16
years old.
What about other household resources, can they
compensate? Figure 5.4 tells us that among the better
off, human resources are important. For the young and
core age group, the wife's resources are the most
crucial and for the older children, the husband's
occupation has the largest ability to split. But a closer
look shows that these are households where the
husband has a public occupation, usually dependent on
formal education, and hence even for the older
children, human resources are crucial. An important
issue is also that among the younger ones, the wife's
education is the most important, while the husband's
education has a larger effect to ensure that the older
ones stay on.
The pattern is similar among the moderate poor, while
for them the differences in schooling opportunities
across the provinces is the most central for the very
14 Variables, variable abbreviations, values, and value abbreviations
are listed in table A2.
young children. While data are not available, we
assume this is a reflection of access or distance to
school. Also for the moderate poor households, wife's
education is most important for the core age groups,
but husband's education gives a larger push to ensure
older children to remain in school.
For the extreme poor, the educational level of the hus-
band is essential. In fact a high level of education of
the male head of the household can compensate for the
negative effect of extreme poverty. If the male head of
an extreme poor family has an education above the
average, the school attendance among the core age
group and the older ones are more or less on average.
Summarizing the effect of the analysis shows that
poverty is the crucial variable that split the children in
groups likely to attend and groups not likely to attend
school. Except for the very young, the main split is
between better off and moderate poor versus extreme
poor. In addition the educational level of the male
head is essential and can even partly compensate for
extreme poverty.
It is equally interesting to learn that the schooling
opportunities from province to province are less
important and that the dependency ratio, number of
children at school age, whether mother and father lives
in the household and whether the family has moved in
during the last years do not affect school attendance
equally much in all provinces. Detailed analysis not
published here shows that some of these factors are
important for some sub-groups, e.g. among better off
people, newcomers might have lower school atten-
dance. But on average, the effects are smaller. It
should be added that this is not an obvious result.
Often numbers of children at school age and depend-
ency ratio are reducing school attendance consider-
ably. One possible explanation is that the lack of school
fees, at least at this time, made the indirect costs more
important. And if you need your children to do
household chores and paid work, you rather need them
all to work.
5.5. Policy conclusions
There are two clear and distinct findings. First the very
large repetition rate creating an extreme extra burden
on the primary schooling sector. Second that the main
factor effecting school attendance is poverty level.
Again the clear result is that the main issue is the effect
of poverty. For the core age group, the main split is
between better off and moderate poor versus extreme
poor; while for the younger and older ones, even
falling into poverty is enough to clearly reduced the
attendance ration.
The policy challenge is to handle both effects simul-
taneously. If the challenge is successfully met, the
reward might be large. If repetition is reduced, two
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impacts are achieved, first less resources are needed
OR more resources are available; second if repetition is
reduced, the share of poor children not leaving school
before an exam or at least functional literacy is
obtained might really be increased. The task is to break
the vicious resource circle.
This would require a multifold strategy, such as the
following one:
• Donor assistance is requested to provide additional
resources for a limited period of ten years to
improve quality and hence reduce repetition;
• A school fee program with local control and local
spending is introduced to ensure a proper teacher/
student ratio and material;
• In order to give all children a chance to attend
school and to motivate school start when planned
each student would be exempted from school fee
for a limited period of 3-5 years linked to the age of
the child, i.e. no school fee for 6-8 years old
children and no school fee for 9-10 years old
children with a maximum of one repetition (or no
repetition) .
• For children above 10 years of age, a fellowship
program for school fees covering extreme poor
children should be introduced. Only non-repetitors
would be eligible for this program.
• When donor support is phased out, the school fees
should fully cover the extra costs of repetition and
pay for the fellowship program of the extreme poor.
52
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6. Urban areas: Health
As education, health is both a human goal as such, a
human investment and a means to increase income
and avoid poverty. A comprehensive picture of the
health sector needs a twofold focus:
• from a general health perspective the focus would
be on health status; and
• from a policy perspective the focus would be on
access to health service.
We would expect that poverty might affect both
whether people are exposed to health risks throughout
their live cycle and whether they have access to and
can afford treatment when need be.
Given the policy focus of this report and the lack of
data linking poverty and health status, the main focus
will be on health service. The Luanda Household
Budget Survey 1990 on health service provisions
(Devereux and Hunt 1991) has chosen another
approach by addressing whether the design and
performance of the health service provisions respond
to the need for preventive and curative health. They
conclude by emphasizing the need to improve the
adequacy and performance of preventive health
provisions while focusing less on curative health. The
focus on preventive health is according to other
analysis (such as World Bank 1993) which underscores
the potential efficiency and equity gains from a well
functioning preventive health provision system. How-
ever the household survey data does not allow for this
type of analysis but is well designed to analyze
provision of curative health and the ability to pay for
medical treatment (or "willingness" as expressed by
Gertler and van der Gaag 1990) .
The analysis will address access to health service and de
facto consultation and treatment for people having been
sick during the last two weeks. As for education, an
important issue is whether poor households can afford
to pay for health service. The choice to make is however
quite different from education. Education is a long term
investment for your children and your own far future
with both direct costs and opportunity costs for not
sending your children out to work. Curative health is a
short-term investment with a risky outcome, but the
trade off between quality and costs are the same.
Table 6.1. Any sickness during last two weeks in five provinces.
Per cent







11 	 89 	 100 	 15419
15	 84 	 100 	 1 735
12 	 88 	 100 	 2867
8 	 92 	 100 	 5 158
6 	 94 	 100 	 3 328
10 	 89 	 100 	 28 507
Table 6.2. Any sickness during last two weeks among males and
females. Per cent
Yes 	 No 	 Total 	 Number
Males 	 10 	 90 	 100 	 14 044
Females 	 11 	 89 	 100 	 14 463
Total
	
10 	 89 	 100 	 28 507
Table 6.3. Any sickness during last two weeks in various age
groups. Per cent
Yes 	 No	 Total 	 Number
0-9
	
13 	 87 	 100 	 8 495
10-19
	
8 	 92 	 100 	 8 679
20-29
	
10 	 90 	 100 	 4 598
30-39
	
10 	 90 	 100 	 3 484
40 + 	 13 	 86 	 100 	 3251
Total
	
10 	 89 	 100 	 28 507















6.1. Access to health service ant treatment
We would expect that people might be more or less
exposed to health risks due to various factors and
especially climatic ones (such as more mosquitoes in
wet and humid areas), infrastructure ones (especially
affecting access to safe water and a proper latrine or
sewage system), poverty level as materialized through
a proper nutrition and health service over the years,
Yes
Better off 	 12
Poor 	 10
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100 	 900
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and the civil war/unrest causing forced migration,
deslocados and a lack of infrastructure. As shown in
table 6.1 the incidence of sickness does vary across the
provinces. As for primary schooling Moxico is worst
off. Huila and Benguela have the lowest rates. Moxico
is not the province worst hit by civil war/ unrest.
Hence there might be valid reasons to postulate that
lack of infrastructure and high poverty incidence are
the main causes.
Table 6.5 confirms this picture. Due to a drier climate
and higher altitude there are less malaria in Moxico but
this is more that compensated for by a higher incidence
of other diseases. One should however add that fever is
often a malaria case with a wrong diagnosis and hence
the malaria incidence in Moxico is probably not that
much lower than in the other provinces in the sample.
The incidence of waterborne diseases such as diarrhea is
alarmingly high in Moxico, Huila and Benguela, and
clearly underscoring the need for access to safe water.
Table 6.2 shows that women reports sickness more or
less like men. We know however that women are more
exposed to health risks and when they report an incid-
ence of sickness more or less like men, this is partly
due to a larger underreporting of sickness among
women compared to men, commonly perceived as the
breadwinners. Unfortunately it is difficult to disent-
angle the reporting bias and the real figures. Table 6.6
shows that the gender differences remain small even
when focusing on the various types of sicknesses. One
would expect women to report pre- and antenatal
related sicknesses as other diseases. When women
report more or less the same incidence as men, that
confirms a hypothesis of underreporting by women.
The picture of incidence of sickness over the life span
presented in table 6.3 might be less biased in general,
but we will expect an underreporting for children. The
incidence of sickness is clearly shaped like a U-curve
over the life span. Table 6.7 shows that the U-curve is a
composite reflecting a high incidence of diarrhea and
other waterborne diseases among children and a larger
variety of other diseases increasing over the life span.
Table 6.5. Type of sickness during last two weeks in five provinces. Per cent
Table 6.6. Type of sickness during last two weeks among males and females. Per cent
Malaria Fever 	 Water born 	 Respiratory
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Table 6.7. Type of sickness during last two weeks in various age groups. Per cent
Malaria
	
Fever Water born 	 Respiratory
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The figures for malaria and fever should be studied
with caution. There is clearly an underreporting of
malaria among children. This is partly compensated by
an overreporting of fever but only partly. These figures
confirms malaria as the most common sickness and
also that malaria among children often are hardly
perceived as malaria, rather some kind of fever. This
might reflect the tradition of hardly treating malaria
among children but rather hoping that they will
strengthen the immunity towards malaria for the
future.
Even with this background information it is difficult to
sort out the impact of poverty as presented in table 6.4
and 6.8. There is a clear tendency for poor people to
"underreport" sickness. Simply speaking, poor people
can not afford to consider minor health problems as
sicknesses. Usually they can neither afford treatment
nor to stop working for minor problems. You would
expect that underreporting varies with type of sickness.
As table 6.8 shows the different sicknesses are more or
less equally distributed among better off, moderate
poor and extreme poor. An interesting details confirm-
ing the poverty bias in reporting is that better off
people reports a slightly higher share of malaria and a
lower share of fever. This might partly reflect better
knowledge and a real diagnosis, but also a tendency to
overreport malaria versus fever. Hence we are not able
to tell whether a lower reported incidence of illnesses
among poor people only reflects the likelihood of
reporting or a real situation.
Given these variations of incidence of illness, to what
degree have people access to a proper health service
and can they afford private health service.
6.2. Allocation efficiency and equity
Efficiency in the health sector is required at two levels,
first to ensure efficiently run institutions and health
service and then to ensure a proper allocation of public
resources ensuring an efficient distribution across
levels of health service, number and distribution of
institutions and hence distance to access one and the
exposure to health risks. Finally the issue is whether
officially to introduce a system of cost recovery.
Efficiency at the institutional level is outside the scope
of this analysis. Survey data might allow for an analysis
of allocation efficiency but would then in addition to
the households and individual information also require
information on quality and access to the local health
institutions. Such information is likely to be available
in a few years time from the Village Recording System.
In the meantime the main focus will be on equity,
while still approaching the issue of efficiency on an ad
hoc basis.
As shown in figure 6.1 and table 6.9 differences in
incidence across provinces are reflected and multiplied
in the figures of health service. Moxico is again worst
off with the largest share without any treatment, the
smallest share using private doctors and the highest
shares using a nurse. This pattern reflects both demand
and supply of health service. There are fewer public
health institutions, fewer people can afford private
health service and those who can, only have access to
nurses rather than doctors. Cabinda and to a certain
degree Luanda are better off. Public doctors are avail-
able (may be with a gasosa for drugs and even consul-
tation, may be not) and private doctors are available
for those who can afford that.
As shown in figure 6.1 and table 6.10 differences
between men and women are negligible.
Figure 6.1. Medical consultation among people who were sick
during last two weeks in poverty groups, provinces,
gender and age groups
100 % -
80 % -
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16 	 7 	 100 	 1 734
22 	 7 	 100 	 265
15 	 1 	 100 	 339
13	 3 	 100 	 436
15 	 11 	 100 	 2 07






Private 	 Midwife Traditionalnurse 	 healer None 	 Others 	 Missing 	 Total 	 Number
14 	 5 	 0 	 100 	 1 092
19 	 8 	 1 	 100 	 653
14 	 4 	 0 	 100 	 444
17 	 6 	 1 	 100 	 358
16 	 7 	 1 	 100 	 434
16 	 6 	 1 	 100 	 2 981











































Private 	 Midwife Traditionalnurse 	 healer None 	 Others 	 Missing 	 Total 	 Number
	28	 31 	 31 	 28 	 24 	 28
	
19 	 23 	 25 	 25 	 20 	 22
	
9 	 7 	 9	 11 	 8	 9
	
28 	 18 	 21 	 14 	 27 	 23
	
- 	 - 	 1 	 0
	
1 	 1 	 1 	 3 	 6	 2
	
10 	 11 	 8	 15 	 11 	 11
	
4 	 7 	 5 	 3 	 5 	 5
	
0 	 1 	 - 	 - 	 0
	
100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
	
341 	 176 	 146 	 104 	 119 	 886
	
34 	 24 	 27 	 36 	 30 	 30
	
15 	 17 	 25 	 15 	 20 	 18
	
8 	 7 	 7 	 6 	 8	 7
	
20 	 20 	 16 	 17 	 16 	 18
	
1 	 0 	 3 	 1 	 1
	
17 	 23 	 18 	 17 	 17 	 18
	
5 	 8 	 4 	 10 	 7 	 6
	
0 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1
	
100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
	
507 	 318 	 190 	 168 	 209 	 1 392
	
35 	 29 	 34 	 24 	 33 	 32
	
13 	 17 	 27 	 9 	 19 	 16
	
5 	 5 	 3 	 2 	 4
	
15 	 14 	 15 	 24 	 12 	 15
	
2 	 6 	 1
	
23 	 28 	 20 	 27 	 16 	 23
	
8 	 5 	 - 	 3 	 12 	 6
	
1 	 1 	 2 	 3 	 7 	 2
	
100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
	
104 	 76 	 41 	 33 	 43 	 297
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Table 6.10. Medical consultation among males and females who were sick during last two weeks. Per cent
Public 	 Private 	 Public 	 Private 	 Traditional
doctor 	 doctor 	 nurse 	 nurse 	 Midwife 	 healer







































16 	 6 	 1 	 100 	 2 981


























18 	 6 	 1 	 100 	 1 392

























16 	 6 	 1 	 100 	 2 575
Table 6.13. Medical consultation among people who were sick
during last two weeks in various poverty and age
groups. Per cent
Figure 6.1 and table 6.11 tell you that the pattern of
consultations changes somewhat over life span. For
children the families would to a larger degree consult  





































both to a better public service offered to children than
to adults and a higher aversion to take children to
expensive private service.
As you would expect figure 6.1 and table 6.12 show a
similar pattern even more clearly across poverty levels.
The share with no consultation doubles from 11 per cent
among the better off to 23 per cent among the extreme
poor and private options are seldom for the poor.
Moderate poor and extreme poor people consulting a
public doctor more frequently than better off people
should not mislead you. Add the shares consulting a
public or a private doctor we see that the better off
people do this more frequently. However, among those
consulting any doctor a large share of the modeate poor
and extreme poor are choosing a public doctor,
obviously because the can not afford a private doctor.
Table 6.13 shows that in all age groups, the moderate
poor and even more the extreme poor are less likely to
go for a consultation. The moderate poor and extreme
poor suffer in all age groups. The extreme poor are
twice as likely not to go for any consultation whether a
child, a youth or an adult is sick. It is only when a
person above 40 is sick that the differences are smaller.
It seems reasonable to assume that sicknesses among
children youth and younger people develop faster and
do not allow the poor people any chance to raise the
money and time needed, while older people develop
more serious and long term sickness over time






































100 	 2 981
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Table 6.14. Payment for medical consultation and treatment/drugs
among people who were sick during last two weeks in
five provinces. Per cent
Table 6.18. Payment for medical consultation and treatment/drugs
mong people who were sick during last two weeks in






















0-9 	 10-19 20-29 30-39 	 40 + Total
18 	 24 	 16 	 19 	 17 	 19
55 	 55 	 48 	 46 	 46 	 51
27 	 21 	 36 	 35 	 37 	 30
100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
341 	 176 	 146 	 104 	 119 	 886
25 	 33 	 26 	 31 	 25 	 28
55 	 46 	 50 	 43 	 45 	 49
21 	 21 	 24 	 26 	 30 	 23
100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
507 	 318 	 190 	 168 	 209 1 392
33 	 41 	 32 	 27 	 49 	 36
51 	 50 	 59 	 58 	 35 	 50
16 	 9 	 10 	 15 	 16 	 13
100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
104 	 76 	 41 	 33 	 43 	 297
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100 	 2 981
Table 6.15. Payment for medical consultation and treatment/drugs
among males and females who were sick during last
two weeks. Per cent
	No	 For treat- 	 For
	
pay- 	 ment/ 	 consul- 	 Total 	 Number























100 	 2 981
Table 6.16. Payment for medical consultation and treatment/drugs
among people who were sick during last two weeks in
various age groups. Per cent
Table 6.17. Payment for medical consultation and treatment/drugs
among people who were sick during last two weeks in
various poverty groups. Per cent
	No	 For treat- 	 For
	
pay- 	 ment/
	 consul- 	 Total Number
	ment	 drugs only 	 tation




































You will also find similar patterns in tables 6.14 to
6.18 presenting information on whether sick people do
not pay at all, pay for treatment and drugs only or
even pay for the consultation, but also some distinct
differences.
The ideal situation is obviously when a decent public
health service is available on a general basis and
people neither has to pay a fee for the consultation nor
for drugs or other treatment. However a more common
situation might be that people either go to public
health service but has to pay for drugs or other treatent
or go for private health service and have to pay either a
fee covering the whole package or both for
consultation and treatment. In fact some will go for
Figure 6.2. Payment for medical consultation and treatment/drugs
among people who had a) any sickness or b) malaria













Any 	 Malaria 	 Any 	 Malaria 	 Any 	 Malaria 	 Any 	 Malaria
sickness 	 sickness 	 sickness 	 sickness
• No payment ® For treatment/ drugs only 0 For consultation
public health service but still have to pay a gasosa for
both the consultation and for the treatment. On the
other hand, if few people pay for the consultation is
also reflects that private service is not commonly
available.
As shown by table 6.14 people in Moxico again appear
to be the losers, but the picture is somewhat compli-
cated. 44 per cent in Moxico had to pay for treatment,
but few for consultation. This reflects a limited offer of
private health service. In Luanda, Cabinda and
Benguela the situation is really different. Only between
20 and 30 per cent could avoid paying anything. On
the other hand more than half had to pay even for the
consultation. This might reflect a pretty far-reaching
change towards a dual system of private health service
and gasosa-based public health service in these
provinces.
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Addressing equity in health service across gender and
age gives a completely different picture. Tables 6.15
and 6.16 show that there are hardly any differences !
The main split seems to be the provincial one. Well,
not totally. Figure 6.2 and the last part of table 6.17
tell us that the moderate poor and even more the
extreme poor are squeezed. Only 13 per cent of the
extreme poor could afford to pay for a consultation
while 30 per cent of the better off could. On the other
hand a large share of the poor and especially the
extreme poor had to pay for treatment. Hence the
better off paid for private service or a bribe for public
service and got the drugs or treatment without addi-
onal payment. The moderate poor and even more the
extreme poor did not pay any consultation fee, were
likely to end up with second quality service, but still
had to pay for treatment to a larger degree than the
better off. This is really a confirmation of the old truth
that it is expensive to be poor. One might be tempted
to add that it is both expensive and dangerous.
Table 6.18 shows that at least the poor are more
vulnerable to having access to free public treatment.
Table 6.13 showed that only among the people above
40 years of age there was a smaller gap between better
off and poor people. Table 6.18 shows however that
this is due to older people more frequently taken to a
free consultation. Again we may assume this is rather
due to the sickness developing over a longer time for
people above 40 years of age. To summarize poor
people below 40 years are more seldom given any
consultation while poor people above 40 might be
given a consultation but only if there is access to free
health consultation.
A problem with information on consultation and
treatment is that demand and supply of health service
are closely related. In any country you will find that
outside the capital the situation is that the more
hospital beds and doctors you find in a geographical
area, the higher incidence of sickness you find. The
main reason is that the authorities naturally locate
more hospitals in areas where the population is more
exposed to health risks such as in swampy areas and
areas with a lack of safe water. Hence the above
picture might partly reflects similar relations. It is
impossible to work around this problem, but the
problem is more straightforward when addressing a
more homogenous group. Hence in tables 6.19 to 6.28
the situation is presented for a more homogenous
group, those with malaria and fever during the last
month.
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16 	 6 	 100 	 1 302
29 	 4 	 100 	 153
15 	 0 	 100 	 281
14 	 2 	 100 	 291
17 	 10 	 100 	 86
16 	 5 	 100 	 2 113
Table 6.20. Medical consultation among males and females who had malaria or fever during last two weeks. Per cen


















































Table 6.21. Medical consultation among people who had malaria or fever during last two weeks in various age groups. Per cent























































Table 6.22. Medical consultation among people who had malaria or fever during last two weeks in various poverty groups. Per cent
Public doctor Private Public nurse Pirvate nurse 	 Traditionaldoctor 	 healer None 	 Others 	 Total 	 Number









































































































100 	 2 113
Reports 99/20 	 Poverty Alleviation Policy
Table 6.23. Payment for medical consultation and treatment/drugs
among people who had malaria or fever during last
two weeks in five provinces. Per cent
For
consul- 	 Total 	 Number
tation
Luanda 	 21 	 55 	 24 	 100 	 1 302
Moxico 	 39 	 17 	 44 	 100 	 153
Cabinda 	 20 	 63 	 17 	 100 	 281
Benguela
	 27 	 51 	 21 	 100 	 291
Huila 	 44 	 27 	 29 	 100 	 86
Total
	
24 	 52 	 24 	 100 	 2113
Table 6.24. Payment for medical consultation and treatment/drugs
among males and females who had malaria or fever
during last two weeks. Per cent
Payment 	
payment drugs only
No treatment/ For consu-ltation Total 	 Number
100 	 986
100 	 1 127
















Table 6.25. Payment for medical consultation and treatment/drugs
among people who had malaria or fever during last
two weeks in various age groups. Per cent
Table 6.26. Payment for medical consultation and treatment/drugs
among people who had malaria or fever during last
two weeks in various poverty groups. Per cent
No For 	 ForPayment 	 a 	 treatment consul- 	 Total Numberp yment /drugs only 	 tation
Better off 	 17 	 55 	 28 	 100 	 642
Poor 	 27 	 51 	 22 	 100 	 983
Extreme poor 	 34 	 55 	 11 	 100 	 212
Total 	 24 	 53 	 23 	 100 	 1 837
As table 6.19 shows, Moxico is again worst off. They
incidence of malaria and fever might be lower but the
access to consultation is more than proportionally
reflecting this pattern. Cabinda is the better case, not
necessarily due to a higher access, but at least a higher
share being able to consult a doctor rather than only a
nurse. Tables 6.2 adds some interesting details to the
findings from table 6.19. The health service in Moxico
does not seem to be up to standard may be due to large
areas being without a proper access to any health
service and hence a large share does not pay anything.
On the other hand in Cabinda a large number of people
have access to public health service but then they really
have to pay for treatment and drugs. The nice side is
that people can afford this payment, the bad side that
this reflects the lack of drugs in public health service.
Table 6.21 complements table 6.11 showing that the
pattern of consultation across age groups is similar for
those with malaria/ fever as for the average sickness.
Given the lack of immunity against malaria among
children this reflects a pretty tough tendency to "allow"
children to build immunity against malaria. Table 6.25
shows that children are not given any special prefence
when payment is needed and that young people are
given paid treatment/drugs even less commonly than
adults are.
Table 6.20 shows that for once women are given a
higher probability of consulting a doctor. There are
reasons to assume this reflects the seriousness of
malaria during a pregnancy. Table 6.24 shows howver
that there are few differences across gender in payent.
Given that women are more frequently going for a
consultation this might reflects a lower willingness or
ability to pay for treatment for women.
Table 6.22 shows that many poor and especially
extreme poor can not afford any consultation against
malaria. The difference among better off and extreme
poor is considerably larger for malaria than for the
average sickness. Table 6.27 shows that the big differ-
nce is found among people between 30 and 39 and for
people 40 and above. This is quite alarmingly. When
people can not afford to give any treatment against
malaria for people in their working life cycle, it reflects
a very extreme poverty level.
Figure 6.2 and table 6.26 confirm that an alarmingly
high share of the moderate poor and even more the
extreme poor can not afford treatment and drugs.
Across provinces, gender and age groups you may
discuss whether the differences are reflecting different
needs but across poverty groups the only possible
explanation is that the poor people can not afford the
treatment and drugs. That is a pretty serious situation.
We are not talking about expensive hospitals or
doctors, but cheap drugs. Table 6.28 confirms this
pattern across the age groups. While the numbers are
small, the trend is clear, poor people and especially
extreme poor people can not afford the relatively
cheap treatment/ drugs against malaria.
6.3. Factors affecting payment for health
service
The tabulation analysis has focused on two issues:
• Incidence of sickness
• Medical consultation and payment among sick
people
The information on incidence of sickness is an
important input to the allocation of health sector
resources and should be considered jointly with more
detailed information on sickness and injuries from
other data sources especially the dedicated surveys
such as the Demographic and Health Survey. From an
epidemiological point of view it would be very
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between poverty and sickness/low health. We would
expect poverty and sickness to increase each other both
at one point in time and in the worse cases in a bad
circle over time. Unfortunately a self-diagnosis as
applied in the poverty survey would usually give a
poverty bias in reporting of sickness. As already
discussed this is also likely to be the case in this survey.
Hence we do not continue this analysis but leave that
to a future survey combining health and poverty.
On the other hand this survey gives proper information
to analyze the mix of need for health service and
access to health service as presented by information on
de facto health consultations and willingness to pay
among the sick people. Hence this is the focus in the
further analysis where we analyze which factors affect
the willingness to go for health service requiring
payment. We have used the same tree-diagram
technique as applied for school attendance.
Factors expected to affect the probability and ability to
go for health service when sick during the last 2 weeks
and the willingness to go for health service requiring
payment are analyzed by a classification analysis
presented in tree-diagrams'.
With our focus on poverty we have followed the
approach from analysis of school attendance forcing
poverty as the first predictor variable and then allowed
the others to enter the analysis according to how they
are able to split those who were sick during the last
two weeks. The tree diagrams in figures 6.3-6.5 show
the impact of poverty level: whether people consult
health service at all, whether they pay for the first
consultation and whether they pay for any expenses
related to the sickness.
As you would expect there are barriers for the poor at
all levels. 89 per cent of the better off who was sick the
previous month did consult a health service, while only
76 per of the extreme poor did. As shown in other
surveys, the education of the wife is essential. In
extreme poor families where the female head has no
education only 68 per cent consulted any health
service and 32 per cent did not consult any health
service. If we assume that the better off consult health
service if they see the need for it, it means that you
would expect that around 89 per cent do need to
consult health service. Among the extreme poor 21 per
cent points out of the 89 per cent or roughly speaking
1 of 4 extreme poor did not consult a health service
when needed just because they are extreme poor.
The next barrier is whether people can afford to pay
for consultation, drugs and treatment at all. As figure
6.4 shows the access to free health service and drugs
15 Variables, variable abbreviations, values, and value abbreviations
are listed in table A2.
Table 6.27. Medical consultation among people who had malaria
or fever during last two weeks in various poverty and
age groups. Per cent
0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 	 40 + 	 Total
	
30 	 28 	 31 	 27 	 19 	 28
	
20 	 27 	 24 	 27 	 23 	 23
	
7 	 8 	 10 	 11 	 9 	 8
	
31 	 19 	 21 	 15 	 30 	 24
	
1 	 1 	 3 	 1
	
9 	 10 	 8 	 19 	 11 	 11
	
3 	 7 	 5 	 1 	 5 	 4
	
100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
	
34 	 22 	 27 	 31 	 26 	 29
	
18 	 19 	 28 	 16 	 26 	 21
	
8 	 8 	 7 	 6 	 7 	 8
	
17 	 19 	 13 	 18 	 18 	 17
	
1 	 - 	 2 	 - 	 1 	 1
	
17 	 24 	 19 	 17 	 16 	 19
	
5 	 8 	 2 	 11 	 5 	 6
	
100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
	
352 	 250 	 135 	 116 	 130 	 983
35 	 27 	 35 	 32 	 33 	 32
13 	 16 	 29 	 9 	 10 	 16
5 	 5 	 5 	 4
15 	 16 	 13 	 23 	 14 	 16
25 	 29 	 23 	 32 	 24 	 26
7 	 6 	 10 	 5
100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
75 	 63 	 31	 22 	 21 	 212
varies substantially from province to province but also
that poverty level is important. If we again assume that
there is a need to pay for an average of 89 per cent of
sick people as registered among the better off, we can
calculate that 17 per cent points of these 89 per cent or
roughly 1 of 5 have not paid and hence not gotten
access to health service, drugs or treatment just
because they were extreme poor.
The next and last barrier is a barrier to climb one step
up from free public service, either to private health
service or to paying a gasosa to get special treatment in
the public system. As shown in figure 6.5, 30 per cent
of the better off paid for the health consultation while
17 per cent points of the extreme poor among these 30
per cent could not afford to pay anything even if they
probably needed, and this just because they are
extreme poor.
It should be added that a proper analysis of the access
to health service is complex because it is affected by a
mixture of variations in need of health service, lack of
a proper health service system and due to the patients
and their families lacking money and resources needed
to pay for consultation, drugs and treatment. Hence
any interpretation of the survey data should be done
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Table 6.28. Payment for medical consultation and treatment/drugs
among people who had malaria or fever during last
two weeks in various poverty and age groups. Per cent
0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 	 40 + 	 Total
Better off
No payment 	 15 	 24 	 17 	 16 	 14 	 17
For treatment/
drugs only 	 57 	 55 	 52 	 51 	 54 	 55
For consultation 	 29 	 21 	 31 	 32 	 32 	 28
Total 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
Number 	 242 	 143 	 109 	 74 	 74 	 642
Poor
No payment 	 24 	 33 	 24 	 30 	 22 	 27
For treatment/
drugs only 	 57 	 47 	 53 	 42 	 48 	 51
For consultation 	 19 	 20 	 22 	 28 	 30 	 22
Total 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
Number 	 352 	 250 	 135 	 116 	 130 	 983
Extreme poor
No payment 	 31 	 37 	 35 	 27 	 48 	 34
For treatment/
drugs only 	 53 	 54 	 61 	 68 	 38 	 55
For consultation 	 16 	 10 	 3 	 5 	 14 	 11
Total 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100
Number 	 75 	 63 	 31 	 22 	 21 	 212
6.4. Conclusion
The overall picture of access to health service is not
nice. As you would expect the situation if best for the
better off living in Luanda and Cabinda, and also
Benguela. But even better off people in Luanda find the
health service not up to standard. And in general there
are large differences both along geographical and
poverty dimensions. Moxico is systematically worse off.
Huila is usually the second worst. Luanda, Cabinda and
Benguela might have better access then people have to
pay to a larger extent. Payment is a dual issue. It
should not be problematic with private health service if
the patient, the family or the employer pay, but unfor-
tunately a possibly large share of the payment are
gasosas for special treatment or for bypassing the lines
in the public institutions. Whenever this happens, the
public still pays the basic expenses and the individual
just the topping. Hence the effect of the better off
paying to get special treatment or bypassing the lines,
is that the moderate poor and extreme poor are not
getting access at all. A gasosa will of course also serve
as an additional payment to the personnel and pursue
them to stay on, but there are no reasons to believe the
total effect for the poor is positive.
The analysis of access and payment for people sick
with malaria gives the strongest impression. We all
know that malaria is the top killer disease for the
whole globe. If you do not treat malaria with drugs it is
a substantial chance for it killing you, especially if you
are a child, already sick or old, but also if you are
healthy and in breadwinner age. And if it does not kill
you, the malaria parasite might remain in an inactive
stage in your body and return to life at a later stage.
Hence all people with malaria need drugs treatment to
combat the disease. But as the survey data tells, a lot of
malaria patients do not consult any health service and
do not pay for any drugs, may be in some cases
because they are not available at the local health
station or the local market, but more likely because the
moderate poor and extreme poor can not afford to pay.
6.5. Policy conclusion
The problem comprises three elements:
• an overall lack of access especially in Moxico;
• no ability to pay for health service and drugs among
the extreme poor; and
• a system of gasosas which hardly increase the
overall health service available, but rather
reshuffles the line making it even harder for the
extreme poor to get a consultation and treatment.
The solution requires large efforts both to improve
access to health service and to assure the extreme poor
access even if they can not afford to pay. At the same
time, neither donors nor the Government are able to
provide the necessary resources.
Hence it appears to be no way around an expanded
two-tier system, trying to develop both the public and
the private health service.
The main obstacle to develop a functioning two-tier
system is the massive use of gasosas. Rather than
trying to control or even combat this system, it is
recommended that the Government establish a legal
way to develop a two-tier system within the public
health service.
One solution to consider is to allow all public health
staff to run private business as well. They should be
given access to use public premises for private business
but only at certain earmarked time period after the end
of the standard working day. They might be asked to
pay a small fee to ensure the maintenance but not the
full costs because otherwise they might just go private.
For resident treatment they should also be allowed to
rent hospital beds, but for this arrangement they will
have to pay the full costs since there is no reason to
stop them from going private for this type of health
service.
In order to reduce the need for control, the Govern-
ment should consider to negotiate a deal with one or
more doctor associations and one or more nurse and
mid-wife associations. This deal should state the
conditions for the deal and a system for fines to be
paid by the association if the doctors and nurses do not
follow the rules. If going for such a deal, it is of course
essential to make membership in an association a
precondition for the arrangement.
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Figure 6.5. Paying for health consultation
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7. Urban areas: Water, sanitation, energy
and time use
Moser and Holland (1997) stress that while labor is the
main asset of the poor, there are a number of other
assets being essential for the poor. Social and economic
infrastructure, housing and household relations are
important assets for poor and better off alike. You
might think that household relations are more impor-
tant as a survival strategy for the poor and hence they
have established and maintain stronger household
relations that the better off, but Moser and Holland
stress that even household relations are unequally
distributed in favor of the better off.
The poor are both more vulnerable to the lack of these
assets and they have access to less of them. The better
off will always face a better chance to replace public
services with private services. In some cases private
services are available and in these cases the better off
can afford to buy private alternatives such as private
health service while the poor have to rely on miserable
public service or stay without. In other cases, a down-
graded access to public service might be replaced
either with expensive private solutions or time con-
suming public second best alternatives, such as to fetch
water from a public pipe in a neighbor quarter or even
further away. The poor will loose at both fronts, they
can not afford the private alternative and are more
time constrained than the better off.
Therefore the main perspective on access to infrastruc-
ture is whether the poor are again loosing out at two
fronts. The information on expenditures in chapter two
showed already that the poor and to an even larger
extent the extreme poor had to face expensive consum-
ption alternatives such as for energy and water. Hence
the core issue is whether they also have to face a lower
access to infrastructure and even to spend more time to
acquire necessities like water. This core issue highlights
the gender dimension as well. Already the Gender
paper from Luanda Household Budget and Nutrition
Survey (Aguilar 1992) showed that the female partici-
pation in the labor force is around 2/3 of the male
participation. The informal sector analysis in chapter 2
showed that this process has continued and that
women in urban Angola have entered the labor force
on equal footing with men, not for a short term crisis,
but on a permanent basis. When this has happened in
countries in the North, it has been the starting point
for men to take on more household chores and child
care. It is definitely a high profile issue for the time to
come to address whether this happen and how it can
be encouraged and arranged for, not only from an
equity point of view but also as a strategy for poverty
reduction.
7.1. Issues
Water supply is essential in a number of perspectives.
It is more essential for human beings than food and it
is a main source of diseases or good health, and there-
fore poor and better off alike are demanding and ready
to pay in cash and kinds to ensure water supply, as a
public service, a common free good, or if need be a
private market good. In a poverty perspective we need
to view water from a matter of equal distribution of a
public good, a matter of health, a matter of costs and a
matter of time use.
A special feature in the Luanda water supply picture is
the shear size of the water tank system. Many cities
have problem with a stable supply of clean/ treated
water and you will often find both private water fixed
tanks and commercial water transport-tanks. You may
also find private wells where the owners are selling
water on a retail basis and even in a few cases private
water tanks which are filled by water tank trucks
transporting water from other sources. But hardly
anywhere else will you find a widespread system of
private water tanks in the ground constructed with the
specific purpose of local retail trade of water and a
situation were half the households get their water from
this system. There are two hardly acceptable dimen-
sions in this picture, the first which we will return to in
the analysis, is who is gaining from the public supply
still operative and the second is the vicious circle of
rent seeking among "entrepreneurs". There are a
number of anecdotal evidences that the water supply
"mafia" not only threaten but also in fact are able to
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7.2. Profiles of access to water, sanitation and
energy
7.2.1. Sanitation
As shown in figure 7.1 and table 7.1, sanitation is not
that different for moderate poor and better off, how-
ever the extreme poor are clearly worse off and 2 of 15
extreme poor families are without any latrine or other
sanitation arrangement. The provincial distribution
show that this is a small city problem located to
Moxico and Huila provinces, probably reflecting that
the extreme poor people living in the outskirts of these
cities have nowhere to go but the bush. Lucky enough
the situation improves by age and we might hope that
this means the younger families will pick up over time.
Unfortunately it might also mean that the young
families being the last immigrants to the cities have
nowhere to settle but new squatter areas missing even
the very essentials. It is clearly a signal not to try to
stop immigration, because that can hardly be done, but
to ensure at least a bare minimum standard in new
areas.













Table 7.1. Sanitation amenities for various groups by poverty, province, gender and age of head. Per cent
WC 	 Latrine WC & latrine	Communal	 Private	latri 	 latrine None Total 	 Number
Poverty
Better off 	 62.4 	 20.9 	 2.8 	 6.0 	 1.9 	 6.1 	 100.0 	 1521
Poor 	 60.7 	 23.0 	 3.8 	 3.3 	 2.1 	 7.1 	 100.0 	 2089
Extreme poor 	 59.0 	 19.9 	 2.4	 3.3 	 2.0 	 13.3 	 100.0 	 471
Province
Luanda 	 60.9 	 25.0 	 3.3 	 4.6 	 1.6 	 4.5 	 100.0 	 2061
Moxico 	 24.9 	 38.9 	 6.4 	 7.5 	 3.4 	 18.8 	 100.0 	 291
Cabinda 	 57.8 	 12.0 	 12.9 	 7.6 	 0.9 	 8.0 	 100.0 	 422
Benguela 	 76.5 	 4.1 	 0.2 	 2.4 	 5.4 	 11.5 	 100.0 	 873
Huila 	 64.2 	 9.7 	 0.2 	 1.0 	 24.7 	 100.0 	 434
Gender of head
Man 	 61.6 	 22.3 	 3.1 	 3.6 	 2.1 	 7.1 	 100.0 	 3224
Woman 	 59.7 	 20.2 	 3.8 	 6.7	 1.5 	 7.9 	 100.0 	 857
Age of head
15-29 	 56.8 	 21.7 	 4.5 	 5.4 	 2.5	 9.0 	 100.0 	 792
30-39 	 58.4 	 23.3 	 2.6 	 5.5 	 2.1 	 8.0 	 100.0 	 1516
40-49 	 61.8 	 24.2 	 2.3 	 3.4 	 1.9 	 6.2 	 100.0 	 994
50+ 	 70.2 	 15.8 	 4.8 	 2.2 	 1.4 	 5.6 	 100.0 	 779
Total 	 61.2 	 21.9 	 3.3 	 4.3 	 2.0 	 7.3 	 100.0 	 4081
Table 7.2. Water supply for various groups by poverty, province, gender and age of head. Per cent
Pipe water 	 Fountain 	 River/ lake 	 Well Cisterne/ tank 	 Others 	 Total 	 Number
Poverty
Better off 	 44.9 	 7.6 	 2.2 	 4.4 	 39.0 	 1.8 	 100.0 	 1521
Poor 	 41.3 	 7.3 	 3.0 	 6.8 	 40.2 	 1.4 	 100.0 	 2089
Extreme poor 	 35.3 	 8.8 	 2.0 	 15.7 	 37.0 	 1.3 	 100.0 	 471
Province
Luanda 	 41.9 	 6.5 	 0.3 	 2.0 	 48.0	 1.3 	 100.0 	 2061
Moxico 	 10.1 	 - 	 62.2 	 2.2 	 25.5 	 100.0 	 291
Cabinda 	 15.5 	 4.7 	 0.7 	 72.9 	 4.7	 0.5 	 100.0 	 422
Benguela 	 62.4 	 9.5 	 3.4 	 19.9 	 4.9 	 100.0 	 873
Huila 	 47.9 	 22.3 	 0.2 	 27.0 	 1.7 	 0.8 	 100.0 	 434
Gender of head
Man 	 41.1 	 7.2 	 2.5 	 6.9 	 40.6 	 1.6 	 100.0 	 3224
Woman 	 45.6 	 8.7 	 3.0 	 6.0 	 35.2 	 1.4 	 100.0 	 857
Age of head
15-29 	 38.4 	 7.4 	 2.7 	 9.0 	 40.7 	 1.6 	 100.0 	 792
30-39 	 39.6 	 8.2 	 2.7 	 6.7 	 41.6 	 1.0 	 100.0 	 1516
40-49 	 43.7 	 8.0 	 2.4 	 5.9 	 38.0 	 1.9 	 100.0 	 994
50+ 	 48.8 	 5.8 	 2.5 	 5.6 	 35.3 	 1.9 	 100.0 	 779


















53.7 	 46.2 	 100.0 	 3224
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7.2.2. Water supply
As shown in figure 7.1 and table 7.2, the public water
supply has a clear poverty bias; while almost half the
better off households get their water from piped
supply, only slightly above 1 of 3 extremely poor
households get piped water supply. A considerable
share of extreme poor getting water from unprotected
wells balances this. This is seldom very expensive, but
clearly a health risk. Fortunately enough you do not
find the same bias when addressing who are supplied
from the water tanks, around 2 of 5 households being
better off, moderate poor or extreme poor do buy
water this way.
Provincial differences are large. Luanda, Benguela and
Huila all have a working piped water system, Moxico
relies on rivers/lakes, and Cabinda on the unprotected
wells. The water tanks are found not only in Luanda,
but also in Moxico and Benguela, however it is only in
Luanda it is the most common system and where
almost 1 of 2 households get their water this way.
Again households are becoming better off by age and
almost 1 of 2 households with a head above 50 get
their water through pipes to the house. As for sanita-
tion, it is difficult to tell whether this reflects that
households improve over the life cycle or whether old
households are blocking for the younger ones.
7.2.3. Water treatment
Given the poverty bias in water supply it is interesting
to learn whether poor households compensate for lack
of quality by treating their water more frequently.
Unfortunately this is far from the case. As shown in
figure 7.1 and table 7.3, while 3 of 5 better households
treat their water only 2 of 5 extreme poor households
do. Given that quite an additional share of extreme
poor households get their water from unprotected
wells this is really increasing the health risk exposure
of extreme poor people. Worst off are people in
Moxico, where only 1 of 5 households treat their water
and this is exactly the province where a larger than
average share get their water from rivers and lakes.
Rivers and lakes might look better than unprotected
wells, but expect for fast running rivers in low-density
areas this is often not the case.
One might think it is hard to disentangle the two
reasons for missing treatment of water, being a)
poverty i.e. not affording to boil the water and b)
knowledge/ conviction of the need to do so. A look at
table 7.4 will tell you that both reasons are important.
That table shows that people with piped water are
substantially more likely to treat the water, partly
because these are better off and partly because they
are likely to have the infrastructure such as a proper
stove to boil the water. On the other hand, people who
get their water from the rivers and lakes are less likely
to treat their water. One reason might of course be the
lack of knowledge and conviction of the need, but
Table 7.3. Treatment of driniking water for various groups by
poverty, province, gender and age of head. Per cent
Yes




















Table 7.4. Treatment of water by water source. Per cent








equally possible the lack of infrastructure to boil water
on the charcoal burner or fireplace while also cooking
dinner and running short of charcoal or firewood.
7.2.4. Costs of water supply
Table 7.5 shows that on average there are four cost
scenarios. One group gets piped water and pays a
substantial share of their overall costs for that. A second
group pays the double for tank water and gets a
substantially poorer offer (low and/ or volatile quality
and lower volume) for this double price, a third group
mainly get unprotected water but do not pay. A fourth
group gets water from protected wells. On average they
pay as for piped water but as the median shows, the
typical household pays next to nothing for this service.
Table 7.6 shows that despite the large differences in
water supply, the costs are surprisingly equal across
the poverty groups, gender and age groups. However,
across provinces the picture is different. High water
costs are restricted to Luanda and Benguela. How
Moxico with their water tanks and Huila with quite
some piped water can keep the costs down is really an
issue. One obvious reason might be that the tanks in
Moxico are either public or private with a low fee. The
explanation in Huila might be low fees all together, but
still this is worth a study hoping that Luanda and
Benguela local authorities might learn how to improve
the situation in their cities.
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Other
energy Number 0.9	 1.9 	 2.4 	 10.7 100.0 	 1521
0.8 	 3.1 	 5.0 	 10.6 100.0 2089



































26.8 100.0 	 434
	0.8 	 3.1 	 4.4 	 10.1 100.0 3224
	
0.8 	 1.5 	 6.0	 15.4 100.0 	 857
	
1.0 	 2.3 	 4.5 	 14.2 100.0 	 792
	
0.8 	 2.9 	 3.9 	 10.3 100.0 	 1516
	
0.7 	 3.1 	 4.6 	 11.7 100.0 	 994
	
1.0 	 2.3 	 7.1 	 9.8 100.0 	 779
	
0.8 	 2.7 	 4.8	 11.3 100.0 4081
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Table 7.5. Costs of water and energy by source, per cent of total
costs 
Table 7.7. Energy carrier for light for various groups by poverty,




















































































































































































































72.4 	 1.3 	 25.6 	 0.5 100.0 	 3224














































Table 7.6. Costs of water, electric and other energy by various
pocverty groups, provinces, gender and age of head of
household, mean per cent of total costs
Water 	 Electricity
Poverty




























































8.8	 6.3 	 3224
Woman 	 7.7
	





































The large differences in cost scenarios and across
provinces show the large potentials for equity and
efficiency improvements. We should add that the price
has increased for public water supply to the single
house since 1995, but given the large differences this is
clearly still an arena with a potential win-win situation.
Local authorities might introduce user fees for public
provision of protected water, spend the income for
maintenance and extension. Rather than to fighting the
waterlords, these might be engaged in an open bidding
process to run the local business of collecting user fees
and maintaining the pipe network.
Table 7.8. Energy carrier for cooking for various groups by
poverty, province, gender and age of head. Per cent
Gas 	 Elec- Petrol 	Fire Char- Total Num -tric iy 	 wood 	 coal 	 ber
Poverty
Better off 	 83.5
Poor 	 80.3















Tota I 	 80.0
7.2.5. Energy
As shown in figure 7.1 and tables 7.7 and 7.8, the poverty
differences are larger when it comes to energy sources.
For light almost 4 of 5 better off households use electri-
city, while only almost 3 of 5 extreme poor do. For
cooking, slightly more than 4 of 5 better off use gas while
only slightly more than 3 of 5 extreme poor households
do. The extreme poor are to a large extent relying on
petrol for light and charcoal or firewood for cooking. But
this access to more convenient and probably more energy
do not result in higher costs for the better off. The electri-
city bill might be higher, but this is more than compen-
sated for by lower costs for other energy. Since 2 of 15
extreme poor use firewood for cooking, the other 13 of
15 obviously pay a substantial premium. The old lesson is
verified again, it is expensive to be poor. One reason for
66
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this is the Government subsidies on electricity, gas and
petrol. These subsidies are reduced since 1995, but not
removed. It is exceptionally hard to understand that
energy consumption rather than extended coverage of
electricity is subsidized. This study documents that what
might be assumed to be a poverty neutral policy is biased
against the extreme poor.
It should however be added that the moderate poor
also are doing well on energy. While not up to the
standard of the better off, even the moderate poor
have a quite convenient mix of energy and spend in
fact less that the better off on energy. Hence may be
the most correct statement is that it is expensive to be
extreme poor when the Government provide some
subsidies to the moderate poor (but not extreme poor)
and even more to the better off.
The bias against the extreme poor is not the only one.
It has its parallel in a provincial bias. In Luanda and
Benguela 3 of 4 households use electricity for lighting,
in Cabinda and Huila, 2 of 3 do, while people in
Moxico have to rely on petrol except for 1 of 20 who
have access to a generator for electric power. The
situation concerning energy for cooking is not very
different. In Luanda 6 of 7 households use gas, in
Cabinda and Benguela 3 of 4 and in Huila 3 of 5 do,
while in Moxico 2 of 3 stick to charcoal and 1 of 3 use
firewood. The differences across gender and age of
head are not that large, but older people somewhat
more frequently use electricity and firewood rather
than charcoal.
These biases are however balanced. While Moxico is
worst off in convenience, people there are at least
spending a lower budget share on energy. The same,
but to a lesser degree is the case for female headed
households and for younger households. They both
have a less convenient energy consumption pattern,
but at least a cheaper one. As we will return to, they
might however all have to pay in time spent on
collecting firewood.
Figure 7.2. Time spent per week collecting firewood & water,








Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Total
• Does not do this 	 ®< 1 hour 	 01 hour - < 2 hours 	 ❑ 2 hours - >
7.3. Profiles of time use
The measurement of time use is always a difficult task
and in this survey the focus is on time use related to
access to service, i.e. time for collection of firewood
and water, adding information on time spent for
shopping and household chores. It turned out to be
difficult to categorize those who did not spend any
time on a certain activity. For the collection of fire-
wood and water this could either be because the family
did not use firewood at all and had tapped water or
because the husband (or others) did not view this are
their obligation and hence the question was not
applicable for them. Still the time use data provides
very useful information both on indirect (time) costs
for energy and water and for gender obligations.
7.4. Profiles of time use in an access perspective
In an overall perspective the time burden in urban
areas is of a really different magnitude for collection of
firewood and water. As shown in figure 7.2 and table
7.9, it is only like 3, 4 and 6 per cent of better off,
moderate poor and extreme poor who are spending
more than one hour a week for collection of firewood.
It might of course still be a burden for those doing this,
but it is not a policy issue of overall concern.
However in Moxico, collection of firewood is a sub-
stantial burden. 1 of 6 persons or on average 1 person in
each 2 of 3 household spends at least 2 hours a week to
collect firewood and 2/3 of these spend more than 6
hours a week. As we remember the costs of electricity
and energy was low in Moxico, but they obviously have
to pay for it, directly or indirectly. Rather than paying
for electricity we saw that people in Moxico pay a sub-
stantial amount for petrol for lighting and here we see
that the non-spending on gas and the lower spending on
charcoal is paid indirectly by spending their own time.
There is a clear gender bias where women do like 3/5
of this work, but still on average this is not a large
burden neither for men nor for women. The age differ-
ences are small, but there is a trend towards more time
spent for the older ones.
The pattern of time spent for water supply is not that
different from time spent for collecting firewood (refer
to table 7.10), but the level of time spent turns this into
a serious policy issue. For once, the poverty bias is quite
low, although the extreme poor spend more time,
among all groups, i.e. better off, moderate poor and
extreme poor alike, around 1 of 4 persons or on average
one person per household spend at least one hour a
week to collect water. This might not be a real burden,
but when you look at the gender distribution you realize
that 1 of 5 women or an average of one women in every
second household spend at least 2 hours a week and al-
most half these spend at least 6 hours a week to collect
water. The somewhat glamorous picture of easy (but
costly) urban life for women with access to a nearby tap
































































































































































































Table 7.10. Time spent per week for collecting water for persons 7 years and above. Per cent








above 	 No time/ not
	
6 hours 	 applicable
Poverty Alleviation Policy 	 Reports 99/20
Table 7.9. Time spent per week for collecting firewood for persons 7 years and above. Per cent








above 	 No time/ not
	





















































































































































































































































7.5. Profiles of time use in a gender obligation
perspective
As documented in Perfil de Pobreza (GMCVP 1996),
the same share of men and women are economically
active. Still these chores are highly gender biased. We
have already documented that 3 of 5 people collecting
firewood and water are women. This is also the case
the case for shopping, 3 of 5 people doing shopping are
women (refer to table 7.11) . As you might expect
doing households chores are even more gender biased.
As shown by table 7.12, 2 of 3 persons doing
household chores are women.
7.6. Profiles of time use of adults in a gender
obligation perspective
Looking at adult women and men (refer to table 7.13),
the gender bias is even grimmer. In general adult
women do 2/3 of the work for the listed unpaid house-
hold work. Men tend to do some more shopping than
this, but this is "compensated" by doing even less
household chores. In fact only 1 of 3 men do any
household chores and only 1 of 2 men do some
shopping.
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Table 7.12. Time spent per week for doing household chores for persons 7 years and above. Per cent
< 30 min
	
30 min - above 1 hour - above 2 hours 	 - 	 above 	 No time/ not
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Table 7.11. Time spent per week for shopping for persons 7 years and above. Per cent
< 30 min 30 min - above 1 hour - above 2 hours -1 hour 	 2 hours 	 6 hours
	
above 	 No time/ not
	











































































































































































8.4 	 19.2 	 11.9 	 6.7 	 2.6 	 51.2
	

































































































































































7.0 	 16.2 	 10.7 	 6.2 	 3.8 	 56.1








































Some generations ago this might have been a matter of
division of work, but as these urban data tells us, now-
adays urban women are equally often breadwinners as
men and still they take the lion's share of household
chores and other unpaid households work.
It is important to stress that the gender issue is first
and foremost one of equity. When women have moved
in as breadwinners there are no ways other than men
moving in to do household chores.
The equity perspective is however not the only one.
Numerous research and surveys such as this and the
MICS report (INE 1997) document the impact of the
mother and wife's resources for family and social
welfare such as health and education. This inevitably
leads to the need for a policy to support education for
girls. But the other side of the coin is often forgotten,
the double need to reduce the workload of women,
both by improving infrastructure to reduce the overall
unpaid family work and the need to push men into
doing their share of this work.
7.7. The bearing of gender, time use conclusions
Water supply. The survey itself documents a not
uncommon situation where the extreme poor have the
lowest water quality, treat the water less frequent than
moderate poor and better off and end up being
substantially more exposed to diseases. But the survey
also documents that this circle has moved a further
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step especially but not only in Luanda and created a
system with private entrepreneur water lords running a
retail water business, putting a quite large financial
burden on the extreme poor. This has two vicious effects
on the moderate poor and extreme poor. First, high
price means a low water consumption among the
extreme poor and hence they become even more depen-
dent on the water quality and more affected by low
water quality and more exposed to diseases. Second, the
waterlords not only have no incentives to improve the
situation, they are even trying to stop public pipelines to
be extended to public taps in new squatter areas.
Energy. The energy situation is more standard. The
better off people are, to a larger degree they buy
subsidized energy carriers than the extreme poor.
Time use for household chores. It is well documented that
during crises, women move in as breadwinners. After a
short crisis they might then return to their homes, but
the crisis in Luanda is not a short term one. The situa-
tion has long ago settled as permanent. Women are
breadwinners on equal footing with men. But still we
see that they continue to bear the sole burden of house-
hold chores. Well that is not totally correct. Children are
definitely taking their share, the point is rather that men
have not really moved into household chores.
7.8. The bearing of gender, time use policy
conclusions
7.8.1. Water supply.
The nice side of the extraordinary situation in water
supply is that at a bottom of a wave there are no ways
but up. The current situation is a potential win-win
situation for the years to come. The challenge is to
design programs where donors will support the exten-
sion and rehabilitation of public water pipes and the
Government will tender the work to entrepreneurs
currently running water truck. Running and mainten-
ance of taps and wells should be tendered to the
previous water lords with bairo water committees
monitoring the situation and participate when the
tenders are up for renewal.
7.8.2. Energy.
There are no reasons what so ever for the Government
to subsidize energy supply. These have been and will
remain subsidies for the better off. A stable electric
power supply might be seen as a strategic need and
require a public company, but there is no real argu-
ment for the Government to cover any costs. For
provision and distribution of oil and gas products there
are hardly any argument for a public supplier which
can not be better handled with public control and
conditions set for private suppliers. Private suppliers
should of course include any parastatal company
competing on equal footing with private ones, such as
a potential retail subsidiary of Sonangol.
7.8.3. Time use for household chores.
While the survey information on time use is limited it
is obvious that women have moved into the bread
winner group while men have not started to do house-
holds chores to the same extent. The old fashioned
statement that division of labor in families is a private
matter should be confronted openly by two strategies:
Irregular but frequent public campaigns to tell the
population that men are not doing their share of the
total work burden and that it is due time for them to
start doing household chores
• Government support to provisions to reduce the
work load for women such as:
• a second review on the gender impact when
introducing new Government policies to avoid
the families (read: mothers and wives) having
to replace the food supply by staff for in-house
hospital patients;
• an improved water supply as discussed above,
reducing the time needed to walk long
distances; and arranging for extra child care
such as kindergartens etc.
Table 7.13. Time spent per week for collecting firewood, collecting water, shopping and doing household chores by men and women 20
years and above















1,0 	 1,5 	 0,7 	 1,1 	 0,5 	 95,2 	 100,0 	 5 331
	
1,9 	 3,4 	 2,3 	 1,9 	 1,5 	 89,0 	 100,0 	 5 710
	
12,2 	 12,6 	 4,6 	 3,2 	 2,4 	 65,1 	 100,0 	 5 339
	
16,6 	 21,4 	 11,2 	 11,9 	 10,9 	 28,1 	 100,0 	 5 716
	
8,9 	 19,2 	 10,7 	 7,2 	 3,1 	 50,8 	 100,0 	 5 339
	
7,8 	 26,0	 17,6 	 17,7 	 16,6 	 14,1 	 100,0 	 5 716
	
6,4 	 13,1 	 9,0 	 4,8 	 3,4 	 63,3 	 100,0 	 5 335
	5,8	 21,5 	 17,0 	 18,7 	2 3, 6 	13,5	 100,0 	5 717
	6 1	 17,4 	 13,2 	 12,0 	 13,9 	 37,4 	 100,0 	 11 052 
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8. Urban areas: Food security
Food security is a matter of sufficient food supply at
national, local, household and individual level. In this
study the focus is solely at the micro level. This is far
from undermining the need for a proper food supply at
higher levels. During periods of freedom fighting, war
and civil war, the people of Angola have just too many
times been made aware of the need for national and
local food supply.
On the other hand, it is only too easy to forget that
national food supply might be a necessary, but indeed
not a sufficient precondition to avoid starvation. Food
security is also a matter of having the resources needed
either to produce, to barter or to buy the food needed
for the survival and proper health of a household and
all individuals. Unfortunately the data does not allow
us to study the distribution of food within the house-
hold. We know from other studies (such as Wold 1987)
that the food usually is distributed in an unequal
manner within the household. While stable food items
might be equally distributed, consumption of high
protein food items as meat and fish are often going in
favor of first, the father, second, the mother and third,
the children. From a nutritional point of view the
priority order should be opposite. This biased distri-
bution makes the women and especially the children
even more exposed to food insecurity than the house-
hold information might indicate.
The so-called Engel's law is based upon the global fact
that when income increases, the share spent on food
consumption decreases. As shown in chapter 2 this is
also the case for urban Angola, but the food share
decreases only slightly from better off to poor to
extreme poor. There are two main reasons for this
situation 16 . First, the poor are forced by lower access to
infrastructure to spend quite an amount on more
expensive form of energy and private solutions for
water supply. Second, the better off are consuming
more expensive food items than the poor are. It should
16 It should be added that the measurement approach is likely to
have caused an underreporting of the durables being bought
throughout the last 12 months such as furniture, commodities of
which the better off are likely to consume considerably more than
the poor.
be added that while the food might be more expensive
this does not mean that the better off get more calories
for the Kwanzas.
Despite the higher food shares and the tendency to buy
cheaper food, the Luanda study from 1990 (Bender
and Hunt 1991a) showed that none of the extreme
poor and only one per cent of the poor got enough
calories, while almost half those above the poverty line
got enough calories 17 . Hence, while we still expect food
insecurity to be a problem for the poor and extreme
poor, even some of the better off might face food
insecurity and some of the poor might get enough
calories if the food is distributed within the household
in an equal manner.
The analytical approach is to calculate the overall
calorie consumption based upon registered food
consumption in value terms.
8.1. Calorie intake, regression analysis
The IPCVP survey (GMCVP 1996) includes the
consumption of all food commodity groups. By
applying average prices as measured in the Consumer
Price Index and calorie content of each food group, this
allows for the calculation of calorie content being
available for each household measured by adult
equivalent.
The adult equivalent unit is an adult man, who needs
2100 kcal just to stay fit and doing easy office work. In
order to manage easy manual work the same adult
man will need 2400 kcal. Hence we have calculated
whether the total consumption in value terms allow
each family to buy food enough to provide these
calorie requirements assuming an average food pattern
for those around or at the poverty line'.
17 The calorie requirements are said to be according to international
standards, but for some reasons these are not referred. It is difficult
to know which standard is being used, but the most likely ones are
either 2 100 or 2 400 kcal per adult equivalent.
18 As recommended by Ravallion (1994) we have used the average
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D Above 2400 kcal
® 2100 - 2400 kcal (medium activity level)
• Below 2100 kcal (low activity level)
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2400 kcal Total 	 Mean Median 	 Number
Figure 8.1. Calorie intake per adult equivalent in various pocverty
groups, provinces, gender and age of head of
household
Figure 8.1 and table 8.1 show that money metric
poverty certainly is closely related to the fulfillment of
a basic need as the necessary food energy or calorie
intake. While more than 9 of 10 better off households
consume enough food to provide enough calories for
each household member. Of course, if there is a biased
food consumption pattern in the family where the
father gets the better share, and the mother and the
children the second priority, this does not mean that all
household members get enough. But it means that all
household members might get enough by fair sharing.
The moderate poor are well spread; 2 of 5 families can
not even reach the bare minimum of 2100 kcal, 2 of 5
reach even above 2400 kcal while 1 of 5 is in the
middle. For the extreme poor, there is no doubt, no
way they can get the minimum calories even for a low
activity level. Hence it is not very hard to understand
how difficult it is to crawl out of extreme poverty.
There is common saying nowadays that the only asset
the poor have to sell, is their own labor. But that
requires breaking a vicious circle, not enough calories,
not enough capacity for manual work, hence no work,
no food and no calories.
across pro-in calorie requirements 	The differences ca p
vinces and by gender of head are small. Cabinda was
the poorest province and is again the province with the
highest number of a very low calorie intake. There is
however a clear development over the age groups,
where the share of low calorie households doubles
from the youngest ones to the oldest.
As for poverty we have conducted a regression analysis
and a classification analysis of which factors affect the
overall calorie intake. We have chosen even to include
an analysis on the composition of consumption by
running an analysis of what affects the share of food
consumption versus non-food consumption.
The regression analysis presented in tables 8.2 & 8.3. 10
shows remarkable resemblance with the one on pover-
ty, which is hardly that surprising since food consump-
tion is the large chunk of overall consumption. Also
calorie intake increases if the male and female heads
are working and most if the female head is working.
There are however three distinct differences, of which
two point in the same direction and one is not clear.
The effect of higher education for the male or the
female head was clearly positive on overall consump-
tion. The effect of higher education for the female head
is even larger on calorie intake and has changed to a
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Table 8.2. Total calories per adult equivalent* , weighted linear
regression**, reduced form, complete modell
Table 8.3. Total calories per adult equivalent* , weighted linear
regression**, reduced form, significant modell
Regressor
Stand-Esti-
 Esror ardized Sig.Beta
Regressor
	
Esti- 	 Std. Standa
	ma  B	 Error rdized Sig.Beta




Male head: education in years 	 0.00
	
0.00 -0.02 §§§










Female head: years in current job 	 0.00
	
0.00 -0.01 §§§
Age of head of household 	 0.00
	
0.00 -0.13 §§§
Dependency ratio: dependants /







Occupational status, male head
Self employed
Employed in public sector
Employed in private sector
Occupational status, female head
Self employed
Employed in public sector
Employed in private sector
Gender of head of household






* Logaritm of total calories per adult equivalent, ** Weighted least squares
regression
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level
weak negative one for the male head. And while
having a male head reduced poverty it even reduces
calorie-intake. These findings again supports that
women give a larger priority to food than men and that
higher education for her, increases her bargaining
power allowing her to increase the priority given to
food consumption (refer to Wold 1997) .
8.2. Food share of total consumption,
regression analysis
We have checked these results by running a regression
analysis on the share of the total consumption spent on
food. The results of this analysis presented in tables 8.4 &
8.5 10 confirms the bargain power caused by the education
of the female head. A female head gives preference to
food consumption while the male head does not. 19
8.3. Calorie intake, classification analysis
The classification analysis does not mirror the poverty
analysis to the same degree. The tendency for younger
households to give preference to food consumption
19 There is however quite some multi-collinearity between
experience in current job and type of occupation and hence these
parts are difficult to interpret.
Intercept 	 3.50 	 0.01 	 §§§
Continous variables
Male head: education in years 	 0.00 	 0.00 -0.02 §§§
Femal head: education in years 	 0.01 	 0.00 	 0.13 §55
Male head: years in current job 	 0.00 	 0.00 	 0.06 §§§
Female head: years in current job 	 0.00 	 0.00 -0.01 §§§
Age of head of household 	 0.00 	 0.00 -0.13 §§§
Dependency ratio: dependants /
breadwinners 15-60 	 -0.04 	 0.00 -0.09 §55
Classification variables
Province, default=Luanda, Moxico
Cabinda 	 -0.05 	 0.01 	 -0.03 §§§
Benguela 	 0.03 	 0.00 	 0.02 §§§
Huila 	 -0.03 	 0.00 -0.03 §55
Occupational status, male head
Self employed 	 0.12 	 0.00 	 0.17 §55
Employed in public sector 	 0.06 	 0.00 	 0.11 §§§
Employed in private sector 	 0.07 	 0.00 	 0.10 §§§
Occupational status, female head
Self employed 	 0.11 	 0.01 	 0.18 §§§
Employed in public sector 	 0.09 	 0.01 	 0.14 §§§
Employed in private sector 	 0.11 	 0.01 	 0.13 §§§
Gender of head of household 	 -0.06 	 0.01 	 -0.05 §§§
Lived at current residence,
def.=1992 or before 	 -0.05 	 0.00 -0.04 §§§
Significance for model 	 -0.05 	 0.00 -0.04 §§§
R-square 	 0.06
Adjusted R-square 	 0.06
Number of observations 	 4 109
* Logaritm of total calories per adult equivalent, ** Weighted least squares
regression Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level,
§§§ significant at 1% level
and calorie intake outweighs other factors. From the
poverty classification analysis we also remember that
dependency ratio made a split among the better
educated. Here it makes a split between the younger
ones, and again can we see that households with many
dependents per breadwinner are the losers. Otherwise
education will always help to achieve a higher food
intake. The effects of work and education are not easy
to disentangle, but there appear to be certain groups
who gain from working in the formal sectors while
other do not. In the case of calorie intake we see that
households where the female head works in the public
sector and the male head works in the private formal
sector both have an especially high share with a high
calorie intake.
8.4. Food share of total consumption, classi-
fication analysis
The food share of consumption reflects both the
priority given to food, and the level of living. Higher
human resources will tend to increase consumption
and then reduce the food share. Control by women
(requires high bargaining power) will tend to increase
the food share while control by men will tend to
decrease the food share.
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Table 8.4. Food expenditures as per cent of total expenditures,




 Error ardized Sig.Beta




Male head: education in years 	 0.00 	 0.00 -0.09 §55
Femal head: education in years 	 0.00 	 0.00
	
0.06 §55
Male head: years in current job 	 0.00 	 0.00
	
0.10 §55
Female head: years in current job 	 0.00 	 0.00 -0.14 §55
Age of head of household 	 0.00 	 0.00 -0.01
	
§
Dependency ratio: dependants /









Occupational status, male head
Self employed
Employed in public sector
Employed in private sector
Occupational status, female head
Self employed 	 -0.02 	 0.00 -0.04 §55
Employed in public sector 	 0.00 	 0.00 -0.01
Employed in private sector 	 0.02 	 0.00
	
0.04 §55
Gender of head of household 	 -0.04 	 0.00 -0.06 §55
Lived at current residence, def.=1992
or before 	 0.02 	 0.00
	
0.03 §55
Significance for model 	 0.00
R-square 	 0.08
Adjusted R-square 	 0.08
Number of observations 	 4 109
* Weighted least squares regression
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level
Since increased human resources have a double effect,
the net result is not clear. For men, higher human
resources will tend to increase consumption and hence
reduce the food share and at the same time increase
their bargaining power, which again will reduce the
food share, hence we would clearly expect a lower
food share. Also for women, increased human
resources tend both to increase overall consumption
and to increase their bargaining power, but since they
tend to give priority to food the net result is not clear.
And this is really the case, female education does not
stand out in this case. It is in fact rather the provincial
dimension that goes to the front.
Neither the net provincial effects are clear. You will
expect better off provinces to have a lower food share,
but the effects of the food price level and the non-food
price level are likely to be more important. In the end
Luanda and Cabinda have the lowest food shares as
shown both in table 8.3 and figure 8.2. The most likely
explanation is food versus non-food prices. Given their
positions as external trading ports you would expect a
large influx of imported non-food goods while food
items might be relatively more expensive as in any
Table 8.5. Food expenditures as per cent of total expenditures,
weighted linear regression*, reduced form, significant
modell
Stand-Esti-
 Error ardized Sig.Beta
Intercept 	 0.74 	 0.01 	 §55
Continous variables
Male head: education in years 	 0.00 	 0.00 -0.09 §55
Femal head: education in years 	 0.00 	 0.00 	 0.06 §55
Male head: years in current job 	 0.00 	 0.00 	 0.10 §55
Female head: years in current job 	 0.00 	 0.00 -0.14 §55
Classification variables
Province, default=Luanda
Moxico 	 0.13 	 0.00 	 0.11 §55
Cabinda 	 0.03 	 0.00 	 0.02 §55
Benguela 	 0.07 	 0.00 	 0.10 §55
Huila 	 0.08 	 0.00 	 0.12 §55
Occupational status, male head
Self employed 	 0.04 	 0.00 	 0.10 §55
Employed in public sector 	 0.02 	 0.00 	 0.06 §55
Occupational status, female head
Self employed 	 -0.01 	 0.00 -0.03 §55
Employed in private sector 	 0.02 	 0.00 	 0.04 §55
Gender of head of household 	 -0.04 	 0.00 -0.05 §55
Lived at current residence, def.=1992
or before 	 0.03 	 0.00 	 0.03 §55
Significance for model 	 0.00
R-square 	 0.08
Adjusted R-square 	 0.08
Number of observations 	 4 109
* Weighted least squares regression
Significance: § significant at 10% level, §§ significant at 5% level, §§§
significant at 1% level
other large city especially when the transport from the
hinterland is a bottleneck.
8.5. Policy conclusions
There are two policy conclusions to be drawn, both
already addressed in other chapters:
• food security in a gender perspective: to improve food
security women should be encouraged and assisted
both to increase their human resources as education
and work pratice; and
• cross-subsidizing food items: to mitigate the effects
of poverty, the Government should consider
utilizing the different consumption pattern to
redistribute money from the better off to the poor
by cross-subsidizing food items.
8.5.1. Food security in a gender perspective
In this chapter we have learned that one strategy to
improve food security is to strengthen the bargaining
power of women by improving their human resources
and monetary resources by a renewed emphasis on
education and employment/ self-employment. As
already addressed in the chapter on water, sanitation,
energy and time use, an additional emphasis on a more
equal sharing of the work burden between men and
women would also be needed, first and foremost to
press and pull men into doing households chores.
Hence three lines of follow up is required:
	0.0 	 0.11 §55
	
0.00 	 0.02 §55
	
0.00 	 0.10 §55
	
0.00 	 0.12 §55
	
0.04	 0.00 	 0.09 §55
	
0.02 	 0.00 	 0.06 §55
	





40 years and above
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Calorie intake per adult equivalent above 2400 kcal per day
54 %
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• ensure equal access and enrollment in school for
girls and boys;
• reduce existing barriers for women to enter public
and private formal sector work
• public campaigns for gender equality in sharing
household chores and public efforts to reduce the
work load, refer to chapter on water, sanitation,
energy and time use
8.5.2. Cross-subsidizing food items
Refer to the chapter on expenditures and subsidies.
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9. Summary of policy conclusions
The objective of this report is to raise policy issues
based upon factual statistical information stimulating
the discussion on policy issues and policy design
leading to a more efficient and equity oriented policy
solutions according to the priorities by the Government
and other authorities. Hence the aim of this report is
not to present final policy solutions but to stimulate the
process leading to them. It might present examples for
consideration, but these are nothing more than
examples. Final decisions on how to implement policy
changes require a broad and deep knowledge of how
to implement policy in Angola and this is a knowledge
outside the scope of this report and reanalysis of
statistical data.
A starting point was three special features of the
Angolan economy, special in a twofold sense, they are
setting Angola apart from the average African country,
and two are special in the sense that since the peace
agreement in 1992 they have both been deemed a
short life expected to disappear or be transformed:
• the civil war itself,
• the special mix of regulated and free market
economy and
• the natural resource situation, the oil and diamond
economies.
These dimensions have been and still are pulling in
different directions. The prospect of continued civil
war, costly in both human and economic terms,
effectively has discouraged both the Government and
donors alike to invest in infrastructure not only at the
countryside but even in the capital and other big cities.
The potentially and from end 1998 de facto increased
forced migration pushed by possible and de facto
fighting and pulled by the more secure (military
protection and emergency food) situation in the main
cities is also a reason behind the reluctance to invest in
urban areas.
The special mix of regulated and free market economy
is in reality providing a huge subsidy to insiders allo-
cated quotas of foreign exchange. During the period
from 1992 to mid 1997, the parallel market rate went
up to 3.5 times the primary official exchange rate and
1.6 times the secondary official exchange rate (Banco
Nacional de Angola 1997a & b) . Obviously this drains
potential resources from the treasury and leaves only
the trickle down for the poor.
Despite the civil war and the regulations of the
ordinary economy, the natural resources being oil for
the Government and diamonds for UNITA give large
surpluses. These surpluses allow for a range of invest-
ments and recurrent spending; from investing in
further explorations as running the military operations
to providing for the involved staff and their families
including social sector spending on health and even
education; all outside the ordinary control by the
national authorities.
During the labile years since 1992, the economic and
social policy has moved from a focus on emergency
relief and rehabilitation towards a development focus.
The new outbreak of civil war has again changed the
focus back to civil war and emergency relief. Obviously
the situation requires this change of focus, but there
are all reasons to fear that this change of focus also
will serve to hide the necessary policy considerations.
All the policy issues are at least equally important
during a period of civil war and some are definitely
even more important.
9.1. Poverty Policy advises
Poverty analyses have a long history in recent Angola,
from the series published by Ministerio do Plano and
UNICEF/ Angola for Luanda in 1991 (Bender and Hunt
1991 a,b,c, & d, Devereux & Hunt 1991, Aguilar
1992) ; the urban areas of five provinces in 1996
(GMCVP 1996); and rural areas of eight provinces in
1997 (Departamento de Estatistica e de Informåtica
1997) . INE has all the time formed the core and been
supported by a range of donors for data collection and
analysis as UNICEF, World Bank, FAO, and UNDP.
Already the first data collection, The Luanda House-
hold Budget and Nutrition Survey (Bender & Hunt
1991b), designed to provide information on poverty
was followed by a thorough set of proposals on poverty
related policy proposals. Unfortunately the poverty
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policy proposals did not really confront the critical
special dimensions listed above and with one impor-
tant exception, hardly any was implemented. The one
policy recommendation implemented was definitely a
pro-poor policy issue and rather than draining the
treasury it saved public money. The recommendation
implemented was to cut subsidies favoring the better
off such as electricity and telephone subsidies. One
might of course suspect these policy changes to have
been implemented as a fiscal means rather than a pro-
poor policy issue, but we would think that it was really
the mutual fiscal and pro-poor policy interest that
ensured this policy change. We should also add that
while the other policy issues have not been imple-
mented straight away, they have contributed to the
changes such as the improvement of school quality by
increasing lessons per day and reducing the number of
shifts in school.
Never the less, in this report we have given a heavy
emphasis to presenting up front whether a policy
proposal should be considered in short or long terms
and as a win-win proposal (requiring investments but
reducing spending in a mid term perspective) or as an
equity proposal really requiring public spending.
An overall recommendation is for the Government to
try to attract donor support (financial and technical)
for the initial win-win policies, while earmarking own
public funds to a balanced mix of efficiency and equity
policy changes.
9.2. Policy recommendations
The detailed policy recommendations are presented at
the end of each chapter and this one focus on
presenting an overview comprising four categories:
• Rural / urban,
• Subsidies in a poverty and food security
perspective,
• Get people to work, and
• Social sectors.
With the number and size of policy changes in Angola
there is also a stronger than usual need to monitor the
effect of current policies and policy changes a like. This
is addressed at the end of the chapter.
9.2.1. Rural / urban
As documented in the chapter on poverty in rural
areas, poverty head count is more than the double in
rural compared with urban areas when using the same
poverty line approach. Obviously lack of physical
security is not the only reason while people continue to
migrate to urban areas and especially to Luanda. The
probability of falling into poverty and being trapped
there, is larger in rural than urban areas.
It is outside the scope of this report to compare the
over all situation in rural versus urban areas, but one
issue became clear already when calculating the
poverty level, the low and fluctuating prices in rural
areas. This is a standard sign of a market which does
not work. It shows that people living in rural areas are
not able neither to sell to traders coming to their areas,
to sell at local centers nor to arrange for transport and
take the produce to the markets themselves. There is
no way to avoid this situation during civil war time.
But it should worry the Government, the donors and
others alike that this situation prevailed in 1995, well
into a peaceful period.
Both in order to reduce the large influx to urban areas
and to reduce poverty and encourage development in
rural areas a special poverty policy concern is needed.
In a stable situation it would be a win-win policy to
improve crop market efficiency and standard recom-
mendations to be considered would include as follows:
• for the Government to improve transport infrastruc-
ture especially feeder roads, but also main roads
and railways.
• for the Government to provide a framework to
encourage production for sale, marketing and
trading; spreading price information (on produce
and on transport services) by radio, to support
provision of credit packages to farmers by private
firms and NGOs, to support a stable marketing
environment by offering a (low) floor price 20 at
provincial level by a marketing agency (rather
contracted to private traders or NGOs than run by a
public agency), provision of credit packages to
farmers by private firms and NGOs providing credit
to traders, supporting construction of storage, and
providing extension service.
The current situation is different. These investments
and recurrent spending are more needed than ever, but
also more risky. They will turn out as win-win policies
if the market efficiency is improved and the migration
to urban areas reduced as expected, but obviously this
is high-risk policy. In this case it would be necessary to
justify the risk in terms of the need to move from
emergency relief to development policy where and
when possible. The implementation would require the
joint commitment and funding from the Government
and donors alike.
In insecure areas two elements should be considered:
• for the Government and donors to improve
infrastructure and provide the framework in the
surrounding secure areas, and
• for the Government and donors to support private
traders and NGOs who are trading in less secure
20 It is essential that the floor price is low. The aim is not to build a
large public marketing agency, but is limited to providing stable
prices. Hence the public price should aim at being slightly lower than
a private market price, assuming that the latter should be comprising
a commodity price with standard storage, transport and profit
premiums.
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areas, including buying crops, selling inputs,
equipment and even consumer goods, and
providing inputs and equipment on credit terms.
Support could be given as credit or by
commissioning traders to buy produce and
transport it to public depots.
9.2.2. Subsidies in a poverty and food
security perspective
In general there are two mechanisms for reaching the
poor, administrative schemes usually providing food
directly or by food coupons versus some kind of self-
targeting schemes. In emergency situations and others
where the target population is living in certain
locations, administrative schemes might be effective,
reaching the target population with low administrative
costs and low leakage.
However in most non-emergency cases, the target
population is not located in a certain geographical area
and any administrative schemes are costly in a double
sense. They require high administrative costs and give
a large leakage in both directions, both providing
support to non-eligible people and not providing
support to all eligible people. In general such schemes
have only been successful in a few Latin-American
countries21 where the communities already were well
organized at the local level.
Realizing the difficulty in reaching the poor by admini-
strative schemes, self-targeting subsidies deserves
serious consideration.
Self-targeting subsidies have a long tradition in all
continents and many countries and are implemented
both intentionally and by default. Self-targeting
schemes as designed and justified in three ways:
• Administratively. In a monopoly or cartel situation
prices might be fixed at a fair level at one point in
time. If not adjusted according to inflation, the
fixed price might soon become too low and in
reality turn into a self-targeting subsidy. The price
of public services such as telephone calls are often
fixed this way.
• Sector-wise. Price might be fixed at a deliberately
low level to encourage consumption and use of a
certain product or service. Housing schemes, higher
education, and essential food items are typical
examples.
• Target groups. If the idea is to assist special groups
such as the poor or families with small children,
subsidies will be given to products and services with
a higher consumption share among the target
group.
21 In these countries, such as Bolivia all families classified themselves
along certain dimensions and if they were found below a certain
level along many dimensions there were classified as eligible and
received food support, free schooling etc. Refer to Jorgensen, Grosh
and Schacter (1992).
Self-targeting subsidies for the moderate poor or
extreme poor as target groups are based upon the
concept of inferior goods as discussed in the chapter on
expenditures and subsidies.
In that chapter maize meallie meal is identified as the
one food item of which the extreme poor have a con-
siderably higher consumption share that the poor and
the better off. The consumption shares in the cities of 5
provinces were as follows:
• consumption share among extreme poor: 0.152
• consumption share among moderate poor: 0.083
• consumption share among better off: 	 0.061
However, there are all reasons to believe that the
maize meallie meal consumed is a mix of own
purchase and provisions by PAM, hence we are not
sure this really reflect the preferences in the
population. That is why we are recommending an
additional study to identify inferior goods, if possible
linked to the Expenditure and consumption study
planned for 1999/2000. The additional study should
identify the food pattern of the extreme poor, the
moderate poor and the better off in details being grain
and meallie meal of maize, cassava, millet, and
sorghum; and do so for each city where subsidies
might be introduced.
It should be stressed that in a political perspective it is
not straightforward to subsidize inferior goods, and the
reason is just this, they are considered inferior. It
should be added that inferiority has a geographical
dimension. Millet, yellow maize and white maize might
all be considered inferior in some areas and the
favorite in others. Hence the subsidy schemes should
definitely be implemented city by city. Since so many
consider themselves poor enough to deserve some
subsidies, they are also going to complain when an
inferior good is identified for subsidies. Obviously they
will face a dilemma, if they want subsidizes cheap
food, they have to buy what they consider inferior
goods. The extreme poor will do that to a very large
extent, while just a few better off will.
Cross-subsidies
If the fiscal situation does not allow for a pure subsidy
scheme, a cross-subsidy scheme is an alternative. In
this case you will subsidy an inferior good and tax a
luxury good. The survey identified three clear luxury
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It is very difficult to tax a commodity like meat, but
sugar and alcoholic drinks and soft drinks are all easy
to control and prime candidates for taxation. Since the
gap in consumption shares is larger for drinks, the
main recommendation is to tax softdrinks and
alcoholic drinks.
It is important to stress that such as tax should never
become a fiscal tax, the sole purpose should be to
transfer some monetary resources from the better off to
the extreme poor.
The size of a subsidy
To avoid artificial changes of food consumption and
large leakage it is important to keep subsidies and
taxes within certain limits such as a maximum price
reduction of 33 per cent and a maximum tax of 50 per
cent. Both should be introduced in steps, say in 3 steps,
one every 3-6 months.
Urban areas only
Since a subsidy scheme requires a certain infra-
structure, it should only be implemented in urban
areas. The parallel scheme in rural areas will be the
proposed scheme to buy crops at a minimum price at
certain depots located in secure areas, starting with the
provincial capital and to be extended to district centers
as the financial situation allows and experience is
gained. This also means that we have no recommen-
dations for rural areas for how to reach non-farmers
and farmers with no surplus for sale. Obviously they
need both emergency relief and other support, but the
surveys and other accessible sources do not provide
information for doing so.
9.2.3. Get people to work, now and in the
future, paid work and at home
The core issue in any poverty alleviation strategy is to
assist poor people getting access to work which give
them a pay that keep them and their families above the
poverty line. We have addressed this issue for the
urban areas in two chapters covering informal sector
work water, sanitation, energy and time use and for
the rural areas in one chapter covering analysis of
poverty. The policy findings are summarized below.
Urban areas
In urban areas, the survey information shows that the
main problem is not lack of work as such, a large share
of the population find work or manage to start some
small or medium scale business or income generating
activity for themselves. The pay is not high, but for
families where at least both husband and wife find
work the average family might remain poor but will be
able to provide enough calories for the family.
But still there are large problems, as follows:
• The informal market has an artificial structure with
very large shares of people working in retail and
petty trading. There are relatively few working in
production of goods and other services and those
who do earn less than people engaged in trading.
• Many women have a large double workload.
• While on average people doing trading are doing
OK, there are still quite large pockets with very low
return for work.
To address these problems, the following win-win
recommendations are proposed:
• Prepare people for the changes by providing
training, with a focus on apprenticeship, but also
vocational training.
• Change the policy regime in a step-wise manner.
The latter means to plan for a well scheduled
change over such as a five year period including the
following steps listed in order of importance:
• replacing import quotas with import tariffs,
• reducing but not removing import tariffs over
time,
• establishing a system of monitoring prices with
active dissemination of market and price infor-
mation, and
• moving to a convertible currency.
• Reduce existing barriers for women to enter public
and private formal sector work.
• Public campaigns for gender equality in sharing
household chores and public efforts to reduce the
workload of household chores such as for water
supply, refer to the chapter on water, sanitation,
energy and time use.
Rural areas
As already stated, it is outside the scope of this study to
undertake a comprehensive analysis of the situation in
rural areas. Obviously the continued support by the
Government, donors and NGOs such as through the
PAM program is essential in an emergency situation.
Our approach is more modest: how to maintain and
rebuild some of the links between rural and urban
areas and one issue that stands out is the need to
reestablish the possibility for crop farmers to sell their
produce. Hence we have concluded the chapter on
Analysis of poverty in rural areas with the need for a
new emphasis on buying food from the hinterland,
refer to the Rural / urban paragraph in this chapter.
This approach do not require an end to civil war and
unrest and will serve as both a short and long term
incentive for rural people to remain in their villages.
Such a program should comprise the following main
element:
• the main element will be to build a strategic food
reserve by a program to buy staple food that store
well (e.g. maize and millet) to be operational both
in large surplus years and normal years.
Such a program should be coordinated by the
Government with assistance from main donors both
emergency relief donors as the WFP and the UNHCR
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and the longer term development donors such us
UNDP and UNICEF. The operations as such would gain
from being decentralized to public authorities and a
series of donors.
The great advantage of a strategic food reserve
program is the two-sided effect:
• marketing opportunities are serving as an incentive
to the rural population, an incentive that might
even improve the transition to a peaceful situation
in the future, and
• a strategic food reserve means that the Government
and donors are better prepared when a new emer-
gency develops.
9.2.4. Social sectors
Policy recommendations within the social sectors are
usually implemented sector-wise but the effects should
be considered simultaneously. The overall situation is
that the poor families to a large degree still manage to
send their children to school, but are hardly able to pay
for health consultation and rely on self-diagnosis and
buying the necessary drugs. Water supply is clearly a
public disaster and is to a very large extent handled by
waterlords who are well paid for their service. In fact
the water supply is so lucrative that there are
anecdotal stories about the waterlords using any
means to make sure new squatter areas are not
supplied with public water taps. Whether true or not,
the water market is overdue for changes.
In this situation, the water supply is a prime candidate
for a win-win solution making sure to involve the
current waterlords but only as well controlled local
operators. The education sector is also a candidate for
a win-win policy change but here improved efficiency
is more openly linked to the equity objective of prov-
iding education opportunities for all. The education
policy should start with improving the school and
education quality based upon a combination on donor
support and locally controlled school/PTA funds.
Second, the policy should reduce repetition. Third, the
policy should reduce number of children in each class.
Fourth, the policy should either improve the quality,
reduce the payment through locally controlled
school/PTA funds, or providing scholarships to the
extreme poor children with scholastic achievements
(limited to such as 5 per cent in a given class) .
The health sector is worse off. We know from other
developing countries22 that the poor are willing to pay
for health service if it is relatively cheap and gives
value for money, but poor and especially the extreme
poor in urban areas in Angola can hardly afford to pay
for any consultation. There is hardly any win-win
policy that will also give access to all. Unless the
Government is willing and able to increase resources
22 Refer to Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) discussing the situation
in Cote d'Ivoire and Peru.
considerably, it is rather recommended to face the
situation and open up for a combined privatized/
public scheme. Health personnel should be allowed to
work in both sectors rather than continue with
charging gasosas or by leaving the public service all
together. Health personnel will then provide free
preventive health service and basic curative health
service at daytime and run a private health service
business in the evenings and weekends.
The detailed policy recommendations from the
chapters are also presented here, the difference being
that we here stress the rationale behind each recom-
mendation.
Education
There are two clear and distinct findings. First the very
large repetition rate creating an extreme extra burden
on the primary school sector. Second that the main
factor effecting school attendance is poverty level.
The policy challenge is to handle both effects simul-
taneously. If the challenge is successfully met, the
reward might be large. If repetition is reduced, two
impacts are achieved, first less resources are needed or
more resources are available; second if repetition is
reduced, the share of poor children not leaving school
before an examination or at least not before functional
literacy is obtained might really be increased. The task
is to break the vicious resource circle.
This would require a multifold strategy, such as the
following one:
• A win-win recommendation: Donor assistance is
requested to provide additional resources for a
limited period of ten years to improve quality and
hence reduce repetition;
• An efficiency recommendation: A school fee
program with local control and local spending is
introduced to ensure a proper teacher/ student
ratio and some material;
• An equity recommendation: In order to give all
children a chance to attend school and to motivate
school start when planned, each student would be
exempted from school fee for a limited period of 3-5
years linked to the age of the child, i.e. no school fee
for 6-8 years old children and no school fee for 9-10
years old children with none or only one repetition.
• An equity/ efficiency recommendation: For children
above 10 years of age, a fellowship program for
school fees covering extreme poor children should be
introduced. Only non-repetitors would be eligible for
this program, and it will be limited to a maximum of
5 per cent of the students in a given class or school.
• An equity/ efficiency recommendation: When donor
support is phased out, the school fees should fully
cover the extra costs of repetition and pay for the
fellowship program of the extreme poor.
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Health service
The health service problem comprises three elements:
• an overall lack of access especially in Moxico,
• no ability to pay for health service and drugs among
the extreme poor, and
• a system of gasosas which hardly increase the
overall health service which is available, but only
reshuffles the line and then makes it even harder
for the extreme poor to get a consultation and
treatment.
The solution requires large efforts both to improve
access to health service and to assure the extreme poor
access even if they can not afford to pay. At the same
time, neither donors nor the Government are able to
provide the necessary resources.
Recommendation: Accepting that there is no way
around an expanded two tier system, it is
recommended to accept this and try to develop both
the public and the private health service.
The main obstacle to develop a functioning two-tier
system is the massive use of gasosas. Rather than
trying to control or even combat this system, it is
recommended that the Government establish a legal
way to develop a two-tier system within the public
health service.
One solution to consider is to allow all public health
service staff to run private business as well. They
should be given access to use public premises for
private business but only at certain earmarked time
periods after the end of the standard working day.
They might be asked to pay a small fee to ensure the
maintenance but not the full costs because otherwise
they might just as well go private. For resident treat-
ment they should also be allowed to rent hospital beds,
but for this arrangement they will have to pay the full
costs since there is no reason to stop them from going
private for this type of health service.
In order to reduce the need for control the Government
should consider to negotiate a deal with one or more
medical doctor associations and one or more nurse and
mid-wife associations. The deal should state conditions
and a system for fines to be paid by the association if
the doctors and nurses do not follow the rules. If going
for such a deal, it is of course essential to make
membership in an association a precondition for the
arrangement.
Water supply
The nice side of the extraordinary situation in water
supply is that at a bottom of a wave there is no way,
but up. The current situation is a potential win-win
situation for the years to come. The challenge is to
design programs where donors will support the
extension and rehabilitation of public water pipes and
the Government will tender the work to water supply
entrepreneurs inviting entrepreneurs currently running
water trucks and others to present bids. Running and
maintenance of taps and wells should also be tendered
to local entrepreneurs. Previous waterlords and others
should be invited to present bids. Community or bairo
water committees should monitor the situation, partici-
pate when the tenders are up for renewal and be given
the right to put in a veto if they are not satisfied with a
bidder.
Energy
There are no reasons what so ever for the Government
to subsidize energy supply. These have been and will
remain subsidies for the better off. A stable electric
power supply might be seen as a strategic need and
require a public company, but there are no real
arguments for the Government to cover any costs. For
provision and distribution of oil and gas products there
are hardly any argument for a public supplier which
can not be better handled with public control and
conditions set for private suppliers. Private suppliers
should of course include any parastatal company
competing on equal footing with private ones, such as
a potential retail subsidiary of Sonangol.
Time use for household chores - the bearing of gender
While the survey information on time use is limited, it
is obvious that women have moved into the bread
winner group while men have hardly started to do
households chores at all. The old fashioned statement
that division of labor in families is a private matter
should be confronted openly by two strategies:
• Public campaigns to tell the population that men
are not doing their share of the total work burden
and that it is due time for them to start doing
household chores.
• Government support to provisions reducing the
work load for women such as:
• a second review on the gender impact
when introducing new Government
policies, such as to avoid that families
(read: mothers and wives) have to
replace public service, e.g. families to
feed their own family member who are
admitted as in-house hospital patients;
• an improved water supply as discussed
above, reducing the time needed to
walk long distances to fetch water; and
• arranging for extra child care such as
kindergartens etc.
9.3. Policy monitoring
As addressed in the introduction to this chapter, this is
not the first report to address the need for policy
reforms and a common experience has been the lack of
implementation of policy reforms. One reason might
have been the tendency to suggest costly reforms
without a proper consideration of the income side or
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budget deficit issue. However, whatever the reason
might be, this highlights the need to monitor the
impact of policy reforms. Already the Luanda House-
hold Budget and Monitoring Survey addressed this
need and proposed a monitoring system (Bender and
Hunt 1991e).
This report would like to highlight the need to focus on
the process rather than on certain indicators. A monito-
ing system needs to meet three requirements:
• The users should participate in the process of
identifying the issues to monitor and the develop-
ment of indicators for monitoring.
• Valid and reliable indicators for monitoring should
be developed by a process led by professional data
producers as the national institute of statistics i.e.
Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, cooperating with
the data users, data providers and other stake-
holders.
• When a monitoring system is agreed upon, the
data producers should be in charge of data collec-
tion, compilation, analysis and dissemination to
ensure non-biased high quality data.
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Appendix A
Appendix on poverty lines
Poverty line traditions
As discussed in Perfil da Pobreza am Angola there are
two main traditions in fixing a poverty line, an
absolute and a relative approach.
An absolute poverty lines will always find its reference
outside the poverty measure itself. Absolute poverty
lines are a century old tradition referring to the
economic means needed to avoid relative deprivation.
Amartha Sen (1987) developed a more comprehensive
rationale of this tradition, introducing the entitlement
concept. The poverty line will then outline the econo-
mic means needed to participate in daily social life.
The comprehensive versions are based on detailed lists
of activities constituting the minimum content of social
life in a given community at a given time, defining the
necessary goods and services needed for this life. You
will find such as approach implemented in various
countries such as Botswana, Norway, Sweden, and UK.
Two "children" of the absolute poverty line deserve a
special interest. A simplified absolute poverty line
approach based upon FAO recommendation for calorie
requirements and the consumption pattern documen-
ted by a household budget survey is being promoted by
the World Bank (Ravallion 1994) . A policy poverty
line, the food basket or extended food basket approach
is both developed along the absolute poverty line
tradition in again in a range of countries such as USA,
UK and Angola. While these lines are based upon a list
of food items and other commodities included, they
will in general miss the connection to a base such as
entitlements or calorie requirements. The food basket
lines are either initially or over time developed during
political compromises and hardly allow for a scientific
discussion. They are developed and changed on the
political arena.
Both the simplified and the comprehensive relative
poverty lines have two main advantages, a policy
advantage and a technical advantage. The policy
advantage is the intuitive interpretation of a line which
outline item by item what is needed to avoid poverty,
and the costs accordingly. The technical advantage is
that you may construct absolute poverty lines over
time, across continents, countries and even provinces
or rural / urban split and still, assuming that you have
applied the same approach, be able to undertake over
time and cross section comparisons.
There are two traditions for relative poverty lines, an
applied and a theoretical. The applied tradition use the
distribution of income or total consumption as a refer-
ence and calculate a poverty line referring to a certain
fraction of the mean or a certain percentile. The most
common ones are half the mean or the 30th percentile;
empirically these usually turn out quite equal. A more
theoretical approach is to define poverty as the level
where food consumption reaches a given fraction of
the total consumption. The main advantage with the
latter is the ability to allow for comparisons across
different household types. The problem with different
household types is however usually approached by
applying adult equivalents. Over time and cross section
comparisons are handled by price indices or price level
indices respectively.
Comparing poverty levels between rural and
urban areas
There are three common approaches to compare pover-
ty levels across rural and urban areas: an absolute
approach, a relative approach and the third being to
undertake a nationwide survey and choosing to hide
the problem by developing a national poverty line.
They all have certain advantages and drawbacks.
The absolute approach will require to develop two
poverty lines based upon common assumptions, such
as the simplified FAO/World Bank approach where you
assume the same set of calories, apply the average
rural or urban food pattern and food prices and an
average non-food consumption, but no non-food
prices. Food pattern data and information on the ratio
of food to non-food consumption are available from
the Pobreza and Agregados Rurais surveys (GMCVP
1996, Departmento de Estatistica e de Informatica
1997) . This information replaces a consumption
commodity basket required for an index approach.
Food price data are available from Agregados Rurais
survey and from the Consumer Price Index work of
INE. You may then apply these two new poverty lines
in order adjust the poverty line from the Perfil da
Pobreza em Angola for rural areas.
The relative approach requires the development of an
appropriate price level index and price information on
food and non-food items for both rural and rural areas.
Some of this information is available, but for non-food
consumption in rural areas it is quite sketchy and not
likely to be very reliable. It might still serve the pur-
pose.
The third approach is by default the most common
one, conducting the same survey in both rural and
urban areas and not adjusting for differences in
consumption patterns or prices. This approach will by
default use the average pattern across both rural and
urban areas. The value of locally produced food in
rural areas and the value of domestically manufactured
or imported goods in urban areas are all underesti-
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mated. In the end these distortions might balance.
Obviously both the weight of each item and the price
gap will determine the final outcome. Let us assume
the following "rural bias" scenario. Half the population
is living in urban areas, 2/3 of goods are produced in
rural areas, items "exported" from urban areas double
in price, items "exported" from rural areas 3-double in
price, and people in rural areas may spend only half
the amount of urban people on non-food. Hence
people in rural area might be equally well off as people
in urban areas with half the cost i.e. with a rural
poverty line being half of the urban poverty line. If you
rather assume a "no bias" scenario where only 1/2 of
goods are produced in rural areas, items "exported" in
any direction all double in price and people in both
rural and urban areas spend the same proportion for
non-food items, then people in rural and urban areas
are equally well off with the same costs i.e. they get
the same poverty line. Both these scenarios are possible
and while you might argue that the former is more
likely or even that the bias might be still larger, one
will need empirical information to decide.
A special version of the third approach is by default
quite common. By not addressing the issue, the "no
bias" scenario is chosen by default. Since the de facto
situation is likely to end up somewhere between the
"no bias" and the "rural bias" scenarios, a common
poverty line will give a rural bias in the sense that the
number of poor are overestimated. Another special
version is worthwhile mentioning. By adjusting for
changes in food prices and not for non-food items you
create an urban bias. Such an approach gives a very
conservative estimate in rural areas. By this approach
you will know that you underestimate the poverty in
rural areas but you will not know how much. If you
expect the rural poverty to be higher than the urban
poverty you might choose this approach rather than
the "no bias" approach to be sure that you identify the
very minimum of higher poverty head count in rural
areas.
Current applications
In order to compare information from the urban Perfil
da Pobreza and Inquerito aos Agregados Rurais all
these three approaches might be considered, as
follows:
• First, simplified absolute poverty lines might be
calculated for both rural and urban areas based
upon FAO calorie-requirements, food consumption
pattern from the surveys, food/non-food ratios from
the surveys and food prices from the Inquerito aos
Agregados Rurais and the Consumer Price Index
work. Finally the two absolute poverty lines might
be used at face value. An alternative will be to use
the ratio between the lines to calculate a rural
version of the Perfil da Pobreza poverty line. This is
a job in itself but technically possible. This option
can be recommended.
• Second, a relative approach requires an urban -
rural price level index. The Perfil da Pobreza and
the Inquerito aos Agregados Rurais will give
weights for the consumption groups; and the
Inquerito aos Agregados Rurais and the Consumer
Price Index might give food prices, but non-food
prices are hardly available for distinct items in rural
areas. One option is however to assume common
non-food prices and hence develop a conservative
poverty line for rural areas showing the very
minimum of poor people in rural areas. This option
can be recommended.
• Third, one might use a provincial study from
Kwanza Sul covering both rural and urban areas in
1994/95 to approach the urban/rural differences.
Again we face the "which-bias" issue. By assuming
common prices we will overestimate the poverty in
rural areas, but we do not know how much. An-
other issue is whether Kwanza Sul is representative
for other provinces. While there are no reasons not
to believe it being representative for provinces
along the coast or may be even for all provinces
with a well-established transport infrastructure, it
will hardly be representative for up-country pro-
vinces with poor infrastructure and/or security.
This option can not be recommended.
Conclusion
In this case there appear to be available data allowing
for both the two former approaches. Hence the choice
is a matter of theoretical pro et contras. From an
entitlement perspective we choose the absolute poverty
line approach because this one use the de facto split
between food and non-food, hence allowing for
different contexts such as the need to buy water and
charcoal etc. in Luanda but not in rural areas.
A simplified absolute poverty line in urban
areas
INE has already done unpublished work on a simplified
absolute poverty line for urban areas. This presentation
is based upon their work. The simplified absolute
poverty line is developed as listed below and the
calculations presented in table Al. It should be noted
that the prices are not adjusted for the period of
collection, being the first quarter of 1995. The price
index for Luanda increased with respectively 39 and 32
per cent per month during that quarter. Hence, too
many people interviewed in January were categorized
poor and too few people interviewed in March were
categorized poor. The average will hardly change if
prices are adjusted, but the effects of being poor are
underestimated.
• The starting points are two, the average food
consumption pattern measured in KwR as
registered in the IPCVP survey and the FAO
recommendation for calorie requirements for an






























Poverty Alleviation Policy 	 Reports 99/20
• Based upon the calorie content of each food item,
the average price per kg as measured in the
Consumer Price Index work, it is possible to
calculate the average calorie consumption in the
urban areas included in the IPCVD survey.
• It turns out that the facto calorie content in the food
items bought is higher than the minimum
requirements.
• Retaining the relative weights of each food item, it
is possible to calculate the costs of a food basket
needed to provide 2100 kcal based upon the same
prices and calorie content.
• By adding non-food consumption you are able to
present the simplified absolute poverty line for
urban areas. We have used the food/non-food
consumption ratio in the decile around the poverty
line, which turns out to be the fourth or the 30-40
per cent decile.
• The final simplified absolute poverty line for urban
areas in the middle of the field period i.e. February
1995 as outlined in table Al is NKw 51 693 672
comprising a food element of NKw 39 282 020 and
a non-food element of NKw 12 411 651.
Table Al. Absolute poverty line for urban areas based upon 2100 kcal per adult equivalent and consumption pattern as in "Perfil da















































Milk, cheese, egg 	 0.046
Drinks 	 0.043
Beans and lentils 	 0.073




Urban extreme absolute poverty line
Food share in the poverty line decile: 30-40%














































































Table A2. Absolute poverty line for rural areas based upon 2100 kcal per adult equivalent and consumption pattern as in "Inquerito nos
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Milk, cheese, egg 	 0.002
Drinks 	 0.045
Beans and lentils 	 0.066





Rural extreme absolute poverty line
Food share in the poverty line decile: 70-80%


















200 000 1.005 	 350 	 117.2
	
78 000 7.163 	 360 	 859.5
	
98 000 0.205 	 360 	 24.6
	
750 000 0.090 	 270 	 8.1
	
200 000 0.640 	 370 	 79.0
	
194 000 1.720 	 115 	 65.9
	
324 000 0.149 	 234 	 11.6
	
100 000 0.211 	 49.6 	 3.5
	
500 000 0.513 	 900 	 154.0
	
250 000 0.417 	 375 	 52.1
	
494 000 0.010 	 490 	 1.6
	
525 000 0.180 	 29 	 1.7
	
150 000 0.909 	 340 	 103.0
	
















1.424 	 284 727
	
10.150 	 791 698
	
0.290 	 28 412
	
0.127 	 95 260
	
0.907 	 181 471
	
2.438 	 472 928
	
0.212 	 68 533
	
0.299 	 29 939
	
0.728 	 363 760
	
0.591 	 147 790
	
0.014 	 6 990
	
0.255 	 133 980
	
1.288 	 193 181
	




1 481.9 2 100.0
76.2
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A simplified absolute poverty line in rural
areas
As already mentioned, Ministry of Agriculture conduc-
ted in 1996 a survey in the rural areas of 10 provinces,
the Inquerito aos Agregados Rurais (JAR) . This survey
includes modules on the value of consumption and
allows for a construction of a simplified poverty line in
rural areas. Some adjustments and recalculations are
however required in order to calculate a simplified
poverty line for rural areas. The principle is pretty
straightforward. The IAR survey includes an expendi-
ture and consumption module and this gives both the
food expenditure pattern and when we add consump-
tion of own produce or autoconsumption we get the
food consumption pattern as well. To convert expen-
ditures to consumption and vice versa we need price
information, this will usually be collected as market
prices, but information on the typical prices paid by the
surveyed family will also do. With information on the
calorie content of each food item we can calculate the
intake of calories for each adult equivalent. When we
have calculated the actual calorie intake, the final step
will be to calculate backwards. If a family should be
able to produce and buy exactly the food needed to
provide e.g. 2100 kcal per adult equivalent, what are
the costs ? These costs form the extreme poverty line
and are the food part of the standard poverty line.
Unfortunately the data revision of the IAR data are not
documented. We started from the raw data and
realized that the data revision has gone further than
what is common. Following the standard procedures,
outlayers have been replaced by a certain undocumen-
ted procedure, but in addition a lot of data imputation
has taken place with procedures to smooth data
variance while retaining national averages. We have
rather applied a more standard procedure by just
replacing outlayers following strict procedures. We
have chosen a very conservative approach and only
replaced values above 100 times the average non-zero
value with a value 1/10 of the previous value assuming
that these observation have been recorded and/or key
punched with an extra zero. We have applied this
procedure on each food commodity group, each
consumption group, overall autoconsumption, food
(excl. autoconsumption), overall food, overall non-
food and grand total expenditures. By applying such a
conservative procedure we are deemed to revise too
few observations. Since prices are based upon median
and not average prices, this does not cause any bias
when calculating the poverty lines. It is not likely to
cause any bias in calculating the number of poor
households either, but if there is a bias, it will be an
underestimation of poverty head count, poverty gap
and poverty severity and not an overestimation.
In further details, the calculations are as follows:
• First, we calculate the overall expenditures split
between food and non-food.
• Second, we calculate the autoconsumption as total
production minus marketed production and we
assume that 0,1 per cent of maize and other
relevant crops are retained for seeds.
• Third, we identify the median price paid for each
food group and apply those prices to calculate the
value of the autoconsumption.
• Fourth, we calculate consumption (expenditures
and autoconsumption) for each food commodity
group, overall food and overall non-food
consumption in value terms and per cent.
• Fifth, we calculate the adult equivalents in each
household by applying the following weights:
• men 20 and above - 1.00
• women 20 and above - 0.73
• boys 16-19 - 1.02
• girls 16-19 - 0,77
• boys 13-15 - 0.96
• girls 13-15 - 0,83
• boys 10-12 - 0.86
• girls 10-12 - 0.78
• children 7-9 - 0.73
• children 4-6 - 0.61
• children 1-3 - 0.45
• children below 1 - 0.27
• Sixth we calculate consumption per adult
equivalent (expenditures and autoconsumption) for
each food commodity group, overall food and
overall non-food consumption in value terms and
per cent.
• Seventh, we calculate the average consumption in
volume terms - kg of each food commodity group
applying the median price.
• Eighth, we calculate the average calorie
consumption per adult equivalent applying the FAO
calorie content list.
• Ninth, we adjust the de facto calorie consumption
per adult equivalent to the standard 2100 kcal per
adult equivalent and calculate backwards, the
expenses needed to ensure that calorie intake.
These expenses represents the extreme absolute
poverty line, being an amount of KwR 2 918 134 in
October 1996.
• Tenth, we identify the decile (the ten per cent
group) with the same food expenditure and the
average food and non-food share in this group.
• Eleventh, we apply the same food/non-food
expenditure ratio as in this group and calculate the
non-food share of the absolute poverty line and
then the overall absolute poverty line, being KwR
3 828 567 in October 1996.
• The absolute poverty line and the extreme absolute
poverty line are used to estimate poverty head
count, poverty gap and poverty severity in rural
areas.
The calculations are presented in table A2.
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Comparing the Rural and Urban Absolute
Poverty Lines
As presented in table A2, the Urban Absolute Poverty
Line in February 1995 was NKw 51 693 671. Adjusting
for the price increase as measured by the Luanda CPI,
this amount it equal to October 1996 KwR 18 034 000.
The Rural Absolute Poverty line calculated while
applying the same approach is only just above 1/5.
There are three potential reasons why the actual rural
line is just a fraction of the urban:
• People in rural areas might have a cheaper
consumption pattern i.e. providing a larger share of
calories from cheap food;
• Prices in rural areas might be lower, either because
the rural population consume locally produced food
stuff or just that since "imported" produce have to
compete with local produce, traders have only two
strategies either to fix a low price in order to
compete and go for a luxury good profile obtaining
higher price but also low volumes.
• Prices in rural areas might have increases less than
in urban areas. Without any information on trading
patterns, we have no information that would allow
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Appendix B
Variables for classification analysis
Table 131. Variables for classification analysis presented in tree diagrams
Dependent variables
Per cent above poverty line = better off
Working in informal sector: commerce
Working in informal sector: manufacturing,
construction and utilities
Working in informal sector: employed non-professionals
Working in informal sector: professionals
Salary above median for the economic active population
(in the labor force)
Poverty incidence, per cent below absolute poverty line:
poor and extreme poor
Poverty incidence, per cent below extreme absolute
poverty line: extreme poor
School attendance of children in extended school age,
6 to 16 years
When sick during last 2 weeks: Going for any health
consultation others than own treatment
When sick during last 2 weeks: Going for paid treatment
and/or health consultation
When sick during last 2 weeks: Going for paid health
consultation
Calorie intake per adult equivalent above 2400 kcal per
day




Province (rural areas) - chapter 4 only
Agegroup of head of household
Agegroup of male head of household
Agegroup of female head of household
Gender of head of household
Gender of individual
Age of school-child
No of children at school age (6-16) in household
Household resource variables
Poverty group (Better off, moderate poor, extreme poor),
Education of husband (male head)/ father




























Age in 10 years from 15 and above
Age in 10 years from 15 and above









High education/ grade 9 +
Medium education/ grade 5-8
Low education/ grade 1-4
No education
No male head in household
As for male head
Salary above median
School attendance of










Age of male head
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Dependent variables
Education of individual Education As for male head
Male head: read and
Literacy in rural areas, male head write a simple frase Yes Y
No N
No male head Missing
Literacy in rural areas, female head As for male head






Not economic active Non-act
Economic active female head: Occupation Occ. female head As for male head
Economic active male head in rural areas: Occupation Occupation male head Crop farming
Not crop farming
Primary sector Primary s
Not primary sector Not prim. s
Economic active female head in rural areas: Occupation Occupation female head As for male head
Work exp./ Period in
Work experience in current job, male head current job, male head Long/ 5 years or more Long/ >5y
Medium Med





Work experience in current job, female head Work exp. female head As for male head
Salary of male head of household Father's salary High (above median) High
Low (below median) Low
None
Salary of female head of household Mother's salary As for male head
More dependents household
members 0-14 and above 60 years Dependents >
Dependency ratio Dep ratio than productive ones 15 - 60 years Breadwinners, D>B
Network (indicator: lived here since election in 1994) Network Yes Y
No N
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